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ABSTRACT 
Thesis Title: 
Military Courts in a Democratic South Africa: In search of their Judicial 
Independence 
 
Submitted by: 
Aifheli Enos Tshivhase on 16 August 2012 
 
The new constitutional era in South Africa has brought fresh demands on all 
institutions of society. The South African military justice system has not been 
spared. The pressure to transform this system has also been fuelled by a wave of 
reform of military justice systems in other democratic Commonwealth jurisdictions. 
In this thesis, I evaluate South African military courts against the basic 
requirements of judicial independence as interpreted by the Constitutional Court 
and relevant international bodies. In doing so, I draw on my experience of working 
in military courts as defence and prosecution counsel respectively in the South 
African National Defence Force.  
 I conclude that all forums of military justice (including the Commanding 
Officer’s Disciplinary Hearing) do not meet most requirements for judicial 
independence. Military judges lack security of tenure; financial security; 
institutional independence on important administrative aspects; and their 
institutional impartiality is questionable. 
 I further investigate a suitable model of judicial independence for South 
African military courts in the democratic era. I propose a new model guided by the 
following: relevant principles of constitutional and international law relating to 
judicial independence and the right to a fair trial; emerging foreign trends; and 
most importantly, military uniqueness and operational effectiveness. In analysing 
relevant foreign trends, I conclude that there is a strong movement towards 
strengthening the judicial independence of military courts and make 
comprehensive suggestions to ensure a stronger degree of judicial independence of 
South African military courts. 
  I also conclude that military courts at lower levels compare very closely with 
magistrates’ courts, and propose that the reform of military courts must take that 
fact into account. I support the idea of creating an independent structure to deal 
with affairs of the military judiciary. Further, I propose that South African military 
judges should be granted tenure until the age of retirement. 
Finally, I argue against ‘civilianisation’ of military courts and suggest that 
the independence of these courts should be improved by integrating principles of 
judicial independence into the military set up. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background to the study 
 
 Developments in human rights in the late 20th century have 
facilitated increased scrutiny of military courts.1 These courts have 
recently been the subject of debate and litigation in a number of 
countries resulting in a wave of reviews of military court systems.2 For 
example, in New Zealand,3 significant reforms of the respective 
systems have been completed recently.4 The system was reformed to 
bring it in line with human rights norms and current international 
trends. In Australia, shortly after the adoption of the new military 
justice system establishing the Military Court of Australia, the system 
was declared to be unconstitutional by the Australian High Court in 
Lane v Morrison.5 As a result, further and radical reforms are awaited 
in that country.6 Notably, and following the European Court of Human 
Rights decisions in Findlay v The United Kingdom (Findlay)7 and, more 
recently, Cooper v The United Kingdom,8 the United Kingdom has been 
                                                 
1 Aifheli Enos Tshivhase ‘Military Courts in a democratic South Africa: An 
assessment of their independence’ (2006) 6 New Zealand Armed Forces Law Review 
96, 96. 
2 Military court system and military justice system will be used interchangeably in 
thesis. 
3 For a detailed account of the review process in New Zealand see Chris Griggs ‘A 
New Military Justice System in New Zealand’ (2006) 6 New Zealand Armed Forces 
Law Review 62. 
4 See Armed Forces Discipline Amendment Act (No 2) 2007 with respect to some of 
the reforms in New Zealand. 
5 (2009) 239 CLR 230. 
6 See Military Court of Australia Bill 2012 tabled before the House of Representatives 
in June 2012 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Res
ults/Result?bId=r4853 [accessed on 17 July 2012]. 
7 [1997] ECHR 8. 
8 [2003] ECHR 686.  
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persuaded to review its system on more than one occasion.9 In 
Findlay, the Court found the British military court system to be in 
violation of the right to be heard by an independent and impartial 
tribunal as provided for in Art 6(1) of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, popularly 
known as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and 
hereinafter referred to as such. This led to some review of the system. 
In Cooper, although the Court found the system to be generally in 
compliance with essential requirements of judicial independence, it 
expressed its concern about a criminal procedure which empowered a 
non-judicial authority to interfere with judicial findings of a court-
martial in the process of reviewing decisions of such courts. For the 
first time in over fifty years the legislation which underpins service law 
in the United Kingdom has been completely re-written following these 
two cases.10 
 
 Similarly, the Turkish military court system has, on more than 
one occasion, also been challenged successfully in the European 
Court of Human Rights. In Mehmet Ali Yilmaz v Turkey the Court 
found the Turkish system of military courts to be lacking in 
independence on several counts.11  
 
In Uganda, the status and jurisdiction of military courts has 
been challenged on several occasions, notably in Uganda Law Society 
                                                 
9 See generally G.R. Rubin ‘United Kingdom Military Law: Autonomy, Civilianisation, 
Juridification’ (2002) 62 Modern Law Review 36 for a discussion of factors 
influencing changes in British military law.  
10 See the Armed Forces Act 2006 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/ukpga_20060052_en.pdf  [accessed on 20 
April 2006]. 
11 (2001) ECHR 548. For a good description of the wave of reforms and their 
influences in various countries see a piece by the President of the International 
Society for Military Law and the Law of War and Judge Advocate of the Norwegian 
Armed Forces Arne Willy Dahl ‘International Trends in Military Justice’ 2011. The 
piece was presented at the Global Military Appellate Seminar at Yale Law School, 
USA http://www.law.yale.edu/2011-04_International_trends.pdf [accessed on 10 
May 2012.  
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v Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda.12 However, in that 
country, the focus of most challenges has been concerned with the 
use of military courts to try civilians rather than a substantive attack 
on the military justice system. 
 
  Canada, however, stood out as a leader in the reviews of 
military court systems for some time because it reviewed its system 
way before the jurisdictions cited although some of these have now 
made far reaching strides.13 
 
 In South Africa, military courts have been under pressure to 
transform since the adoption of the new Constitution in 1996 
(Constitution).14 In 1999, certain aspects of the courts-martial system 
were constitutionally and successfully challenged in Freedom of 
Expression Institute and Others v President, Court Martial and Others.15 
In this case, the High Court found certain aspects of the system to be 
in violation of the right to a fair trial which includes the right to be 
tried by an independent tribunal. This challenge resulted in the 
overhaul of the system in the same year which resulted in the 
adoption of the Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act 16 of 
                                                 
12 (2006) UGCC 10 http://www.ulii.org/ug/judgment/constitutional-court/2006 
[accessed on 16 July 2012]. This case dealt with several issues most of which are 
not directly relevant to this study. Some of the issues dealt with were the 
constitutionality of concurrent proceedings in the High Court and in the General 
Court-Martial based on the same facts, and the status of courts-martial within the 
justice system in Uganda. On the latter question, the Constitutional Court of 
Uganda held, by a majority decision, that the General Court-Martial was the 
equivalent of the High Court in the civil court system. Furthermore, the Court found 
it to be constitutionally permissible for civilians in certain cases to be tried by 
military courts provided the principles of the rules of natural justice and the rules of 
evidence and procedure were strictly followed. However, in the instant case, the 
Court held that the General Court-Martial had no jurisdiction to try the accused 
(civilian) because the court-martial was excluded from trying offences such as 
terrorism. These were only triable by the High Court. It is worth noting that the 
Uganda Peoples Defence Forces Act 7 of 2005 hardly shows any commitment to 
judicial independence and impartiality.  
13 For a discussion of military law reforms in Canada, see D McNairn ‘Military Law 
Reform in Canada’ (2003) New Zealand Armed Forces Law Review 51. This country 
was forced to grant tenure until age of retirement for military judges in 2011 in the 
case of R. v. Leblanc 2011 CMAC 2. 
14 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
15 1999 (2) SA 471 (C).  
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1999. This was a forced and rushed overhaul of the system―initiated 
and finalised in less than a year.  
 
 Nevertheless, the system still faces enormous challenges at 
various levels. The appointment of a Ministerial Task Team by the 
Minister of Defence in 2004 (The Ministerial Task Team Report) to 
review aspects of the military justice system, and more recently the 
Ministerial Legal Audit Committee to spearhead and facilitate the 
process of review of the system, are an acknowledgement of the 
existence of these challenges. However, since the task team tabled its 
report, the process of enacting a bill to kick start the reform process 
has been very slow. 
 
 
1.2 Outline of research problem 
 
Constitutional and international norms require military courts 
to be independent. 16 Section 165(2) of the Constitution guarantees 
the independence of all courts. It provides that ‘[t]he courts are 
independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which 
they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice.’ 
Furthermore, section 174(7) of the same Constitution provides that 
other judicial officers (those of lower courts) ‘must be appointed in 
terms of an Act of Parliament which must ensure that their 
appointment, promotion, transfer or dismissal, or disciplinary steps 
against, these judicial officers take place without favour or prejudice.’ 
This means that any legislation which is aimed at dealing with any of 
the above matters is subject to constitutional control including 
legislation establishing military courts.  
 
                                                 
16 See recent Report on Civil and Political Rights including the Question of 
Independence of the Judiciary, Administration of Justice, Impunity, Issue of the 
Administration of Justice through Military Courts UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/58 (13 
January 2006). 
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 As will be demonstrated further below, the independence of 
South African military courts is questionable.  Problems relating to 
judicial independence and the right to be tried by an independent and 
impartial tribunal can be identified.17 Individual military judges do not 
enjoy some essential requirements of judicial independence. They lack 
basic financial security, security of tenure and perceived impartiality. 
Furthermore, the status of military judges sitting as judicial officers in 
military courts makes their independence from the military command 
and the executive debatable. There are also problems with the 
procedure of appointment, renewal and also the removal of military 
judges. Another area of concern is that the current framework of 
military judicial reviews compromises the dignity and credibility of 
military courts.18  
 
 The uniqueness of the military environment poses a challenge in 
terms of determining ways of achieving an appropriate degree of 
independence of military courts. Moreover, what has emerged from the 
wave of reforms taking place in a number of jurisdictions is that there 
are different ways of ensuring judicial independence of military courts, 
and that different jurisdictions accord different degrees of 
independence to these courts. 
 
 Furthermore, a recent study of military justice systems in 
various democratic countries and representing different legal 
traditions also shows different ways of structuring military courts in 
relation to their independence in the modern era.19 These include 
                                                 
17 The Ministerial Task Team Report points out some of the flaws in the system (on 
file with the author). 
18 For a discussion of these problems see Tshivhase (note 1 above). See also by the 
same author ‘Transformation of Military Courts’ (2009) SA Public Law 24(2) 450-
485. For another perspective on the independence of the system and other related 
issues see also M Carnelley ‘The South African Military Court System – Independent, 
Impartial and Constitutional?’ (2006) 34(1) Scientia Militaria: South African Journal 
of Military Studies 55. 
19 International Commission of Jurists Military jurisdiction and international law: 
Military courts and gross violations of human rights 2004 
www.icj.org/news.php3?id_article=3254&lang=en [accessed on 20 June 2007]. The 
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countries representing the following legal traditions: common law; civil 
law; socialist; and Scandinavian countries. As will be explained 
further below, this thesis will consider some of the common law 
jurisdictions because, in structuring their military court systems, they 
have had to face the challenge of balancing their general legal 
traditions with the uniqueness of the military environment. As a 
common law jurisdiction, South Africa faces a similar challenge.  
 
 This study therefore investigates suitable ways of achieving an 
appropriate degree of judicial independence for military courts in South 
Africa.  
 
 The thesis seeks to demonstrate two key aspects: (a) that South 
African military courts do not meet some basic requirements of 
judicial independence; and (b) ways of achieving an appropriate degree 
of judicial independence of military courts. The thesis argues for a 
stronger degree of judicial independence of military courts. An attempt 
is made to do this without losing sight of the uniqueness of the 
military environment. The thesis is premised on the idea that 
achieving an appropriate degree of independence of military courts will 
require reform of the system which takes into account the following 
factors: principles of constitutional and international law relating to 
judicial independence and the right to a fair trial; emerging foreign 
trends;20 and most importantly, military needs or operational 
effectiveness. In relation to the last factor (military needs) the focus 
will be on the following imperatives: maintenance of military 
discipline; consistency in all strategic environments; requirements of 
command and control; portability of the system; expedition and 
efficiency of the system. These factors are informed by the mandate of 
                                                                                                                                            
study included countries such as Poland; Spain; Norway; Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom; the United States; a number of South American countries to name but a 
few. Regrettably, none of the African countries was studied. 
20 The criteria of countries chosen for comparative study are set out further below 
(para 1.7). 
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the defence force both in peace and war times and the constitutional 
requirement that the defence force must be structured and managed 
as a disciplined military force.21  
 
 
1.3 Research objective 
 
The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that South African 
military courts do not comply with constitutional and international 
standards of judicial independence, and more importantly, to suggest 
a model for ensuring their independence.  
 
 
1.4 Significance of the study  
 
In the democratic South Africa, it can be expected that various 
aspects of military law will be questioned from time to time in the light 
of the demands of the new Constitution. Thus far, the military justice 
system has been subjected to constitutional challenges on two 
occasions. The first challenge concerned the independence of courts-
martial in 1999 while the second concerned the separate existence of 
the military prosecuting authority, independent from the National 
Prosecuting Authority.22 The military court system is currently 
undergoing its second reform since the dawn of democracy.  
 
It is important for South Africa to be pro-active in the process of 
reviewing the military court system and to avoid piecemeal reforms 
                                                 
21 Section 200(1) of the Constitution. These factors have been taken into account in 
the review of the New Zealand military court system. See Griggs (note 3 above) in 
this regard. 
22 Minister of Defence v Potsane & Others 2002 (1) SA 1 CC.  In this case, the 
separate existence of the military prosecuting authority as provided for in the 
Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act was challenged on the basis that 
the Constitution makes provision for ‘a single national prosecuting authority’. In 
interpreting these words, Kriegler J held that the word ‘single’ does not mean one 
and only and also explained the need to have a separate prosecuting authority for 
the military. 
8 
 
 
arising out of court challenges. The experiences of Canada and the 
United Kingdom have shown that ‘such challenges could develop very 
quickly and have the potential to seriously undermine the military 
justice system.’23 According to Griggs, the process of review in United 
Kingdom following piecemeal court challenges has demanded the 
allocation of significant resources by the British Ministry of Defence 
and has also produced some outcomes which in the longer term may 
be difficult to reconcile with the vital elements required for a 
successful military justice system.24 
 
The limitation of the ongoing reform of the system is the dearth 
of home grown knowledge which the process of reform could draw 
from. In reforming the South African military court system and with 
the view of bringing it in line with constitutional and international 
norms, a wealth of knowledge and scholarship on ways of improving 
the system can enrich the process. It is hoped that this study will 
contribute such knowledge, on which the process of review of the 
system could draw in relation to the judicial independence of military 
courts.  
 
 
1.5 Literature review 
 
There is an abundance of literature on judicial independence, 
but most of it focuses on civilian courts. Two recent studies are worth 
noting. In the Southern African context, the study by the Democratic 
Governance and Rights Unit is of particular note.25 This landmark 
study makes use of the most recent international understandings in 
evaluating judicial independence in selected jurisdictions of Southern 
Africa. 
 
                                                 
23 Griggs (note 3 above) 64. 
24 Ibid. 
25 University of Cape Town entitled The Judicial Institution in Southern Africa 2006. 
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 At the global level is the study comprising a collection of essays 
edited by Russell and O’Brien entitled: Judicial Independence in the 
Age of Democracy, Critical Perspectives from around the world.26 
Despite its focus on civilian courts, this literature has informed this 
thesis. 
 
 However, as already pointed out, there is very limited 
scholarship on the study of judicial independence with particular 
focus on military courts post the 1996 democratic Constitution. A 
study which can be noted is the Ministerial Task Team Report. The 
report strongly showed that the forced and rushed reform (1999) did 
not address some of the key challenges facing the system particularly 
in relation to the independence of military courts. It looked at a 
number of aspects which are the subject of investigation in this 
thesis. 
 
 However, the report is very limited in scholarship and research 
which can be attributed to its purpose and the fact that the Task 
Team had a very limited time frame. Furthermore, the Team was also 
burdened with a host of other issues in addition to looking at the 
independence of military courts.27 Secondly, it did not deal with some 
crucial questions on judicial independence of military courts. For 
example, it did not address the issue of the appropriate level of 
remuneration of military judges. Furthermore, it makes some 
recommendations I consider to be inappropriate for military courts 
which I intend to address in this thesis. For example, one of the key 
recommendations of the Task Team was that some civilian elements 
must be introduced into the military court system.28 Despite these 
                                                 
26 2001. See also a more recent study building on the earlier study referred to above 
Russell P & Malleson K (eds.) Appointing judges in an Age of Judicial Power: Critical 
Perspectives from around the World (2004). 
27 For example, it also looked at military disciplinary hearings, military offences and 
types of punishment and the issue of overlapping jurisdiction with civilian courts. 
28 See Tshivhase (note 1 above) 122-123 for a discussion on this point. 
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limitations, the report of the Task Team has shaped aspects of this 
thesis.  
 
 Other available writings directly relevant to the topic are 
Carnelley’s article29 and my earlier work on the subject.30 These both 
assess the independence of the current system of military courts.  
Common to the two pieces of work is that they are, for obvious 
reasons, not exhaustive enough to be noted as significant and 
comprehensive pieces for purposes of this work.   
 
 There are also military law studies undertaken and reports 
compiled in other jurisdictions focusing on aspects relevant to this 
work.31 It is not necessary to reflect these studies here because they 
were written or prepared in the context of their respective jurisdictions 
and cannot be regarded as significant for purposes of literature review 
in this thesis. However, some of the foreign studies mentioned in the 
preceding pages of this Chapter have indeed assisted the writing of 
this thesis.  
 
 On the global level, the study by the International Commission 
of Jurists (ICJ) entitled: Military jurisdiction and international law: 
                                                 
29 Note 18 above. Carnelley’s main conclusion is that South African ‘military courts 
can in general be regarded as independent and impartial although, with small 
changes, any doubt with regard to independence could be eradicated.’ In contrast, I 
have concluded that there were a number of flaws with regards to military courts at 
lower levels (Tshivhase note 1 above). 
30 Tshivhase (note 1 above). 
31 See, for example, David McNairn ‘Does Canada Need a Permanent Military Court?’ 
(2006) 18 National Journal of Constitutional Law 2005; Michael Doi ‘The Judicial 
Independence of Canadian Forces General Court Martials: An Analysis of the 
Supreme Court of Canada Judgment in Regina v. Genereux’ (1993) 16 Dahousie Law 
Journal  234; Guy Gournoyer and Tiphaine Dickson ‘Of Legal Free Trade and 
Opportunity Lost: How Canadian Constitutional Law could have Tipped the Scale in 
Favour of an Independent Military Justice System in the United States’ (May 1994) 
41 Federal Bar News & Journal  270; J. Jason Samson and Mike Maden ‘Entrech 
the Bench! Canada’s Pressing Need for a Permanent Military Court’ (2009) Criminal 
Law Quarterly 215. Although most of these writings have been overtaken by events 
to some degree, they are useful in tracking the history of reforms of the Canadian 
military justice system. 
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Military courts and gross violations of human rights is worth noting.32 
This study focuses on the practice of using military courts to try 
members of the military who have carried out or aided and abetted the 
carrying out of, human rights abuses. It describes the organisation of 
military courts in selected countries. It notes that the organisation of 
military courts in various jurisdictions varies and also makes 
reference to some emerging trends regarding military justice 
influenced mainly by international jurisprudence on the subject. The 
study concludes that: 
 
on the whole, as far as ensuring that justice is dispensed independently and 
impartially is concerned, military courts do not adhere to the general 
principles and international standards and their procedures are in breach of 
due process. In many countries, so-called ‘military justice’ is organizationally 
and operationally dependent on the executive.33  
 
While the study is a major resource for this work, it does not pay 
particular attention to South Africa as a jurisdiction.  
 
Finally, I should say a few words about a very recent study by 
Nel focusing on Sentencing practice in military courts [South Africa]34 
which came to my attention shortly after finalising the writing of this 
thesis for submission. The study deals with the status of the 
Commanding Officers’ Disciplinary Hearing (CODH) and the 
independence of military courts as incidental questions. Its primary 
focus is self evident from its title. Despite the time constraints faced 
by the author, an attempt has been made to consider the key 
arguments and conclusions in that study in as far as they relate to 
this thesis.  
 
                                                 
32 ICJ (note 19 above). 
33 Ibid 10. 
34
 Michelle Nel Sentencing Practice in Military Courts (2012) Thesis submitted for LLD 
Degree, University of South Africa 
http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/5969/dissertation_nel_m.pdf?sequ
ence=1 [accessed on 26 July 2012]. This thesis was submitted in January 2012 and 
made available on the above-mentioned website on 06 July 2012.  
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For purposes of this thesis, Nel’s study concludes that the 
constitutional rights of accused persons are not applicable to the 
CODH. It also concludes that South African military courts are 
sufficiently independent. However, I have not been persuaded by Nel’s 
arguments and her subsequent conclusions for reasons set out in 
Chapters Three and Six of this thesis. Furthermore, while one accepts 
that judicial independence of military courts was not the primary 
concern of her thesis, I am of the respectful view that she has 
perceived the problem of judicial independence wrongly. 
 
That said, the divergence of conclusions between me and Nel 
vindicates the need for studies of this subject. 
 
 
1.6 Limits of research project 
 
This research will not measure the independence of the CODH 
because this forum cannot be regarded as a court of law. The CODH 
differs from military courts in at least five main respects. First, it is 
presided over by the officer commanding or his/her representative, 
who need not have a law degree.35 Second, it only hears guilty pleas.36 
Third, it does not follow strictly the rules of criminal procedure and 
the law of evidence. Fourth, accused before the CODH generally have 
no right to legal representation during the proceedings.37 Fifth, the 
CODH cannot impose a sentence of imprisonment nor a fine in excess 
of R600. However, the study attempts to locate the status of the 
CODH within the military court system, and it also considers the 
applicability of several constitutional rights to the CODH.  
 
 Furthermore, the form of judicial independence considered in 
this thesis refers to independence from state organs. In other words, 
                                                 
35 Section 11 of the Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act. 
36 Ibid s 29(7). 
37 See ibid s 23(a). 
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the thesis does not consider independence of military courts from 
non-state actors. 
  
 
1.7 Research methodology and countries chosen for 
comparative study 
 
Data are drawn from primary and secondary sources. Relevant 
primary sources such as treaties, legislation (both domestic and 
foreign), resolutions, directives and reports of governments and 
intergovernmental organizations are used extensively. International, 
domestic and foreign case law are also used extensively. The 
secondary sources include books, journal articles, and information 
from the internet. Where appropriate, I also draw on my own personal 
military experience and observations arising from my service as a 
Military Defence Counsel in the regular force of the South African 
National Defence Force for two years and later as a Military 
Prosecution Counsel for four years (reserve force). 
 
 Although the thesis is not styled as a comparative study, there 
are several jurisdictions which have significantly shaped key parts of 
the work. Almost all of the countries considered are common law and 
democratic jurisdictions which have recently reviewed their military 
justice systems, and most importantly, have shown some commitment 
to the principle of judicial independence in structuring military courts. 
These are countries considered to be on the cutting edge of reform of 
military justice systems the world over. They are as follows:  New 
Zealand, United Kingdom, Canada, United States,38 Australia, and to 
some extent, India because it only recently entered the scene of 
military courts reforms but in a limited fashion. Countries on the 
African continent do not feature in this study mainly because military 
                                                 
38 The United States military justice system is the most famous in the world 
probably because of its publicity, and that country has held debates about its 
system many times and in different forums including courts.  
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laws of countries that could have been considered hardly show any 
signs of respect for the principle of judicial independence, and 
therefore, with respect, do not offer any positive lessons for South 
Africa, given the progress already made by this country. Examples are 
Zimbabwe,39 Tanzania, 40 Ghana,41 and Uganda.42 For the most part, 
these countries are still trapped in the old British court-martial 
system. Ironically, the United Kingdom has moved away from that 
system, albeit involuntarily as previously noted. 
 
 There may very well be other interesting jurisdictions to 
consider, but for pragmatic reasons, it is not possible to analyse each 
country in a study of this nature, and some choices have to be made. 
 
 
1.8 Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into four parts namely contextual and 
organizational issues styled as the introduction; introduction to 
military courts and their status and uniqueness; analysis of the 
theoretical framework, its application to military courts and 
assessment of judicial independence of South African military courts; 
and a proposed model of judicial independence for South African 
military courts and conclusion. A description of these parts follows 
but with the exclusion of Part 1 as this chapter already constitutes 
this part. 
 
 
                                                 
39 See Defence Act: Chapter 11:02, 1972. 
40 See for example Military Court Act 15 of 1964. 
41 See Armed Forces Act 105 of 1962 
42 The Uganda Peoples Defence Forces Act 7 of 2005. Although this Act was adopted 
in the modern era, there are no signs (in the Act) of any serious commitment (on the 
part of Uganda) to the principle of judicial independence in relation to military 
courts. This Act says nothing about the independence and impartiality of military 
courts in that country. 
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1.8.1 Part 2: Introduction to military courts and their status 
and uniqueness 
 
This part of the study has two chapters. Chapter Two has three 
parts. The first part is aimed at providing a brief history of military 
courts in South Africa and introducing the current military court 
system while the second part locates the status of this system in the 
South African judicial system. The third part focuses on assessing the 
uniqueness of military courts with a particular emphasis on South 
African military courts. Chapter Three attempts to show that the 
CODH is not a court of law or a military court in a strict sense of the 
word. It highlights the difficulties of locating the CODH within the 
military court system. The conclusions reached in the chapter form 
the basis for not including the CODH in the assessment of the judicial 
independence of military courts in Chapter Six. 
 
 
1.8.2 Part 3: Analysis of the theoretical framework, its 
application to military courts and assessment of judicial 
independence of South African military courts 
 
Three chapters are presented in this part, which sets out the 
theoretical framework for the thesis and applies the framework to 
military courts. Chapter Four assesses the meaning of judicial 
independence with a particular focus on South African constitutional 
law but also draws from international principles and foreign case law 
where appropriate. Chapter Five discusses the applicability of the 
right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal to military 
courts from an international perspective. In writing this part of the 
thesis, I have, in the background, sought to assess whether the 
uniqueness of the military environment justifies a different set of 
standards for the judicial independence of military courts. The 
chapter also analyses developments at the United Nations (UN) 
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specifically aimed at universal regulation of military tribunals. The 
standards discussed in chapters four and five are applied in Chapter 
Six to assess whether South African military courts meet such 
standards. 
 
 
1.8.3 Part 4: Proposed model of judicial independence for South 
African  military courts and conclusion 
 
This part of the thesis consists of two chapters. Chapter Seven 
focuses mainly on addressing the flaws identified in Chapter Six. 
Comprehensive suggestions on ways of improving the judicial 
independence of South African military courts are made. The chapter 
seeks to craft a suitable model of judicial independence for South 
African military courts taking the following into account: principles of 
constitutional and international law relating to judicial independence 
and the right to a fair trial; emerging foreign trends; and most 
importantly, military needs or operational effectiveness of the military. 
This chapter attempts to answer a wide range of questions relating to 
various aspects of the independence of military courts.  
 
For example, the following specific questions are dealt with. 
What level of independence should military courts enjoy in light of the 
Constitutional Court decision in Van Rooyen v The State43? Is 
                                                 
43 (2002) 5 SA 246 (CC). In this case, the Constitutional Court followed a 
controversial approach to judicial independence of lower courts when it accepted a 
lower standard of independence in relation to magistrates’ courts than it requires of 
the High Courts. It did this for several reasons: (a) that the Constitution provided for 
a hierarchy of courts and in its view this justifies the different degrees of 
independence;154 (b) that higher courts deal with matters which were seen to be 
‘the most sensitive areas of tension between the Legislature, the Executive and the 
Judiciary’;155 and (c) that the increased level of institutional independence at the 
higher level was justified because the High Courts are in themselves a means of 
ensuring and guarding the independence of lower courts through the mechanism of 
judicial review. The central argument of the Constitutional Court suggests that 
judicial review is the remedy by which the lowered standard of independence is 
justified. In the context of military courts, this would mean that the remedy to the 
lower standard of independence of military courts at lower levels is judicial review by 
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civilianisation of military judges as suggested by the Ministerial Task 
Team appropriate for the military? Should the military judiciary 
continue to be separately regulated or be regulated as part of the 
mainstream judiciary? What is the appropriate procedure for the 
appointment and removal of military judges? What is the appropriate 
level of remuneration of military judges including the appropriate 
authorities to determine the question (financial security)? What 
should be the security of tenure of military judges? Should they be 
granted tenure until retirement age or be appointed for a fixed term? If 
it is for a fixed term, how long should that term be? Should it be 
renewable? Should they be subject to performance evaluation and 
eligible for promotion during their appointment? How should military 
cases be reviewed in the light of problems with the current system of 
review and problems pointed out by the European Court of Human 
Rights in relation to the United Kingdom?44 
 
 Chapter Seven revisits the major questions investigated in this 
study. It summarises the main findings and conclusions set out in 
each of the chapters and sets out the key recommendations for the 
improvement of judicial independence of South African military 
courts. The final part of the chapter makes suggestions for future 
research.  
 
 There are many aspects which make the study of military courts 
interesting and challenging. Key among these is their uniqueness set 
out in the next chapter, among other things. It is the uniqueness and 
the potential of the military as an instrument of peace and war which 
have prompted me to pursue a career in the military, and to embark 
subsequently on the journey undertaken in this study, underpinned 
by my belief that a fair and robust military justice system is key to 
achieving high levels of discipline in any defence force―which in turn 
                                                                                                                                            
the Court of Military Appeals and higher civilian courts. See further (Tshivhase note 
1 above) 126-127 on this point. 
44 See ibid 125-126 on this point. 
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can assist in ensuring stability. This is particularly important on the 
African continent where military coups are common. 
 
 
1.9 The meaning of ‘military judge’ in this thesis 
 
The term military judge/s is used in two senses. The primary usage of 
the term refers to military judges or senior military judges in South 
Africa as provided for in the Military Discipline Supplementary 
Measures Act.45 The second usage refers to South Africa’s military 
judges’ equivalence in jurisdictions considered in this thesis. As will 
be observed throughout the thesis, these officers are generally either 
referred to as military judges in some countries or judge advocates in 
others.46 The latter could be members of the military or civilians47 
depending on the jurisdiction. In the case of Australia, a different term 
is used: defence force magistrates. The context in which the term 
‘military judge’ is being used will be determined by the circumstances 
of the discussion. That said, the term does not refer to ‘lay military 
members of military courts or courts-martial’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45
 Act 16 of 1999. 
46 Judge advocate is a military term which is used to refer to a military law officer or 
legal adviser or simply a military judge as is now the case in the United Kingdom. 
The meaning of the term has evolved over time in some countries. For the purposes 
of this study, nothing turns on the designation of judge advocate to the extent that 
they are only appointed to perform military judicial functions. However, questions 
arise where judge advocates are used to simultaneously perform judicial functions 
and other legal duties in the military, in such cases, it is unclear whether they hold 
a judicial office.  
47 As is the case in the United Kingdom 
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CHAPTER 2 
INTRODUCTION TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY COURT 
SYSTEM: ITS STATUS WITHIN THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND THE UNIQUENESS OF MILITARY 
COURTS* 
 
2.1 Introductory remarks 
Military courts have a long history in South Africa and the world over. 
Since their establishment, they have always had certain unique features, 
and their status within the South African judicial system has been 
uncertain. This Chapter has three parts. The first part is aimed at giving a 
brief history of military courts in South Africa and introducing the current 
military court system while the second part locates the status of this system 
in the South African judicial system. The third part focuses on assessing the 
uniqueness of military courts with a particular emphasis on South African 
military courts.  
 
2.2 History of the South African military court system 
The South African military court system has not been through many 
phases in its life thus far. Although it is not the objective of this chapter to 
give an exhaustive historical account of the development of the system, an 
attempt will be made to describe it according to the following periods: the 
position before 1957 (the reign of the British Imperial Army Act), the South 
African Defence Act of 1957 and its travails, and finally, military courts in a 
democratic era (the present period). A substantial amount of time will be 
spent describing the latter system because this study is concerned with 
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military courts as currently constituted. There will, therefore, be little 
emphasis on the first two phases of the system. 
 
2.2.1 The position before 1957: the reign of the British Imperial Army 
Act 
The history of the South African military court system arguably 
started in 1912 when South Africa enacted its first Defence Act just after the 
formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 (Union).1 The Act was the 
result of the Imperial Defence Conference held in London in 1911.2  
However, s 95 of the Defence Act made provision for discipline in the South 
African military to be meted out in accordance with the relevant provisions 
of the British Imperial Army Act of 1881 (Imperial Army Act) subject to such 
adaptations and modifications made by the Governor-General after such 
shall have been published in the Gazette.3 
 In terms of the Imperial Army Act, there were three types of courts 
martial over and above a summary trial by a commanding officer.4 Those 
included: a general court-martial consisting of not less than five officers, a 
district court-martial consisting of not less than three officers, a regimental 
court-martial consisting of three officers whose president generally had to be 
an officer not less than a captain, and a summary court-martial consisting 
of not less than three officers unless three officers were not available in 
which case it would consist of two officers.5 Some of the common features of 
                                                          
* Some descriptive parts of this Chapter have been published in this author’s articles as 
follows: Aifheli Enos Tshivhase ‘Military Courts in a Democratic South Africa: An 
Assessment of their Independence’ (2006) 6 New Zealand Armed Forces law Review 96,105-
111, 123-126 and Aifheli E. Tshivhase ‘Transformation of military courts’ (2009) SA Public 
Law 24(2) 450, 451-465. 
1 SA Defence Act 13 of 1912. See B C Stoop The Law of South Africa (2005) 270 in this 
regard. Military court system and military justice system will be used interchangeably in 
this study. 
2 Stoop Ibid. 
3 Section 95(1) of South Africa Defence Act 13 of 1912. 
4 See ss 47 and 48 of the Army Act, 1881. 
5 See Army Act ss 47(1) and (4), 48 and 55(2)(a). 
21 
 
these courts-martial are that they were convened on an ad hoc basis, the 
officers were not required to have legal training, they were generally 
empowered to impose a death sentence, and the findings and sentences 
imposed by these courts-martial were subject to confirmation by the 
convening authority.6  
An interesting feature introduced by the South Africa Defence Act of 
1912 was that ordinary courts of the Union had jurisdiction to try any 
offence committed by any person against the Military Discipline Code; but in 
imposing punishment for an offence, the court had to ‘take cognizance of the 
gravity of the offence in relation to its military bearing and have due regard 
to the maintenance in the Defence Forces of a proper standard of military 
discipline.’7 
In 1932 South Africa came up with the Union Military Discipline Code 
(UMDC) which came into being as a result of the 1932 amendments to the 
Defence Act (Amendment) and the Dominion Forces Act.8 However, Stoop 
correctly points out that the UMDC was a mere modification of the Imperial 
Army Act and the rules of procedure made in terms of the same Act.9 A look 
at the UMDC of 1932 shows that it did not introduce any substantial 
changes to the British Imperial Army Act. The UMDC did not apply to, 
among others, any members of the South African Naval Service and any 
members of the South African Permanent Force Reserve.10 Discipline in the 
South African Naval service was meted out in terms of enactments and 
                                                          
6 Army Act ss 48 and 54. 
7 Section 97(1) and (2). 
8  Act 32 of 1932. 
9 Stoop (note 1 above) 270. In this connection, s 2(1) of that Act provides that ‘[t]hose 
provisions of the Army Act, 1881 (44 and 45 Vict. C. 58) of the United Kingdom as amended 
from time to time up to the commencement of this Act, and the rules of procedure made 
under section seventy thereof, as adapted and modified under section ninety-five of the 
principal Act, which by virtue of section ninety-five of the principal Act, comprise, at the 
commencement of this Act, the Union Military Discipline Code, shall, notwithstanding the 
repeal of section ninety-five of the principal Act by this Act, and subject to the provisions of 
sub-section (3) of this section, continue to apply in relation to the Defence Forces of the 
Union and to all members thereof, subject to such adaptations and modifications as the 
Governor-General may, by notice in the Gazette, make thereto.’ 
10 Defence Act and Dominion Forces Act s 2(3). 
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regulations for the discipline of the Royal Navy subject to such adaptations 
and modifications as the Governor-General could by Proclamation in the 
Gazette direct. 
The UMDC remained in operation until 1957 when a major 
consolidation of South African defence laws took place. 
 
2.2.2 The Defence Act of 1957 and its travails 
Defence laws were consolidated by the Defence Act of 195711 which 
also introduced the Military Discipline Code (MDC). The MDC introduced a 
fairly comprehensive system of military justice, which, however, still bore 
close resemblance to the British military justice system. It made provision 
for numerous military offences and was supplemented by South African 
criminal law and the law of evidence. Some of the offences provided for in 
the MDC were as follows: mutiny; desertion; absence without leave; 
assaulting a superior officer; assaulting or ill-treating a subordinate; using 
threatening, insulting or insubordinate language; malingering; disobeying 
lawful commands or orders; causing or allowing a vessel or aircraft to be 
hazarded, stranded or wrecked; negligently losing kit, equipment or arms; 
drunkenness on or off-duty; riotous or unseemly behaviour and conduct to 
the prejudice of military discipline. Most of these offences carried, among 
others, a sentence of imprisonment.12 
The MDC applied, among others, to members of the regular force13 
and also to members of the reserve force when they were rendering service 
or when liable to render service.14  
                                                          
11 Act 44 of 1957. This Act has to a great extent been repealed by the Defence Act 42 of 
2002. However, the MDC and other provisions relating to military discipline have been 
retained. See Schedule one to the Defence Act 44 of 1957 in this regard. 
12 However, military courts rarely impose this sentence for minor disciplinary offences. 
13 Defence Act of 1957, s 104(1). 
14 Ibid s 104(2). 
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Prior to 1999, the MDC made provision for the court-martial system. 
Six types of courts-martial existed. Those six types included: a general 
court-martial; an ordinary court-martial; the summary trial courts of a chief 
of staff; a convening authority; a commanding officer deriving his powers 
from a convening authority; and a commanding officer with delegated 
powers. 
These courts were convened on an ad hoc basis and presiding officers 
were appointed by the convening authority on the same basis. The Act did 
not require members of courts martial to be legally qualified. Furthermore, 
the accused did not have the right of appeal to the High Courts against a 
conviction and sentence by the ordinary court-martial. Matters could only be 
taken to civilian courts on review. A classic example of such a review is the 
case of Council of Review, South African Defence Force, and Others v Mönnig 
and Others where proceedings of a court-martial were challenged on the 
basis that members of the court were biased. 15  
The military justice system briefly described above was subjected to 
constitutional challenge in Freedom of Expression Institute and Others v 
President, Ordinary Court Martial, and Others.16 This case dealt with the 
constitutionality of an Ordinary Court-Martial convened in terms of the 
Defence Act. The Act empowered the convening authority to order the 
proceedings of an Ordinary Court-Martial to be held in camera. Under that 
Act, the convening authority could vary, confirm or substitute sentences of 
an Ordinary Court-Martial.  
The High Court held that empowering the convening authority to order 
the proceedings of an Ordinary Court-Martial to be held in camera 
amounted to an invitation of arbitrary interference by an executive official 
with the due process of the Court.17 The challenged provision was held to be 
unconstitutional on the basis that it violated the right to a fair trial, which 
                                                          
15 1992 (3) SA 482 (A).  
16 1999 (2) SA 471 (C). 
17 Ibid para 11. 
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includes the right to a public trial before an ordinary court as provided in s 
35(3)(c) of the South African Constitution, 1996 (the Constitution).18 The 
High Court also stated that neither the Act nor the MDC required that 
members of the Ordinary Court-Martial be legally qualified and that this 
permitted lay members of an Ordinary Court-Martial to convict and imprison 
people for up to two years.19 The High Court added that the relevant parts of 
the Act and the MDC were unconstitutional because they violated s 174(1) of 
the Constitution which requires a ‘judicial officer’ to be an appropriately 
qualified woman or man who is a fit and proper person.20 Furthermore, the 
High Court held that the fact that the sentence of the court-martial could 
not be enforced or executed until such finding and sentence had been 
confirmed by the convening authority allowed executive interference with the 
judicial process.21 
By the time the case reached the Constitutional Court for confirmation 
of the High Court order, the impugned provisions of the Defence Act and the 
MDC had already been repealed and replaced by a new Act, the Military 
Discipline Supplementary Measures Act 16 of 1999 (Military Discipline Act 
or the Act). In the circumstances, the Constitutional Court declined to 
confirm the High Court order of invalidity because the basis upon which the 
parties had approached the High Court had disappeared, and, therefore, an 
order of confirmation of invalidity would have no practical effect on the 
parties to the litigation.22  
The hasty repeal and replacement of the Act before the case could be 
heard by the Constitutional Court was rather unfortunate in that it 
effectively denied the Constitutional Court an opportunity to pronounce on 
important aspects of the military justice system in a democratic South 
                                                          
18 Act 108. 
19 Freedom of Expression Institute v President of the Ordinary Court Martial (note 16 above) 
para 18. 
20 Ibid para 21. 
21 Freedom of Expression Institute v President, Ordinary Court Martial (note 10 above) para 
23. 
22President, Ordinary Court Martial, and Others v Freedom of Expression Institute and Others 
1999 (4) SA 682 (CC) paras 17-18. 
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Africa. The Court’s pronouncements on the system would have probably laid 
down some fundamental principles which could help shape the military 
justice system in the modern era. 
 
2.3 Military courts in a democratic South Africa: the Military 
Discipline Supplementary Measures Act 
The adoption of the final South African Constitution in 1996 made it 
possible for the legislation governing courts-martial to be challenged on the 
basis of constitutional inconsistency. The Constitution makes provision for 
constitutional supremacy as opposed to parliamentary supremacy which 
prevailed prior to the democratic era.23 
The Freedom of Expression case represented a turning point in the 
history of the South African military court system. It resulted in the Military 
Discipline Supplementary Measures Act which established a completely new 
system of military justice. The system is now composed of several ‘military 
courts’ as opposed to ‘courts-martial’.  
A brief introduction to the current system of military justice as 
provided for in the Act, follows. There are four levels of military courts. 
 
2.3.1 Court of Military Appeals 
The Court of Military Appeals (CMA) is the highest military court in 
South Africa.24 Section 8(1) of the Act read with rule 74(1)(b) of the Act’s 
rules of procedure provide for the CMA review powers that are wider than 
those of the High Court when it sits on appeal. It does not only consider 
                                                          
23 See s 2 of the Constitution. 
24 Military Discipline Act, s 6(3). 
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cases before it on the record of proceedings but also has the power to allow 
further evidence.25  
When the CMA deals with treason, murder, rape or culpable homicide 
committed outside the Republic and in the case of offences endangering the 
safety of forces or offences by a person in command of troops, vessels or 
aircraft, it must be composed of five members consisting of three incumbent 
or retired High Court judges, of whom one must be appointed by the 
Minister of Defence (Minister) as Chairperson.26 The fourth member must be 
an appropriately qualified officer27 of the Permanent Force. This officer must 
hold a degree in law and possess appropriate legal experience.28 Finally, the 
fifth member of the Court must have experience in exercising command in 
the field in the conducting of operations.29   
When it deals with matters other than those referred to above, the 
CMA is composed of three members.30 Its Chairperson must have the 
required experience as a High Court judge or a magistrate.31 The second 
member must be an appropriately qualified officer of the Permanent Force 
who holds a degree in law with appropriate experience.32 The third member 
must be a person with command experience in conducting field operations.33 
The Act does not require the latter to be legally qualified. This person 
                                                          
25 For a recent consideration of CMA’s powers see Mbambo v Minister of Defence 2005 (2) SA 
226 (T). This case concerned the question whether there was a right of appeal from the CMA 
to the High Court. The Court held that the CMA was the highest military court and an 
accused person’s right to approach it for review constituted a right to the meaningful 
reconsideration of the conviction and sentence in accordance with s 35(3)(o) of the 
Constitution and thus there was no right of appeal from the CMA to the High Court. 
26 Military Discipline Act, s 7(1)(a). 
27 According to s 1 of the Act, this includes the passing of a departmental course in military 
law. 
28 See Military Discipline Act, s 7(1)(a)(ii). 
29 Ibid s 7(a)(i), (ii) and (iii). Operational knowledge may be relevant in certain military cases, 
hence the need to have a member with such knowledge. 
30 Ibid s 7(1)(b). 
31 The magistrate must have held that office for a continuous period of not less than 10 
years. To date, the Chairperson of the Court of Military Appeals has always been a High 
Court judge. 
32 Military Discipline Act, s 7(1)(b)(ii). 
33 Ibid s 7(b)(i), (ii) and (iii). 
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therefore sits as a layperson and contributes only military field command 
knowledge.   
 
2.3.2 Court of a Senior Military Judge 
The Court of a Senior Military Judge (CSMJ) may try any person 
subject to the MDC for any offence except murder, treason, rape, or culpable 
homicide committed within South Africa and may, on conviction, sentence 
the offender to any punishment that falls within the penal jurisdiction of 
military courts.34 The sentences include, among others: imprisonment; 
cashiering; dismissal from the SANDF; detention for a period not exceeding 
two years; a fine; and reduction in seniority of rank or a reprimand.35   
It may try the above-mentioned offences provided they are committed 
beyond South African borders including contraventions of ss 4 and 5 of the 
MDC.36 When this Court exercises this jurisdiction, it must consist of three 
senior military judges.37 It is striking to note that, when the Court exercises 
jurisdiction in respect of the above offences outside South Africa, it is 
empowered to impose any sentence of imprisonment. The CSMJ clearly has 
extensive powers. 
The Court is presided over by an officer of a rank not below that of 
colonel or its equivalent and with not less than five years of appropriate legal 
experience, and a military assessor.38 The officer must be assigned as a 
Senior Military Judge by the Minister of Defence on the recommendation of 
the Adjutant General (AG).39 He or she must hold a degree in law and be 
                                                          
34 Ibid s 9(2).  
35 Section 12 of the Military Discipline Act. 
36 Endangering the safety of the forces and offences relating to the command of the forces, 
vessels or aircraft. 
37 Military Discipline Act, s 9(3). 
38 Ibid s 9(1)(a). Military assessors are generally appointed at the instance of an accused 
person. The military assessor system is rarely used in practice. 
39 Ibid s 14(1)(b). The AG is responsible for the overall management of the military justice 
system and the military legal services: s 28 of the Military Discipline Act. 
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‘appropriately qualified’.40 The appointee must also be a fit and proper 
person.41  
Assignments for a military judicial office are usually fixed for a specific 
period or coupled to a specific deployment, operation or exercise.42  
 
2.3.3 Court of a Military Judge 
Less seniority and experience are required for the Court of a Military 
Judge. It is composed of an officer of not less than field rank43 having 
appropriate legal experience, in addition to a military assessor if the accused 
requests one.44 As in the case of the Court of a Senior Military Judge, the 
appointee must hold a degree in law, be appropriately qualified and a fit and 
proper person.45  
The Court of Military Judge has jurisdiction to try any person subject 
to the MDC other than an officer of field or higher rank46 and may not try 
murder, treason, rape, culpable homicide, or any offence under ss 4 and 5 of 
the MDC.47 It may, on conviction, sentence the offender to any punishment 
referred to in s 12 of the MDC, subject to a maximum sentence of 
imprisonment for a period of two years.48 
Having described the various military courts above it might be worth 
explaining, briefly, the general role of military judges in those courts as 
provided for in the relevant law before describing the lowest forum within the 
military court system and other support structures. 
                                                          
40 Ibid s 13(2). 
41 Ibid s 14(2). 
42  Ibid s 15. 
43 Major in the Army, Air Force, Military Health and Lieutenant Commander in the Navy. 
44 Military Discipline Act, s 10(1)(a) and (b). 
45 Ibid s 10(1)(a). 
46 By contrast, the Court of Senior Military Judge may try a person of a rank higher than 
itself. 
47 Military Discipline Act, s 10(1)(a). 
48 Ibid s 10(2).  
29 
 
 
2.3.4 General duties of military judges 
Over and above the common duties associated with judges, military 
judges also have statutory general duties. These duties are enumerated in s 
19 of the Act. However, as will appear further below, most of these duties are 
a mere re-statement of the common duties of judges. 
Military judges are required to be independent and subject only to the 
Constitution and the law. They must apply the Constitution and the law 
impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice.49 In addition to the 
relevant constitutional provisions, s 19 provides a basis for judicial 
independence of military courts. It presents a break with the past where 
‘independence’ of officers presiding in courts martial was not guaranteed. 
Furthermore, military judges must conduct every trial and all 
proceedings in a manner befitting a court of justice. In conducting their 
proceedings, they must ensure that the accused, whether represented or 
unrepresented, does not suffer any disadvantage because of his or her 
position or of ignorance or incapacity to examine or to cross-examine 
witnesses or to make his or her defence clear and intelligible or otherwise.50 
 
2.3.5 The Commanding Officers’ Disciplinary Hearing (CODH) 
The CODH is the lowest level of military courts. It consists of the 
commanding officer or an officer subordinate in rank to such commanding 
officer and of not less than field rank. In the latter case such an officer must 
be authorised in writing by the relevant commanding officer. Neither the 
                                                          
49 This duty is similar to the provisions of s 165(2) of the Constitution which declares that 
‘[t]he courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they 
must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice’. 
50 Military judges are also not to express any opinion whatsoever on any matter relating to 
any case except in prescribed course of proceedings or as may be required by law. They are 
also responsible for the safe custody of the record of proceedings and of every exhibit 
produced at a trial. 
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commanding officer nor his delegated officer needs to possess any legal 
qualification or be appropriately qualified.51  
A commanding officer may conduct a disciplinary hearing of any 
person subject to the MDC other than an officer52 or warrant officer, who 
has elected in terms of the Act to be heard by a commanding officer, for any 
military disciplinary offence, and may on conviction sentence the offender to 
certain punishments prescribed in s 12(1)(i),(j),(k),(l) and (m) subject to a 
maximum fine of R600, 00.  
The punishments which may be imposed by the CODH are 
confinement to barracks for a period not exceeding 21 days in the case of a 
private or equivalent; corrective punishment for a period not exceeding 21 
days in the case of a private or equivalent rank; extra non-consecutive 
duties for a period not exceeding 21 days in the case of any other rank than 
that of an officer; or a reprimand.53 The CODH deals only with guilty pleas. 
Cases involving any other pleas are remanded and referred to the 
appropriate court54 which will usually be the CMJ. 
In terms of the Act, there is no right to legal representation at the 
CODH.55 The Act only makes provision for a right to consult a lawyer prior to 
making any election to be heard at a disciplinary hearing.56 The 
constitutionality of that provision may be brought to question in the light of 
the Constitutional Court decision in SANDU v Minister of Defence and 
                                                          
51 However, the OC or his delegated officer will usually have passed a departmental course 
in military law as a matter of practice. 
52 This refers to the commissioned officer starting from second lieutenant and above. All 
officers are commissioned by the President as the Commander-in- Chief of the SANDF. 
53 Military Discipline Act, s 12(1)(i)(j)(k)(l) and (m). No officer may be heard by a commanding 
officer’s disciplinary hearing. 
54 See Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act: Rules of Procedure made by the 
Minister of Defence under s 44(4) of the Act: GNR.747 of 11 June 1999, Rule 65. 
55 Section 23.  
56 Section 23(b). Section 11(2) read with s 29(6) of the Military Discipline Act make provision 
for an accused right to make an election to be heard by a commanding officer or a military 
judge if the accused is charged with a military disciplinary offence and decides to tender a 
plea of guilty.  
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Others.57 In this case, the Court held that it is ‘internationally accepted that 
once trade unions are recognised by an employer, trade union 
representatives have a right to represent their members in disciplinary 
hearings.’58 The Court also held that ‘the right of representation in grievance 
and disciplinary proceedings forms part of the right to fair labour practices 
protected by s 23(1) of the Constitution’ which cannot be limited unless it is 
reasonable and justifiable to do so.59 Following the above-mentioned ruling, 
there has been some confusion within some quarters in the South African 
military as to whether this representation is legal or refers to representation 
by trade union officials at disciplinary proceedings. 
On the basis of the above observations, the Court found a regulation 
which provided that a military trade union representative has the right to 
‘assist’ members in grievance and disciplinary proceedings but does not have 
a right to represent members, to be unconstitutional because the Minister 
proffered no reason for limiting the right in question in the regulations. It is 
doubtful if any reasonable and justifiable reason can be advanced for 
limiting s 23(1) in the context of trade union officials representing their 
members in disciplinary hearings. Perhaps an argument which could be 
advanced in favour of the limitation is the established principle that CODH 
proceedings should take place efficiently without any delay. Furthermore, it 
could also be argued that in the light of the fact that the CODH deals only 
with guilty pleas involving relatively minor offences which attract relatively 
light sentences and the fact that accused persons have access to a lawyer 
before electing to be heard by the commanding officer, representation by a 
trade union in actual proceedings is unwarranted. However, the counter to 
that argument is that representation of the accused in actual proceedings of 
a disciplinary hearing is critical in ensuring that the accused puts a strong 
                                                          
57 2007 (8) BCLR 863 (CC). 
58 Ibid para 93. This was an application from the Supreme Court of Appeal against the 
finding that the Constitution did not impose a duty to bargain and the finding of 
constitutional validity of regulations made in terms of the Defence Act of 2002. 
59 Ibid. 
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case in mitigation of sentence.  There is much more that could be written on 
either side of the scale but this is not the place for it. 
The status of the CODH within the military court system is considered 
in detail in Chapter Three.  
  
2.3.6 Military judicial review authority 
Persons convicted and sentenced by a military court have the right to 
automatic, speedy and competent review of the proceedings.60 Every 
acquittal or discharge of an accused is final but every finding of guilty, any 
sentence imposed and every order made by a military court is subject to the 
process of review by the review authority.61 Automatic review of proceedings 
is considered to be an added benefit for accused persons.  
Should the accused elect to make representations on the finding or 
sentence of a military court, the matter is referred to the CMA for review.62 
Furthermore, the sentences of imprisonment, including a suspended 
sentence of imprisonment, cashiering, discharge with ignominy, dismissal or 
discharge from the SANDF cannot be executed prior to confirmation by the 
Court of Military Appeals.63 All other sentences by a military court are 
reviewed by the review authority which may exercise the powers conferred 
on the CMA.  
The military review authority exercises enormous power despite the 
fact that it is not a court of law. It may uphold, vary or substitute a sentence 
or refuse to uphold a finding and set the sentence and/or finding of a 
military court aside.64 Moreover, a review authority may direct a military 
                                                          
60 Military Discipline Act, s 25. 
61 Director of Military Judicial Reviews in consultation with the Chairperson of the Court of 
Military Appeals determines review counsel policy and issues policy directives which must 
be observed in the review process: Ibid s 26(3)(b).  
62 Ibid s 34(5). 
63 Ibid s 34(2). 
64 Ibid s 8(1). 
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court to give written reasons for any ruling or finding.65 The finding of the 
review authority is deemed to be the finding of the court which passed the 
original sentence or made the original finding or order.66 It follows that the 
review authority, in exercising its review powers, becomes a court of law by 
fiction. Review officials are neither court officers nor judicial officers. The 
military judicial review authority is staffed by military law officers referred to 
as review counsel and headed by the Director: Military Judicial Review. Both 
officers are assigned by the Minister.  
 
2.3.7 Military Defence Counsel Authority 
An accused person before a military court has the right to legal 
representation at state expense.67 In addition an accused person also has 
the right to choose his or her own counsel at own expense. Military defence 
counsel is assigned should an accused elect to be represented at state 
expense.68 The defence counsel authority functions under the direction and 
control of the Director: Military Defence Counsel. Defence counsel are 
assigned by the AG subject to the control of the Minister and must be 
appropriately qualified, over and above holding a degree in law.69 
 
2.3.8 Military Prosecution Authority 
The military prosecution authority (MPA) functions under the direction 
and control of the Director: Military Prosecution Authority.70 Military 
prosecutions are conducted on behalf of the state.71 The MPA must be 
                                                          
65 Ibid s 107.  
66 Ibid s 107. 
67 Ibid s 23(a). 
68 Ibid s 23(a). 
69 Ibid s 23(2)(c) and (3)(a). 
70 Ibid s 26. 
71 Ibid s 22(1). 
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generally free from executive or command interference.72 Its members are 
required to assist the court in the administration of justice and to present 
their cases fairly.73 
The military prosecution authority is independent from the civilian 
(national) prosecution authority though the civilian authority is empowered 
to prosecute both military and civilian offences committed by persons 
subject to the MDC.74 
The MPA is one of the institutions that has been under tremendous 
pressure in the current system of military justice. It was challenged in 
Potsane v Minister of Defence75 on a number of grounds. The first was 
whether the provisions of the Act conferring authority on military 
prosecutors to institute and conduct prosecutions in military courts were 
inconsistent with the provisions of s 179 of the Constitution. Section 179 
provides that ‘[t]here is a single national prosecuting authority in the 
Republic’.  This section creates the office of the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions (NDPP). 
The applicants contended that the section invests the NDPP with 
exclusive prosecutorial authority, which is infringed by the competing 
authority conferred on military prosecutors by the Act. According to the 
argument, prosecutions in military courts should be conducted by or under 
the authority of the NDPP.  
The second contention was that the military prosecutions infringed the 
right to equality in s 9 of the Constitution.76 However, the applicants did not 
challenge the principle of a separate military justice system with jurisdiction 
to try and punish them (for both civilian and military offences). The 
                                                          
72 Ibid s 14(4). 
73 Ibid s 21(a) and (c). 
74 However, the civilian prosecuting authority, as a matter policy and practice, prefers not to 
exercise this power over members subject to the MDC. 
75 The Potsane matter in the High Court is unreported. 
76 Section 9(1) provides that ‘everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal 
protection and benefit of the law.’ 
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constitutional attack was directed at only one component of the military 
justice system, the prosecuting section. 
The High Court found in favour of the applicants. It held that the 
relevant provisions of the Act conflicted with the Constitution to the extent 
that they permitted military prosecutions to prosecute civilian offences 
committed by soldiers in South Africa and accordingly struck down the 
provisions. The High Court reasoned, among other things, that the words 
‘there is’ mandates that ‘there must be’ and ‘single’ means ‘sole’ or ‘one and 
only’. 
The Minister of Defence filed a successful appeal against the decision 
of the High Court in the Constitutional Court.77 The Constitutional Court 
held that ‘single’ in the context of s 179 does not intend to say ‘exclusive’ or 
‘only’ but means to ‘denote the singular, ‘one’.78 It stated, further, that 
‘[w]here there used to be many, there will now be a single authority. That is 
consistent with the historical context as well as with the corresponding 
provisions of the Constitution where the diffused powers of state under the 
previous dispensation were to be brought under a single umbrella.’.79 
On the equality challenge, the Court held that:80 
The impugned sections of the Act differentiate between soldiers and other people. 
Such differentiation is rationally connected to the legitimate government purpose of 
establishing and maintaining a disciplined military force with a viable military 
justice system. The ground of differentiation is not one specified in s 9(3) of the 
Constitution; it applies equally to all members of the SANDF in their capacity as 
such. This basis of differentiation can have no adverse effect on their human dignity 
or have any comparable impact on them. … [t]he] differentiation is therefore not 
unfair discrimination within the meaning of s 9(3) of the Constitution.   
I agree with the above conclusion. Establishing and maintaining a 
disciplined military force is mandated by s 200(1) of the Constitution. The 
differentiation in question is therefore sanctioned by the Constitution itself 
and does not adversely affect the interests of solders. The Court also stated 
                                                          
77 Minister of Defence v Potsane 2002 (1) SA 1 (CC). 
78 Ibid para 26. 
79 Ibid para 26. 
80 Ibid para 44. 
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that for civilian prosecutors, even one attached to the particular military 
unit but not forming part of the command structure, to be making 
prosecutorial decisions which take account of military policy considerations 
would be unfair to both the prosecutor and the accused.81 Potsane is clearly 
a landmark case for the military justice system in South Africa and other 
jurisdictions will also probably find it instructive. The case affirmed the need 
for and the continued existence of a separate military justice system. 
 
2.4 The status of the South African military court system within the 
South African judicial system 
The status of military courts within the South African judicial system 
has always been uncertain. The position is no different in the new 
dispensation.  The difficulty is informed by the fact that military courts have 
always operated as a ‘judicial’ entity separate from the civilian judicial 
system due to their uniqueness as will be highlighted further below. The 
separate existence of military courts raises questions whether these courts 
are really courts, and are part of the South African judicial system in the 
new constitutional scheme. These questions will now be the focal point. As 
will be seen during the course of discussion, the answers to these questions 
have implications regarding the applicability of the principle of judicial 
independence to military courts. 
 
2.4.1 Military courts and the judicial authority of the Republic of 
South Africa  
In the new dispensation, the actual position of military courts within 
the South African judicial system can only be ascertained by analysing the 
relevant constitutional provisions and the legislation establishing these 
courts. Section 165(1) of the Constitution provides that ‘[t]he judicial 
                                                          
81 Ibid para 40. 
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authority of the Republic is vested in the courts.’ Furthermore, s 165(2) 
stipulates that these courts are ‘independent and subject only to the 
Constitution and the law...’.  
 In the old dispensation, the question whether courts-martial (as then 
styled) were courts of law was answered in the affirmative by the Appellate 
Division (as it then was) and was also considered by two writers. This 
question will therefore not be entertained in detail here save to highlight the 
conclusions reached by the authorities in question and to comment briefly 
on the status of current military courts. Botha looked at the question in the 
context of the following tests for judicial acts: 
Is there a legal dispute or uncertainty as regards rights, duties et cetera? Is there a 
finding and application of the law to existing facts and duties – in other words, an 
adjudication in the formal sense? Does the organ performing the act possess the 
formal qualities usually attributed to judicial organs, such as independence and 
legally qualified members who are part of the judicial organisation in the state? Is 
the act final and binding? Does the prohibition of res iudicata apply?82 
Botha concluded that there was little difficulty in finding that courts martial 
were courts in the fullest sense of the word ‘despite the fact that the officers 
presiding over the proceedings [were] not professional lawyers; some of them 
[did] not hold formal legal qualifications at all...’.83 Similarly, Anderson 
carefully studied the question of legal classification of military tribunals as 
courts of law and concluded that courts martial were courts of law.84 He 
measured these courts against the so called trademarks of courts such as 
their composition,85 procedure and evidentiary rules86 and found them to 
have attributes similar to those of courts of law in respect to the said 
trademarks. He stated that the only real stumbling blocks were ‘issues of 
independence from executive control, conclusiveness of their decisions and 
                                                          
82  C. J. Botha ‘Jungle justice and the fundamental rights – military courts in a future 
constitutional dispensation’ (1994) 17 African Defence Review 1, 3. 
83 Ibid. 
84 G.C. Anderson The legal classification of military courts as courts of law (1988) 
Unpublished LL M Thesis, University of Pretoria 144. 
85 In this respect, the decisive issue is the independence of presiding officers from executive 
control. 
86 With regard to this factor, the more strictly the body complies with the procedural and 
evidentiary rules employed by traditional courts, the more likely it will be conferred with 
court status (see Anderson note 84 above 139). 
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the lack of statutory provisions for appeal to the Supreme Court.’87 
Nevertheless, he took the view that those factors do not sufficiently negate 
the concept of a fully fledged military judicial system.88  
 Most importantly, the Appellate Division in Council of Review, South 
African Defence Force, and Others v Mönnig and Others clarified the status of 
courts-martial.89  In that case, Corbett CJ stated that ‘[a]lthough a court 
martial is composed of military officers, it is in substance a court of law and 
its proceedings should conform to the principles, including the rules of 
natural justice, which pertain to courts of law.’90 It is worth noting that the 
authorities discussed above are pre-1994 (before the new era). 
 As a matter of logic, there should be no difficulty in concluding that 
the current military courts (CODH excluded) are courts of law in the full 
sense of the word because these courts have more attributes of courts of law 
than the previous courts-martial which have been found to be courts of law.  
There have been some significant improvements to the stumbling blocks 
which Anderson referred to above. For example, although there is still a 
great need for improvement (as proposed in Chapters Seven and Eight), the 
degree of independence of military courts has been raised significantly since 
the dawn of democracy. Furthermore, as noted already, these courts are now 
presided over by professional lawyers who hold formal legal qualifications. 
They clearly resemble attributes of traditional courts in many respects. 
Moreover, s 19 of the Military Discipline Act requires military judges to 
conduct all proceedings ‘in a manner befitting a court of justice’. 
 However, answering the question whether military courts are courts of 
law is not necessarily the end of the matter because s 166 of the 
                                                          
87 Ibid 144. 
88 Ibid. 
89 1992 (3) SA 482 (A). The question in this case was whether there were any grounds for 
members of a court-martial to recuse themselves on account of institutional bias. 
90 It can only be assumed that the Corbett CJ was only referring to courts martial and not 
summary trials or commanding officers’ disciplinary hearings. 
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Constitution makes provision for a specific structure of courts contemplated 
in s 165. It provides as follows: 
The courts are - the Constitutional Court; the Supreme Court of Appeal; the High 
Courts, including any high court of appeal that may be established by an Act of 
Parliament to hear appeals from High Courts; the Magistrates' Courts; and any other 
court established or recognised in terms of an Act of Parliament, including any court 
of a status similar to either the High Courts or the Magistrates' Courts (emphasis 
added). 
Do military courts form part of the structure of courts above? A brief look at 
the means by which military courts were created and other constitutional 
provisions suggests that these courts are part of the courts contemplated in 
ss 165 and 166 respectively. Military courts are established in terms of an 
Act of Parliament.91 This means that they are part of the South Africa 
judicial system hence subject to the requirement of judicial independence 
which applies to all courts.92  
 Furthermore, s 171 of the Constitution provides that ‘[all] courts 
function in terms of national legislation, and their rules and procedures 
must be provided for in terms of national legislation.’ Military courts 
function in terms of national legislation and their procedures are provided 
for in terms of that national legislation.93 Moreover, the Act which 
establishes military courts provides that military courts are subject to the 
Constitution and the law.94 The Act goes further to embrace some of the 
principles entrenched in s 165 of the Constitution which deals with the 
judicial authority in the Republic. For example, s 19 of that Act states, 
among other things, that military judges must ‘be independent and… apply 
                                                          
91 Military Discipline Act 16 of 1999. 
92 However, the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 does not include military courts in its 
definitions of a lower court and a superior court. This is a legislative rather than 
constitutional gap. It is also a reflection of the historic separate existence of military courts 
in South Africa. In the light of some of the difficulties resulting from the unclear status of 
military courts, Botha (note 82 above) 4 argues that ‘[l]egislation should confirm and define 
the status of military courts within the general court structure, perhaps similar to that of 
the special income tax court.’ Even though Botha made this argument in the context of the 
old system, the discussion above shows that the argument is still valid even under the new 
system because the situation remains unclear. 
93 Military Discipline Act: Rules of Procedure (note 54 above). 
94 Military Discipline Act, s 19. 
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the Constitution and the law impartially and without fear, favour or 
prejudice.’95 The extent to which these courts meet the requirements of 
judicial independence is a different question, and one which is addressed in 
Chapter Seven of this study. 
 Attention will now briefly turn to the appointment of judicial officers 
with a view to locating the position of military judges in the constitutional 
scheme. The Constitution distinguishes between ‘judges’ and ‘other judicial 
officers’. Judges are appointed through procedures involving the Judicial 
Service Commission96 and ‘[o]ther judicial officers must be appointed in 
terms of an Act of Parliament...’.97  I would argue that military judges are 
‘[o]ther judicial officers’ for the purposes of the Constitution because they 
are not ‘judges’ for the purposes of the Constitution and are appointed in 
terms of the Military Discipline Act, which is an Act of Parliament as 
contemplated in s 174(4) of the Constitution. They are not covered by 
legislation regulating magistrates as ‘other judicial officers’. Simply put, they 
are not part of the mainstream national legislation regulating the judiciary. 
This, among other things, has arguably contributed to a huge gap between 
judicial officers of military courts and those of other courts of similar status 
with regard to conditions of service and other requirements of judicial 
independence.  
 
2.5 The uniqueness of military courts 
The military is unique in many respects. Accordingly, arguments are 
often made that structuring the independence of military courts has to be 
seen in the context of the uniqueness of the military in general and military 
courts in particular. This uniqueness is often used to argue in favour of 
                                                          
95 This duty is similar to the provisions of s 165(2) of the Constitution which declares that: 
‘The courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they 
must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice’. 
96 The procedure is laid down in s 174 of the Constitution. 
97 Section 174(4) of the Constitution. 
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limited independence of these courts or to justify some other aspects of the 
military court system. For example, this was done (albeit indirectly) by the 
Lesotho Court Martial in Sekoati and Others v President of the Court Martial 
and Others.98 The uniqueness argument was also, in addition to other 
factors, relied on by the Constitutional Court of South Africa to justify the 
separate existence of the military prosecuting authority in the case of 
Potsane;99 but the argument failed in Freedom of Expression Institute v 
President, Ordinary Court Martial100 where an attempt was made to justify 
the lack of independence of South African courts martial (as then styled). In 
this case, it was argued that ‘...the institution of a court martial is known all 
over the world, and should therefore not be tampered with.’101 
That said, the uniqueness of the military cannot be denied. One does 
not have to go very far to observe the unique nature of this organisation. The 
nature of the employment relationship between the defence force and its 
members demonstrates the uniqueness of the military establishment. Its 
members are criminally liable for breaches of the Military Discipline Code 
and may be sentenced to imprisonment. This type of strict discipline is not 
ordinarily found in civilian settings. In South African National Defence Union 
v Minister of Defence and Another, O’Regan J described the employment 
relationship between the defence force and its members as ‘...unusual and 
not identical to an ordinary employment relationship.’102 Kriegler J sums it 
up when he says that ‘[a]lthough the overarching power of the Constitution 
                                                          
98 Sekoati and Others v President of the Court Martial and Others 2000 (12) BCLR 1373 
(LesCm). This case dealt with the question whether the court-martial in Lesotho was 
independent and impartial in the context of the Constitution of that country. The Court 
stumbled with the question, in the end concluding that the Constitution did not require 
courts-martial to be independent but also stating that, in any event, the courts were 
actually independent. On appeal, the Court of Appeal of Lesotho reached similar 
conclusions in Sekoati and Others v President of the Court Martial and Others 2001 (7) BCLR 
750 (Les). 
99 Note 77 above. 
100 Note 16 above. 
101 Ibid para 29.  
102 1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC) para 27. This case concerned the question whether it is 
constitutional to prohibit members of the armed forces from participating in public protest 
action and from joining trade unions. The Court answered the question in the negative and 
thereby set a new precedent in South Africa. 
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prevails and although the Bill of Rights is not excluded, the relationship 
between the SANDF and its members has certain unique features.’103 
A brief description of those unique aspects of South African military 
courts as currently constituted and more generally follows.104 
Perhaps the obvious starting point is the uniqueness of their purpose. 
In the course of making a ruling on the independence of the Canadian 
military court system in R v Genereux, the Canadian Supreme Court 
observed that ‘…the reasons for the existence of such a parallel system of 
courts provide guides as to the system’s proper limits.’105 I agree, and will 
now consider the purpose of the system. 
 Ordinary courts and military courts exist to serve two different 
purposes.106 Ordinary courts exist to combat and prosecute crime while 
military courts are created primarily for the maintenance of military 
discipline both at times of peace and at times of war.107 More specifically, s 
200(1) of the Constitution provides that the defence force must be structured 
and managed as a disciplined military force. Military courts play a central 
role in the maintenance of discipline in the defence force. 
That said, these courts do not focus exclusively on the maintenance of 
military discipline because the commission of crime by a soldier involves 
both elements. This is recognised in s 105 of the Defence Act of 1957 which 
requires a civilian court when considering sentence for an offence under that 
Act or the MDC ‘to take cognisance of the gravity of the offence in relation to 
its military bearing…’.108 This means that adjudicatory considerations are 
                                                          
103 Minister of Defence v Potsane (note 77 above) para 31. 
104 Most of these features apply to military courts of many other jurisdictions the world over 
including Canada, United Kingdom, New Zealand, United States, and Australia.  
105 (1992) 1 S.C.R. 259, 288. 
106 Ibid 25. 
107 In this connection, s 2(b) of the Military Discipline Act provides among others that ‘the 
objects of the Act are to… – (b) create military courts in order to maintain military 
discipline.’ See also Minister of Defence v Potsane (note 77 above) para 38. See more 
expansive remarks by the Canadian Supreme Court on the purpose of the military court 
system in R v  Généreux (note 105 above). 
108 Potsane Ibid para 25. 
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different when sentencing a soldier, given the imperative of the maintenance 
of military discipline. 
Another example of the uniqueness of military courts related to their 
purpose is that their primary focus is trial of military offences, which are 
unique in themselves. The following offences illustrate the point: mutiny; 
desertion; absence without leave; assaulting a superior officer; assaulting or 
ill-treating a subordinate; using threatening, insulting or insubordinate 
language; malingering; disobeying lawful commands or orders; causing or 
allowing a vessel or aircraft to be hazarded, stranded or wrecked; negligently 
losing kit, equipment or arms; drunkenness on or off-duty; riotous or 
unseemly behaviour and conduct to the prejudice of military discipline.109 
According to a dictum by Cullinan J, some of these offences ‘...serve to 
indicate the irreconcilable difference between civilian and military notions of 
discipline.’110 
As already noted, players in military courts are also unique. Judges, 
prosecutors, accused persons and sometimes defence lawyers111 are all 
military people who wear military uniform and are subject to the Military 
Discipline Code. According to Kriegler J, soldiers live and work in a 
subculture of their own.112 Similarly, Conradie J observed that ‘[d]efence 
forces the world over function on a very strong loyalty ethic.’113 As for 
military judges, their uniqueness becomes more obvious when they are 
juxtaposed with ordinary judges. Military judges undergo military training 
and carry a military rank. They may be deployed outside the borders of the 
country and may also be required to hold court sessions in combat or 
                                                          
109 Military Discipline Code. 
110 Sekoati and Others v President of the Court Martial and Others 2000 (12) BCLR 1373 
(LesCm) p 1375. For a further illustration of the uniqueness of military offences see R v 
Généreux (note 105 above). 
111 Provided the accused person chooses to be represented by a military defence counsel. 
See also generally, Peter Rowe (ed.) The Impact of Human Rights Law on the Armed Forces 
(2006) 79-80. 
112 Minister of Defence v Potsane (note 77 above) para 31. 
113  Mönnig v Council of Review (note 89 above). 
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operational environments. In Weiss v United States,114 the Supreme Court 
made the following interesting observation about military judges in the 
United States: ‘[w]hatever might be the case in civilian society, we think that 
the role of military judge is “germane” to that of military officer.’ This 
illustrates, further, the special role of military judges. 
 The post-conviction and sentencing process is also unique in the 
sense that every conviction and sentence by a military court is subject to 
automatic review.115 In the civilian court system, review of sentences is not 
the rule but exception.116 
Another interesting feature of military courts is that they have extra-
territorial jurisdiction in the sense that they can sit anywhere in the 
world.117 The same cannot be said of civilian courts. Their powers only 
extend to the borders of the country. This places military courts in a unique 
position. Extra-territoriality has been held by the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa to be essential to the functioning of military discipline.118 The 
SANDF has to have jurisdiction over its members wherever in the world they 
may be stationed.119  
Finally, in the context of judicial independence, military courts do not 
only have to be independent from the executive (civilian) but from the 
military chain of command as well. This makes matters more complicated 
given the hierarchical nature of the military. In the South African context, 
although the military command is broadly part of the executive, the former 
                                                          
114 510 U.S 163 (1994). In this case, military judges escaped attacks of lack of 
independence. The United States Supreme Court protected them by mainly using 
arguments relating to the long history of uniqueness of courts-martial.  
115 See the description of the review process already discussed in this chapter. 
116 See Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 s 302 for the limited circumstances where a 
sentence of a magistrate’s court is subject to an automatic review by a High Court judge. 
117 Section 5 of the Military Discipline Act. This is also true in many other jurisdictions the 
world over. 
118 Minister of Defence v Potsane (note 77 above) para 24. 
119 See ibid. 
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can be constitutionally distinguished from the latter for purposes of this 
thesis.120 
 
2.6 Concluding remarks 
The South African military court system has been through three 
phases. The first phase was dominated by the application of British military 
law. In the second phase, South Africa tried to come up with its own ‘unique’ 
system in 1957 which operated unchanged and without major difficulty for 
decades. With the dawn of the democratic era, the third phase of the system 
was inevitable. This phase was triggered by the Freedom of Expression case. 
During the same period, the landmark case of Potsane affirmed the separate 
existence of the military court system in the democratic era. However, as 
already suggested in Chapter One, the system still faces some challenges.  
The second part of this chapter has looked at the status of military 
courts within the judicial set up of the Republic of South Africa. It has found 
that military courts are courts of law and part of the judicial system of the 
Republic. The conclusion reached is that the constitutional requirement of 
judicial independence applies to military courts 
Another central observation of this chapter is that, although South 
African military courts have recently witnessed radical changes, many 
unique features can still be identified. The key unique features are:  the 
purpose of the military court system and the environment within which it 
functions, the players involved in the system, the post conviction process 
and the fact that they have extra-territorial jurisdiction. This uniqueness, 
sometimes coupled with other factors, has, in many cases, allowed military 
                                                          
120 See s 202(1) of the Constitution which provides that ‘[t]he President as head of the 
national executive is Commander-in-Chief of the defence force, and must appoint the 
Military Command of the defence force.’ In the same provision, reference is made to the 
military command which must be appointed by the president as head of the national 
executive. 
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courts to escape fair trial and judicial independence standards in a number 
of jurisdictions.  
At the same time, it has also been demonstrated that things are not 
static with military courts. In other words, the dawn of democracy and 
advances in human rights discourse are facilitating challenges to traditional 
notions of military courts. While the uniqueness of the military is still intact, 
the uniqueness of military courts can be described as ‘changing’ given the 
constant challenges faced by these courts. The new military court system 
resembles the ordinary criminal justice system in many respects. It can be 
expected to get even closer to the ordinary criminal justice system when it is 
once again overhauled in the near future in order for it to be more compliant 
with fair trial and judicial independence standards. As Rubin points out 
‘even the military community’s ‘need’ to be different from civilian society in 
order to maintain its perceived collective good may no longer prevail in the 
face of certain human rights...claims.’121 Finally, as will appear in the next 
chapter, the emerging questions about the character and the process of the 
CODH is further testimony of the changing uniqueness of the military justice 
system. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
121 G.R. Rubin ‘United Kingdom Military Law: Autonomy, Civilianisation, Juridification’ 
2002 62 Modern Law Review 36, 39. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE COMMANDING OFFICER’S DISCIPLINARY HEARING AND ITS 
STATUS WITHIN THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY COURT SYSTEM 
 
3.1 Introductory remarks 
 The status of the Commanding Officer’s Disciplinary Hearing (CODH)1 
within the military court system described in the previous chapter is not 
entirely clear. The relevant legislation classifies it as a military court 
alongside the court of a military judge and senior military judge. This is 
despite the fact that the CODH is fundamentally different in terms of its 
attributes, composition and character. The aim of this chapter is to show 
that the CODH is not a court of law or a military court in the strict sense of 
the word. I argue that it is in fact not meant to be a court of law in 
substance despite the fact that the relevant Act classifies it as part of the 
military court system. Furthermore, the chapter suggests that the 
Constitution sanctions the idea that the CODH should not operate as a 
court of law in substance. The arguments proffered in this chapter form the 
basis for not including the CODH in the assessment of the judicial 
independence of military courts in Chapter Six. 
 
3.2 The commanding officer’s disciplinary hearing and attributes of a 
court 
 The CODH was described in some detail in Chapter Two, and this 
need not be repeated here save to highlight a few important points. The 
Military Discipline Act classifies the CODH as part of the hierarchy of the 
military court system.2 It is at the lowest level of ‘military courts’. It consists 
of the commanding officer or an officer subordinate in rank to such 
                                                          
1 In this Chapter, CODH and summary trial will be used interchangeably depending on the 
context, for reasons which will be given further below. 
2 Section 6(1) of the Military Discipline Act. 
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commanding officer and of not less than field rank. In the latter case such 
an officer must be authorised in writing by the relevant commanding officer 
to preside. Neither the commanding officer nor his delegated officer needs to 
possess any legal qualification or be appropriately qualified.  
The classification of the CODH as a court or military court is at least 
questionable. This issue has been studied by Anderson albeit relating to the 
system which existed during the pre-democracy era.3  I am in general 
agreement with the conclusion reached by Anderson, and do not wish to 
repeat his arguments save to emphasise certain key points and to add a few 
aspects to the debate.  
In his study, Anderson  considered, among other things, whether 
‘summary trials’ (as then styled) were courts of law by evaluating them 
against what are referred to as the ‘trademarks of courts.’4 These include 
two groups of factors. The first concerns the composition of tribunals.5 The 
key aspect in relation to this factor is the independence of the body from its 
administrative department.6 The second group of factors relates to the 
procedural and evidentiary rules used by the body concerned. With regard 
to the latter, ‘[t]he more strictly the body complies with the procedural and 
evidentiary rules employed by traditional courts, the more likely it will be 
conferred with court status.’7Anderson concluded that the composition of a 
summary trial ‘negates the notion that these bodies are courts of law.’8 He 
explained that ‘[i]n a real sense, the bench has an interest in the outcome of 
the trial.’9  
Changes made to the military justice system in 1999 regarding 
summary trials did not break away from the key features of summary trials 
or the CODH. The trial officer is still the superior officer of the accused, they 
                                                          
3 G. C. Anderson The legal classification of military courts as courts of law, (1988) 
Unpublished LL M Dissertation, University of Pretoria 139 
4 Ibid 139. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid 142. 
9 Ibid. 
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still follow a relatively simple procedure, and their jurisdiction is still limited 
to minor military offences and guilty pleas.  Furthermore, legal 
representation is still generally not permitted. This means that the 
conclusion by Anderson in relation to the old system of summary trials is 
also applicable to the CODH in the new dispensation.  
The view that the CODH is not a court of law can hardly be rebutted 
for a number of reasons. As Anderson points out, commanders have a direct 
interest in the outcome of any disciplinary hearing; and they convene and 
adjudicate in such proceedings themselves.  On the basis of these alone, the 
CODH cannot be classified as a court of law by any stretch of imagination.  
Moreover, the definition of a military court in the Act suggests that not 
all ‘military courts’ are necessarily courts of law in a traditional sense. In 
terms of s 1 of the Act, a ‘military court’ means any one of the ‘courts’ and 
the ‘disciplinary hearing.’ In my view, this means that a disciplinary hearing 
is not actually a court (as its name suggests) but it is a military court only 
for the purposes of the operation of the Act.  
In fact there are South African authorities to the effect that the 
circumstance that a forum is formally regarded as a court does not 
necessarily mean it is in substance a court or a court of law even if it 
discharges functions of a judicial nature. The first of these is Minister of the 
Interior and Another v Harris and Others.10 In this case, the Appellate 
Division (as it then was) declared the so-called ‘High Court of Parliament’ to 
be only a court in form but not in substance.11 It saw the said ‘court’ as 
simply Parliament functioning under another name. Among other important 
reasons the Court advanced in support of its conclusion, it looked at the fact 
that no legal qualifications were required for membership of the High Court 
of Parliament;12 that the persons, who in their capacity as legislators passed 
an Act, were empowered in another capacity (as a court of law) to decide 
                                                          
10 1952 (4) All SA 376 (A). 
11 Ibid 385. 
12 Ibid 384. 
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whether the said Act was validly passed.13 The court regarded these 
characteristics as foreign to courts of law.14 It held further that the fact that 
Parliament had described itself as a court of law did not alter the fact that 
the High Court of Parliament was Parliament functioning under the relevant 
Act and not a court of law.15 
How does the reasoning of the Appellate Division apply in the case of 
the CODH? As already discussed, the Act does not require commanding 
officers to be legally qualified, and this is one of the grounds upon which the 
High Court of Parliament was found not to be a court of law in substance. 
Furthermore, the fact that commanding officers preside over disciplinary 
hearings or appoint their subordinates to do so despite the fact that they 
(commanding officers and their subordinates) have a vested interest in the 
outcome is something foreign to courts of law, as similarly highlighted by 
the Appellate Division.16  The reasoning of the Appellate Division confirms 
the view that the CODH is not a court of law but simply a commanding 
officer’s disciplinary hearing. The fact that an Act of Parliament formally 
classifies it as a ‘military court’ does not detract from the fact that it is in 
substance not a court of law.  
The second authority which falls for consideration is South African 
Technical Officials’ Association v President of the Industrial Court and 
Others17 which dealt with the identity and status of the industrial court, 
more specifically whether its status was equivalent to that of the Supreme 
Court of South Africa. The Act which created the court provided that it 
would be the function of the industrial court, within the statutorily defined 
limitations, to perform all the functions ‘which a court of law may perform.’ 
The Court ruled that the industrial court was not a court of law despite the 
                                                          
13 Ibid 385. 
14 Ibid 384. 
15 Ibid 385. 
16 It may be worth pointing out, however, that according to Rule 63 (Military Discipline 
Supplementary Measures Act: Rules of Procedure made by the Minister of Defence under s 
44(4) of the Act: GNR.747 of 11 June 1999), ‘when there are reasonable grounds for 
believing that there is a likelihood of bias on the part of the commanding officer; or the 
commanding officer signed as a witness on the accused’s election to be heard at a 
disciplinary hearing, that commanding officer shall recuse himself or herself.’  
17 1985 (1) SA 597 (A). 
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fact that it performed judicial functions.18 Several factors were considered as 
reasons for the decision, many of which were peculiar to the circumstances 
of that case, and these will not be dealt with here because of their obvious 
irrelevance. One of the factors highlighted in support of the court’s view was 
the circumstance that members of the industrial court had an uncertain 
tenure of office and that this was not compatible with judicial 
independence.19 Similarly, in Freedom of Expression Institute and Others v 
President of the Ordinary Court Martial NO and Others, it was held (in 
reference to an ordinary court-martial) that ‘no tribunal or forum which is 
not independent and impartial will qualify as a court.’ 20   
The CODH is clearly not an independent forum.    Officers who preside 
over the CODH have no security of tenure whatsoever, and this is foreign to 
courts of law. In fact, it is difficult to even begin to talk about such tenure in 
relation to the CODH because commanding officers preside over the CODH 
merely by virtue of their status as commanding officers, and not as judicial 
officers. These officers are part of the military command, which could be 
described as an equivalent of the executive branch of government in a 
civilian setting. In his discussion of the military disciplinary process, Rowe 
makes a similar observation persuasively when he states that: 
Despite the relative formality of proceedings before a senior officer they cannot be 
classified as a ‘court’ or he be termed a ‘judicial officer’ since the commanding officer 
is responsible for discipline in his unit and is therefore acting in an executive rather 
than in a judicial manner when he enforces military discipline.21 
The view expressed above clearly reinforces the arguments proffered so far 
in relation to the status of the CODH. 
                                                          
18 Ibid 612. 
19 Ibid. While the principle expressed by the Court is broadly relevant for our purposes, it 
must be pointed out that the Court expressed its view in comparison with the tenure of 
office of judges of the Supreme Court, a circumstance which is not present in the case of 
the CODH. 
20 1999 (2) SA 471 (C) para 23. 
21 Peter Rowe (ed.) The Impact of Human Rights Law on the Armed Forces (2006) 76. For an 
attempt at evaluating the independence of the CODH see Michelle Nel Sentencing Practice in 
Military Courts (2012) Thesis submitted for LLD Degree, University of South Africa 239-246 
http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/5969/dissertation_nel_m.pdf?sequence=1 
[accessed on 26 July 2012]. 
 
52 
 
 
 
 That said, more crucial for our purposes is that, in arriving at its 
conclusion, the Appellate Division in Technical Officials’ Association v 
President of the Industrial Court and Others22 drew inspiration from 
observations in a Privy Council decision emanating from Australia which 
dealt with the question whether the board of review which was created by a 
federal statute was a court of law.23  In that case, it was stated that ‘[t]he 
authorities are clear to show that there are tribunals with many of the 
trappings of a Court which, nevertheless, are not Courts in the strict sense 
of exercising judicial power...’ The Judicial Committee went on and made the 
following negative propositions which were quoted with approval by the 
Appellate Division in Technical Officials’ Association v President of the 
Industrial Court and Others:24 
1. A tribunal is not necessarily a Court in this strict sense because it gives a final 
decision. 2. Nor because it hears witnesses on oath. 3. Nor because two or more 
contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide. 4. Nor because it 
gives decisions which affect the rights of subjects. 5. Nor because there is an appeal 
to a Court. 6. Nor because it is a body to which a matter is referred by another body. 
The CODH has all of the above trappings. The commanding officer gives a 
final decision in the sense that he or she may not review or change his or 
her own decision. Commanding officers hear witnesses on oath.25 They 
usually hear contending views between the State and the accused albeit 
almost always about the nature of the sentence to be imposed because the 
CODH only hears guilty pleas.  There is no doubt that it gives decisions 
which affect the rights of the parties, and there is an appeal to higher 
courts. Despite all these attributes, we have learnt from the above 
authorities that these do not automatically earn the commanding officer’s 
disciplinary hearing the status of a court of law. Something much more 
substantial is required than mere form. Although the authorities referred to 
above dealt with different statutes, different subject-matter and different 
circumstances, the dictum and the reasoning advanced in those decisions 
                                                          
22 Note 17 above. 
23 Shell Company of Australia Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation 1931 AC 275 (PC).  
24 Note 17 above 611. 
25 Rule 96(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Military Discipline Act (note 16 above) which 
provide that ‘[e]very person called to testify as a witness before a military court shall give his 
or her evidence orally and on oath and the presiding judge or commanding officer shall 
administer the prescribed oath to such person. (Emphasis added) 
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are generally relevant to the question whether a body may be said to 
constitute a court of law.26 The difficulties highlighted with respect to the 
nature of the CODH are so glaring that it cannot be a court of law by many 
standards.  
However, having dealt with the question whether the CODH, as 
currently constituted, is a court of law is not necessarily the end of the 
matter. The next question is what exactly is the status of the CODH or put 
differently, how should the CODH be characterized? Does the Constitution 
sanction the idea that it operates not as a court of law? Before answering 
these questions, let us first consider summary trials in comparative military 
justice. 
 
3.3 Summary trials in comparative military justice 
 A comparative overview of the status and nature of summary trials27 
may assist in understanding how the CODH should be dealt with in relation 
to its status and identity. The comparative overview in this section does not 
include African countries because the laws of the relevant countries are 
either unclear about the status and nature of summary trials within the 
military court system, or do not at all mention summary trials. 28 The focus 
will, therefore, be on India, the United States, the United Kingdom, New 
Zealand and Canada.29 The survey will assess aspects of summary trials 
with respect to their status, composition, the right to legal representation, 
and jurisdiction in respect of persons and penalties. 
                                                          
26 See Technical Officials’ Association v President of the Industrial Court and Others (note 17 
above) 611 where the Court applied the same analogy. 
27 In many jurisdictions the commanding officer’s disciplinary hearing is referred to as a 
summary trial or summary court-martial. In this part of the chapter, the expressions 
‘summary trials’ and ‘summary courts-martial’ are used interchangeably. In the old 
dispensation, the CODH in South Africa was loosely referred to as a summary trial because 
commanding officers were empowered to summarily try any person subject to the military 
discipline code (see s 62 of the first schedule of the repealed Defence Act 44 of 1957). 
28 The countries that could have been considered are Zimbabwe (Defence Act Chapter 
11:02) and Tanzania (Military Court Act, 1964). 
29 Australia has not been included in this survey because temporary summary proceedings 
were in existence at the time of writing following a decision of the Australian High Court 
which declared the Australian Military Court unconstitutional: Lane v Morrison (2009) 239 
CLR 230. 
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 In the United States, summary courts-martial are part of the 
hierarchy of military courts,30 as is the case in South Africa. They consist of 
one commissioned officer, usually a non-lawyer, who presides on issues of 
law and also as finder of fact (jury). Summary courts-martial are generally 
convened by a commanding officer of a unit but the presiding officer does 
not necessarily have to be the commanding officer.31 They have world-wide 
jurisdiction over any person subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ) except officers, cadets and midshipmen, for any non-capital 
offence;32 but no one may be brought before a summary court-martial 
without their consent.33 Summary courts-martial may impose any 
punishment not forbidden by the UCMJ ‘except death, dismissal, 
dishonourable or bad-conduct discharge, confinement for more than one 
month, hard-labour without confinement for more than 45 days, restriction 
to specified limits for more than two months’.34 Furthermore, they may also 
not impose ‘forfeiture of more than two-thirds of one month's pay.’35 The 
accused does not have the right to legal representation at summary courts-
martial.36 However, the accused may be permitted to be represented by a 
qualified civilian counsel in certain circumstances – that is ‘if such 
appearance will not unreasonably delay the proceedings and military 
exigencies do not preclude it.’37 That said, it is the function of a summary-
court officer to ensure that the interests of both the government and the 
accused are safeguarded and that justice is done.38 This means that the 
                                                          
30 Art. 16 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice which lists summary courts-martial 
alongside general courts-martial and special-courts martial. The latter two courts have wide 
powers and are presided over by military judges. Summary courts-martial must be 
distinguished from non-judicial punishment which may be imposed by a commanding 
officer to any military personnel including officers. The latter appears to be less formal 
compared to summary courts-martial or the CODH. See § 815. art.15 for detail about non-
judicial punishment. At a formal (legal) level, non-judicial punishment has no equivalence 
in South African military law.  
31 See art. 24 read with art. 25 of the UCMJ. 
32 Art. 13 & 20 of the UCMJ . 
33 Art. 20 of the UCMJ. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 See Rule 1301(e) of the Rules for Courts-Martial (R.C.M). 
37 Ibid. 
38 Rule 1301(b) of R.C.M. 
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summary-court officer ‘acts not only as judge and jury, but also as the 
prosecutor and defence counsel.’39 
 Quite correctly, Huestis points out that ‘a summary court-martial is a 
‘trial’ in name only’ which falls well short of American expectations of 
criminal justice when measured by constitutional due process standards, 
and rightly sees a summary court-martial as ‘an important command tool.’40 
 In the Indian Army, there are four kinds of courts-martial.41 Summary 
courts-martial are the lowest level of courts-martial.42 These courts may be 
held by the commanding officer of any corps, department or detachment of 
the regular Army.43 The commanding officer alone constitutes the court.44 
From this, it is very clear that Indian summary courts-martial are the sole 
domain of the commanding officers. These ‘courts’ may try any person 
subject to the Indian Army Act and under the command of the officer 
holding the court.45 There are, however, a few exceptions. The following 
persons may not be tried by a summary court-martial: an officer, junior 
commissioned officer or warrant officer.46 As for their penal jurisdiction, 
Indian summary courts-martial have more powers than American summary 
courts-martial. They may pass any sentence which may be passed under the 
Indian Army Act with the exception of the following: a sentence of death or 
transportation, or of imprisonment for a term exceeding three months or one 
year depending on the rank of the officer holding the hearing.47 The accused 
                                                          
39 Bradley Huestis ‘The Art of Trial Advocacy: Summary Court-Martial: Using the Right Tool 
for the Job’ (2002) July Army Lawyer 52. For another brief description of summary courts-
martial in the United States see also Michael Gilbert ‘Summary Courts-Martial: 
Rediscovering the spumoni of military justice’ (1996) 39 A.FL. Rev. 119. 
40 Ibid 56. 
41 Section 108 of the Army Act 46 of 1950 hereinafter referred to as the Indian Army Act. 
42 Other courts-martial are general courts-martial; district courts-martial; and summary 
general courts-martial. India has retained the old British model of having a separate 
military justice system for each arm of service (Air Force; Navy; and the Army). In the Air 
Force only three types of courts-martial are provided for. Strikingly, the Air Force Act 45 of 
1950 makes no provision for the summary court-martial. See s 109 of the Act. For a concise 
explanation of the differences between the three arms of services in India, see Umesh Jha 
(ed.) The Military Justice System in India: An Analysis (2009) 280-282. 
43 Section 116 of the Indian Army Act. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Section 120(3) of the Indian Army Act. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid s 120(4). 
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does not have a right to elect trial by a court-martial. However, there are 
some high court decisions in India to the effect that a summary court-
martial must only be convened where the exigencies demand an immediate 
and swift decision without which the situation will indubitably be 
exacerbated with widespread ramifications.48 In other words summary 
courts-martial must be held only as an exception, not the rule. 
Furthermore, the accused does not have the right to legal representation 
except that ‘the accused is entitled to have the services of a ‘friend’ who may 
be any person whose services the accused may be able to procure.’49 This 
person can only advise the accused but may not participate in the actual 
proceedings.50  
 Commenting on India’s summary court-martial, Jha points out that a 
sentence imposed at a summary trial is a non-judicial punishment because 
the officer conducting the proceedings is not a court and the trial is by a 
summary proceeding.51 In the light of several peculiar procedural 
inadequacies52 and the arbitrary nature of the way in which summary trials 
are conducted in India, Jha calls for an urgent need to abolish summary 
courts-martial.53 However, it must be said that, in his analysis, Jha 
acknowledges the importance of summary trials and to an extent supports 
the reform of summary trials elsewhere in his work.54 In my view, the reform 
of these institutions is more desirable than abolition given their importance.  
 In the Indian Navy, there is no summary court-martial in a formal 
sense but a commanding officer is empowered to summarily try and punish 
any person other than an officer for a non-capital offence.55 Commanding 
officers are not empowered to award a punishment of imprisonment or 
                                                          
48 See Umesh Jha (note 42 above) 231 for a discussion of these. 
49 Ibid 229. 
50 Ibid 229 in reference to Army Rules 1954. 
51 Ibid 178. 
52 For example, lack of access to defence counsel and the right to elect to be heard by a 
court-martial. 
53 The author referred to above contrasts summary courts-martial of India with those of 
Israel, China, Russia, Canada and South Africa – saying that military justice systems of 
these countries do not have provisions similar to that of the Indian summary court-martial.  
54 See Jha (note 42 above) 299. 
55 See s 93(2) of the Navy Act 62 of 1950. 
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detention for more than three months, or to award dismissal with disgrace 
from the naval service.56 Although the relevant Act does not use the phrase 
‘summary court-martial’ with reference to the powers of the commanding 
officer, it could be argued that the nature of the powers and the manner in 
which such powers are exercised, the summary trial by the commanding 
officer is an equivalent of a summary court-martial in the Indian Army Act. 
The United Kingdom has had difficulties with the European Court of 
Human Rights concerning its military justice system in recent times. In 
terms of the most recent legislation, summary trials by commanding officers 
are referred to as ‘summary hearings’.57 The words ‘courts-martial’ or ‘court’ 
are not used at all in reference to summary hearings by commanding 
officers. As is the case in many other systems, such hearings have a limited 
jurisdiction in terms of the offences that they may deal with, almost all of 
which are purely military disciplinary offences.58 The punishments which 
are available to commanding officers are also limited. From the list of 
punishments provided for, the most severe are the following (in order):59 
detention for a term not exceeding 90 days; forfeiture of a specified term of 
seniority or of all seniority; and reduction in rank, or disrating.60 It is 
interesting to note that commanding officers are also empowered to try 
certain officer ranks summarily.61 Accused persons have the right to elect 
trial by a court-martial.62 The Act does not provide for the right to legal 
representation at a summary hearing.63 It is perhaps worth drawing 
attention to the fact that ‘any person in respect of whom - a charge has been 
                                                          
56 Ibid. Other tribunals provided for in the Act are a court-martial and a disciplinary court. 
The latter is composed of three to five officers--the majority of whom shall be officers of the 
executive branch of the naval service 
57 Armed Forces Act (c.52), ss 52 & 53 in particular. 
58 See ibid s 53. For example, some of the offences are low flying, hazarding of a ship etc. 
59 It is probably worth pointing out that the issue of severity of punishment in military 
context has relative aspects to it in the sense that it would depend on the circumstances 
and the perspective of the person receiving a particular punishment. 
60 See ibid s 132. 
61 In terms of s 52(3) of the Armed Forces Act an officer below the rank of commander, 
lieutenant-colonel or wing commander may be heard summarily. 
62 Ibid s 129. 
63 The regulations under the old Act (Armed Forces Act of 1996) made provision for the 
accused to take legal advice before electing to be heard by a commanding officer and to 
have access to the so-called the accused’s adviser. 
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heard summarily, and a finding that the charge has been proved has been 
recorded, may appeal to the Summary Appeal Court against the finding or 
against the punishment awarded.’64 It is novel in contemporary military 
justice to have a special appeal court to consider appeals from a summary 
trial. 
In the recent case of Bell v the United Kingdom,65 the European Court 
of Human Rights held that rights of fair trial provided for in Art 6(1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights were applicable to summary trials 
because it considered the penalty imposed by the commanding officer to be 
sufficiently severe as to render it criminal for purposes of that article.66 The 
rights in Art 6(1) include the right to be tried by an independent and 
impartial tribunal, which the Court found to have been violated by a 
summary trial procedure, for obvious reasons.67 Although the court was 
dealing with summary trials under the 1996 Act, the reasoning of the court 
would also apply to summary trials under the 2006 Act because the two are 
substantially similar.  
Following the case of Bell v the United Kingdom, it is possible that 
detention powers of commanding officers may be severely curtailed in order 
to avert another challenge before the European Court of Human Rights. A 
close reading of the above-mentioned case suggests that the United Kingdom 
does not necessarily have to abolish summary trials to ensure compliance 
with the Convention, but must rather cut down the detention powers of 
commanding officers as a possible option.  This will most likely ensure non-
application of Art 6(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights since 
summary trials will be rendered completely disciplinary. I revert to the 
                                                          
64 Ibid s 141. New Zealand has recently introduced a similar court. See Armed Forces 
Discipline Amendment Act (No 2) 2007, s 118. 
65 [2007] ECHR 47. 
66 See paras 42-43. The punishment involved in this case was seven days detention in a 
locked up cell in the battalion guardroom.  
67 Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides among other things 
that ‘[i]n the determination...of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a 
fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law.’ 
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above-mentioned case later in this Chapter with the view to evaluating its 
possible influence on the future structuring of the CODH in South Africa. 
Attention now turns to Canada, which has, in many ways, been at the 
forefront of the reform of military justice systems in the world. In Canada, 
summary trials by commanding officers are not courts-martial as they are 
not included under the definition of ‘court-martial’.68 A summary trial is 
presided over by a commanding officer or an officer delegated to act as such 
by a commanding officer or a superior commander if the accused person is a 
lieutenant-colonel or an officer below the rank of lieutenant-colonel or a 
non-commissioned member above the rank of sergeant provided certain 
requirements are satisfied.69 As is the case with summary trials already 
considered thus far, their jurisdiction both in respect of persons and 
punishment is limited. They may only try an officer cadet or a non-
commissioned officer member below the rank of warrant officer for certain 
offences, notwithstanding whether a guilty or not guilty plea is offered. 
However, as noted above superior commanders have the authority to try 
certain officer ranks summarily. 
Upon a finding of guilty, only one or more of the following sentences 
may be imposed: detention for a period not exceeding thirty days; reduction 
in rank by one rank; severe reprimand; reprimand; a fine; and minor 
punishments depending on the rank of the accused.70 The right to legal 
representation is not provided for, but the accused is allowed to be assisted 
by the so-called ‘assisting officer’ appointed by or under the authority of the 
commanding officer in order to assist the accused at the hearing.71  It is 
                                                          
68 According to s 2(1) of the National Defence Act (as amended) R.S.C., 1985, c. N-5 
hereinafter referred to as Canada’s National Defence Act unless the context dictates 
otherwise, a ‘court martial’ includes a General Court-Martial and a Standing Court-Martial. 
Of course, it could be argued, albeit cynically, that this definition does not necessarily 
exclude summary trials. That said, they are part of the definition of service tribunals – 
which also covers courts-martial. See, once again, s (2)1 of the Act. 
69 Ibid ss 163(1) and (3), 164(1)(a), and 164(3) of the National Defence Act respectively. 
70 Ibid ss 163(3) and 164(4). However, officers delegated to preside over summary trials have 
reduced powers in respect of these sentences. See s 163(4) for limits in this regard. 
71 See Queens Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces Volume II Chapter 108 art. 
108.14. In certain circumstances, the rules make provision for the accused to be assisted 
by an officer of his choosing. However, it is interesting to note that the art. 108.14, Note (B) 
of the regulations provides that ‘(B) An accused person does not have a right to be 
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interesting to note that assistance includes speaking for the accused during 
the trial, something unique among the jurisdictions considered thus far. The 
presiding officer acts as both judge and prosecutor because he is 
responsible for ensuring that both the accused and the assisting officer have 
access to all the information concerning the trial.72 Finally, the accused can 
elect to be heard by a court-martial if he so wishes.73 
Among the countries under consideration, New Zealand is the latest 
country that has ‘voluntarily’74 overhauled its military justice system – 
including summary trials. The new law which introduced sweeping changes 
to the system came into effect on 1 July 2009.75 However, a deliberate policy 
stance has been taken not to introduce any major changes to the core 
elements of summary trials by commanding officers.76 Summary trials 
continue to be conducted by commanders, not courts,77 and they may hear 
both guilty and not-guilty pleas. These officers act generally as both 
‘prosecutors and judges’ because the law expects them to investigate as well 
dispose of offences.78 However, a commanding officer is assisted by a 
‘presenting officer’ assigned by him, and this officer must not be a lawyer.79 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
represented by legal counsel at a summary trial. However, if an accused requests such 
representation, the officer having summary trial jurisdiction has the discretion to: 
i. permit representation by legal counsel; 
ii. proceed without representation by legal counsel; or 
iii. apply for disposal of the charges against the accused by a court martial.’ (emphasis 
added). 
72 See ibid art.108.15. 
73 Section 163(1)(c) of Canada’s National Defence Act. 
74 In the sense that there has not been any major challenge to New Zealand’s military 
justice system as compared to changes in some of the jurisdictions under consideration. 
For some detail on this point, see Chris Griggs ‘A new military justice system for New 
Zealand’ (2006) 6 New Zealand Armed Forces Law Review 62, 62-64. 
75http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/news/publications/one-force/2/military-justice-system.htm 
[accessed on 12 June 2011]. 
76 Chris Griggs (note 74 above) 69. 
77 See new definition of ‘court-martial’ provided for in the Armed Forces Discipline 
Amendment Act (No 2) 2007, s 4(4) which does not include summary trials. See also s 
103(1) of the same Act which provides that ‘[e]very commanding officer must investigate and 
dispose of a charge before him or her in the prescribed manner’ which confirms that 
summary trial is not a court of law in that country. Having said that, the definition of a 
‘military tribunal’ in the same Act includes a disciplinary officer, the Summary Appeal 
Court and the Court Martial. But as noted in Shell Company of Australia Ltd v Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation (note 23 above) a tribunal is not necessarily a court. 
78 See Ibid. 
79 Ibid s 115. 
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The presenting officer assembles the evidence and presents the case in 
support of the charge.80  
As expected, they have a limited jurisdiction in terms of the nature of 
sentences they may impose, and are empowered to impose a sentence of 
detention but only on non-commissioned officers.81 Surprisingly, they have 
virtually no limits in terms of persons subject to hearing before them, 
provided the person concerned is subject to the relevant Act.  
A commanding officer exercising summary trial powers under the Act 
has discretion whether or not to grant an accused person the right to elect 
trial by the Court Martial of New Zealand (hereinafter ‘Court Martial’); this 
discretion is guided by the nature of punishment likely to be imposed by the 
disciplinary officer.82 Finally, accused persons tried summarily are deemed 
to have waived certain rights in certain circumstances.83 Consequently, they 
have no right to legal representation,84 and most importantly, they also have 
no right to a hearing by an independent court.85 
 
Summary of key lessons from comparative military justice regarding 
summary trials  
 The survey of the five countries considered shows that summary trials 
enjoy many similarities. In three of the five countries surveyed, summary 
trials are not formally referred to as ‘courts-martial’ or at least the word 
‘court’ is not used in reference to them.86 All of these countries have recently 
reformed their military justice systems, the most recent being the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand respectively. They have deliberately maintained 
                                                          
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid s 117Y(3). 
82 Ibid s 117L(1) and (2). 
83 Ibid s 117ZD. 
84 However, it must be pointed out that the accused before a summary hearing must be 
assigned a defending officer to assist him or her in the preparation and presentation of his 
or her  case and to act on behalf of the accused, and this officer must not be a lawyer (ibid s 
114). 
85 Ibid. 
86 These are the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand. 
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the status quo regarding the identity of summary trials except making a few 
procedural modifications. On the other hand, the United States and India 
regard summary trials as part of courts-martial, albeit that in the case of 
India the picture is mixed because the Navy has a unique system. However, 
the analysis of South African summary trials shows that nothing much can 
be read into the fact that summary trials are formally courts-martial or 
courts because they are in substance not courts. 
 In all the countries studied, summary trials are essentially the sole 
domain of commanding officers because they act as both ‘prosecutors and 
judges.’ However, New Zealand, one of the countries on the cutting edge of 
reform of military justice, has introduced an additional element to the 
composition of summary trials – that is the ‘presenting officer’ who assists 
the commanding officer in the presentation of a case. Other countries may 
very well have informal arrangements to this effect but their primary military 
laws do not indicate this. 
 With respect to the jurisdiction of summary trials, almost all of the 
countries impose restrictions concerning persons that may be tried and 
penalties that may be imposed upon a finding of guilty. Each of these 
countries permits a sentence of detention or confinement (in the case of the 
United States) at a summary hearing; but only India permits its 
commanding officers to impose a sentence of imprisonment at a summary 
trial. Periods of detention or confinement range from thirty days to ninety 
days. Given the pressure exerted on the Indian military justice system and 
events elsewhere in the world, it is unlikely that commanding officers will 
retain their power to impose a sentence of imprisonment in the event that 
the government decides to embark on a broad reform of the military justice 
system in that country. New Zealand breaks with tradition by subjecting all 
its officers to the jurisdiction of summary trials. This is unprecedented. 
However, the United Kingdom has taken a step in the same direction by 
subjecting certain officer ranks to the jurisdiction of summary trials, against 
the norm that summary trials are generally used to discipline non-
commissioned officers. 
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 Each of the countries gives a choice to elect trial by a court-martial 
albeit that this choice is discretionary (on the part of the commanding 
officer) in the case of New Zealand in certain circumstances. 
 Finally, none of the countries studied provides for the right to legal 
representation at a summary hearing as a general rule. Only the United 
States provides for this right in exceptional circumstances. Lawyers are 
deliberately kept out of summary trials both at the bench and from the floor. 
The reason behind this is that summary trials are meant to be a swift 
disciplinary tool for commanders and the involvement of lawyers in the 
proceedings will naturally slow things down. However, there is a trend 
among some countries to strengthen the assistance available to the accused 
at a summary hearing. New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom are 
among the most recent examples. This is because there is an increasing 
demand for summary trials to be fairer in the modern age. As indicated 
elsewhere, some countries have even gone to the extent of creating specialist 
appeal courts for summary trials which may help deal with some of the 
excesses of these forums. 
  
3.4 Determining the status of the CODH within the military justice 
system of  South Africa in the new era 
 Comparative military justice has shown that countries which have 
recently reformed their military justice systems have chosen to retain the 
essential composition and character of summary trials as a matter of ‘policy 
choice’. It is argued that South Africa should do the same. There are good 
policy reasons for doing this. The effectiveness and efficiency of the armed 
forces largely depend on their discipline. Sometimes this discipline must be 
enforced swiftly and immediately by commanding officers. However, the 
process must be fair and the suggested policy stance must be tested against 
the relevant provisions of the Constitution as will be attempted further 
below in this chapter. 
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In Canada the formal purpose of summary proceedings ‘is to provide 
prompt but fair justice in respect of minor service offences and to contribute 
to the maintenance of military discipline and efficiency...in time of peace or 
armed conflict.’87 Similarly, Griggs states (in the context of New Zealand) 
that ‘[t]he purpose of summary trials is to provide commanders with a 
method of dealing expeditiously and simply with less serious disciplinary 
infractions, whether they be in New Zealand, at sea or in an overseas 
operation.’88 More crisply, Gilbert says that ‘[t]he summary court-martial...is 
valuable when [a] military member needs to be taught a swift lesson that will 
serve as a message to others about to fall off the precipice of good order and 
discipline.’89 If the CODH becomes a court of law staffed by lawyers, the 
swiftness of enforcing discipline will most likely diminish and commanders 
will be disempowered. This in turn will compromise the effectiveness of the 
armed forces.  
 
Determining the status of the CODH will typically revolve around two 
sets of constitutional provisions. The first relates to provisions regulating 
security services, in particular s 200(1). At the risk of repetition, it provides 
that ‘the defence force must be structured and managed as a disciplined 
military force.’  As already noted in Chapter Two, s 200(1) is the 
constitutional justification for the separate existence of the military justice 
system.  
Based on the above-mentioned provision, it could be argued that the 
Constitution requires commanders to have direct control over certain 
military disciplinary structures such as the CODH as they are responsible 
for the defence force which they are required to ‘manage’ as a ‘disciplined’ 
force. The corollary is that any attempt to remove commanders completely 
from military disciplinary structures such as the CODH could be 
constitutionally offensive. In the modern age, the influence of commanders 
in traditional military courts has been significantly (and rightly) eroded. The 
                                                          
87 Queens Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces (note 71 above) art. 108.2. 
88 Note 74 above 66. 
89 Note 39 above 119. 
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CODH remains the only formal tool for commanders to exercise discipline 
over their subordinates, and its reform should not lead to it being elevated 
to a court of law because commanders will no longer have any role in formal 
military disciplinary structures. This would be the position because all 
courts are required to be judicially independent, and any military court 
presided over by a commanding officer cannot meet the requirements of 
judicial independence.  
However, there is another way of looking at this, which is that s 200(1) 
cannot be read in isolation. In practical terms, this refers to the idea that 
when commanders enforce discipline in the defence force, they must do so 
in a manner that does not unjustifiably offend applicable constitutional 
rights and international law. This argument draws direct support from s 
199(5) of the Constitution which provides that ‘[t]he security services must 
act, and must teach and require their members to act, in accordance with 
the Constitution and the law, including customary international law and 
international agreements binding on the Republic.’  
This brings me to the second set of constitutional provisions relevant 
in this discussion. They are all in the Bill of Rights. These are the right to a 
fair trial, in particular ‘the right to a public trial before an ordinary court’90 
‘the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law 
decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, 
another independent and impartial tribunal or forum’91 and the just 
administrative action clause.92   The possible application of these provisions 
to the CODH will be considered in an attempt to classify the status of the 
CODH. 
As will be seen in Chapter Five, the right to a fair trial applies to 
military courts,93 but there is no South African authority on whether the 
                                                          
90 Section 35(3)(c) of the Bill of Rights. 
91 Section 34 of the Bill of Rights. 
92 Section 33 of the Constitution. 
93 See also Aifheli Enos Tshivhase ‘Military Courts in a Democratic South Africa: An 
Assessment of their Independence’ (2006) 6 New Zealand Armed Forces law Review 96, 97-
102 where this author discusses the same point. 
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above-mentioned right applies to the CODH, in particular the right to a 
public trial before an ordinary court.94 The right to a fair trial applies to 
every accused person.95 In a situation where one claims the rights in s 35(3) 
the question would be whether the person concerned is an accused person 
within the meaning of that section. This question is also closely linked to 
whether the proceedings in question are criminal. This was the approach 
followed in Nel v Le Roux and Others,96 and in National Director of Public 
Prosecutions v Philips and Others.97 By way of summary, the reasoning 
employed in these two cases establishes the following: that fair trial 
provisions apply to an accused person facing a criminal prosecution98 and 
that criminal proceedings must culminate in a conviction and punishment 
or criminal sentence in order for any person to qualify as an accused person 
for purposes of s 35(3).99  Furthermore, according to Nel v Le Roux and 
Others, whether a particular order constitutes punishment depends on its 
                                                          
94 Section 35(3) of the Constitution. 
95 See s 35(3)(a) of the Constitution. 
96 1996 (3) SA 562. This case dealt with the constitutionality of s 205 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act  of 1977 which permits the examination of any person likely to have material 
or relevant information about any alleged offence. One of the questions the Court had to 
deal with was whether s 205 proceedings constituted a criminal trial. That provision 
provides for the recalcitrant witness to be sentenced (by a court) to imprisonment for a 
period up to two years after the court has only enquired in a summary manner into the 
examinee’s failure or refusal to testify or answer questions. The Court held that ‘[t]he 
imprisonment provisions ...constitute nothing more than process in aid of the essential 
objective of compelling witnesses who have a legal duty to testify to do so; it does not 
constitute a criminal trial, nor make an accused of the examinee.’ (para 11). This meant 
that the applicant was not entitled to the rights provided in s 25(3) of the Interim 
Constitution Act 200 of 1993, an equivalent of s 35(3) in the final Constitution, 1996. What 
influenced the Court to arrive at that conclusion was the fact that the proceedings in 
question do not result in a conviction and the imprisonment of the examinee is not treated 
as a criminal sentence as ‘after being imprisoned, an examinee becomes willing to testify 
this would entitle the examinee to immediate release’. (para 11).  
97 2002 (4) SA 60 (W) para 40. This case dealt, among other things, with the question 
whether proceedings relating to an application for a confiscation order in terms of s 26 of 
the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 flowing from a criminal conviction were 
criminal or civil so as to trigger the application of certain fair trial rights in s 35(3) of the Bill 
of Rights.  The Court held that the proceedings were civil because the confiscatory order 
only stripped the criminal of the proceeds of crime and did not punish him or her for it. 
Although the Court did not definitively answer the question of what constitutes an accused, 
we can profit from its ratio as it is analogous – especially in relation to the meaning of an 
accused person and the nature of criminal punishment, which will become more relevant 
further below.   
98 With respect to Nel v Le Roux and Others (note 96 above), see in particular para 11. 
99 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Philips and Others (note 97 above) para 41 in 
particular, Nel v Le Roux and Others (note 96 above) in particular para 11. 
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purpose.100 It only constitutes punishment if its purpose is to punish the 
offender for his or her crime.101 
 Do proceedings of the CODH constitute a criminal prosecution 
culminating in a conviction and punishment or criminal sentence? Strictly 
speaking, proceedings before the CODH do not constitute a criminal 
prosecution because the ‘accused’ is not facing a criminal offence but a 
‘military disciplinary offence.’102 Furthermore, in general, the aim of the 
punishment imposed by the commanding officer is not necessarily to punish 
the ‘accused’ but to discipline him or her.  Kriegler J puts it well when he 
emphasises the point in Potsane that 
military discipline is not about punishing crime or maintaining and promoting law, 
order and tranquillity in society. Military discipline as Chapter 11 of the 
Constitution emphasises, is about having an effective force capable and ready to 
protect the territorial integrity of the country and the freedom of its people.103 
 However, proceedings before the CODH are analogous to a criminal 
prosecution despite the fact that the accused is faced with a military 
disciplinary offence. I say this for the following reasons. The accused’s guilt 
or innocence is established on the basis of general principles of criminal 
liability in South Africa,104 including the standard of proof―that is proof 
beyond reasonable doubt. This means that the nature of proceedings before 
the CODH assumes a criminal character although they are disciplinary 
proceedings.  
Furthermore, despite the fact that its purpose is not necessarily to 
punish the offender, the maximum sentence that may be imposed by the 
commanding officer (confinement to barracks for a period not exceeding 21 
days) 105 can generally be seen as analogous to a criminal sentence or 
punishment by those subject to it because it involves a severe deprivation of 
freedom of an individual in a formal way and for a significant period of time. 
                                                          
100 Para 42. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Section 11(2) of the Military Discipline Act which provides that ‘[a] commanding officer 
may conduct a disciplinary hearing of any person subject to the Code, other than an officer 
or warrant officer... for any military disciplinary offence’. (emphasis added). 
103 Potsane v Minister of Defence 2002 (1) SA 1 (CC) para 38. 
104 See Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure of the Military Discipline Act (note 16 above). 
105 Section 12(1)(j) of the Military Discipline Act. 
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The sentence of confinement to barracks is not defined in the Act, but 
according to Nel, it is currently executed as follows: 
1. The member is restricted to the unit lines. He is not detained but 
his movements after hours are very restricted. Within the unit 
lines the accused has relative freedom of movement. 
2. The member forfeits the use of the recreational facilities on the 
unit. 
3. He is easily identifiable because he wears distinguishing 
clothing. 
4. He is required to move in double march wherever he goes within 
a unit. 
5. The maximum period of 21 days may be adjusted to fit the 
offence... 
6. The trial officer may also add variants to the punishment 
depending on the nature of the offence. Any variation must be 
documented on the trial documentation. It may include any or all 
of the following: 
(i) Reporting to the officer on duty as stipulated; 
(ii) Punishment drill with or without equipment; 
(iii) Report in different types of uniform at specified times to 
ensure the uniform is clean and tidy; and 
(iv) Stand inspection in his room. 
The period of confinement to barracks starts immediately after the sentence has 
 been announced in open court. (footnotes omitted)106 
 
From the above, it can be seen that the execution of the sentence of 
confinement to barracks not only involves the offender’s deprivation of 
movement but also the forfeiture of the offender’s normal life within the 
unit.107  It also includes other activities which increase the severity of the 
sentence. Of particular note is the fact the sentenced offender is easily 
identifiable because he wears distinguishing clothing108 and is also required 
to move in double march wherever he goes within the unit.  
 In my view, an offender serving this type of sentence is in a worse 
position than someone serving the sentence of detention in a designated 
facility because everyone in the unit may come across the former in the 
process of serving the sentence in question.109 The embarrassment and 
indignity which the offender may experience on a daily basis in the process 
                                                          
106 Nel (note 21 above) 392-393. For a brief note of other countries (mainly civil) with a 
comparable sentence see Georg Nolte and Heike Kriege ‘Comparison of European Military 
Law Systems’ 137 in Georg Nolte (ed.) European Military Law Systems (2003). 
107 Provided the offender lives within the unit. 
108 According to Nel (note 21 above) 392, this can be seen as a form of stigmatisation and 
regarded as unconstitutional punishment since it could be degrading. 
109 Of course, this may also depend on the conditions in the detention facility in question. 
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of serving the sentence could constitute a double punishment. In fact, 
concern has been raised whether this sentence complies with the objectives 
of the UN Convention against Torture because it imposes additional duties 
on and prohibits extra-mural and leisure activities of the offender.110  
It can be argued plausibly that the purpose of the punishment 
described above (given its nature, duration, manner of execution and 
effect)111 is not only to discipline the offender but to punish the offender for 
his or her crime as well. This means that the sentence of confinement to 
barracks could be regarded as a criminal sentence or punishment, and the 
person facing the penalty therefore qualifies as an accused person for 
purposes of s 35(3)(c) of the Constitution, in line with the reasoning in Nel v 
Le Roux112 and National Director of Public Prosecutions v Philips113 
respectively. 
 The corollary, therefore, is that the accused before the CODH is 
entitled to a right to a public trial before an ordinary court.114  
 The conclusion I have reached regarding the application of s 35(3)(c) 
to the CODH is similar to the view held in Canada and New Zealand on the 
                                                          
110 Nel (note 21 above) 393. Commenting on an analogous sentence, Rowe observes that the 
‘power to impose an order of detention on an ‘employee’ (soldier) by his ‘employer’ (Army 
authorities) places the armed forces disciplinary process in sharp contrast to any civilian 
disciplinary system.’ P Rowe ‘A New Court to Protect Human Rights in the Armed Forces of 
the UK: The Summary Appeal Court’ J. Conflict & Sec. L. (2003), vol. 8 No 1, 201, 202. 
111 These factors were considered by the European Court of Human Rights in Engel and 
Others v The Netherlands (1976) 1 EHRR 647 in deciding whether punishments of light 
arrest, aggravated arrest, and strict arrest constituted deprivation of liberty for purposes of 
Art 5 of the European Convention of Human Rights. The Court held, by a majority, that the 
first two forms of arrest did not constitute deprivation of liberty for purposes of Art 5 of the 
Convention. 
112 Note 96 above. 
113 Note 97 above. 
114 General support for this conclusion can also be had from the decision of the 
Constitutional Court held in De Lange v Smuts 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC). This case dealt with 
an application for confirmation of a High Court order declaring s 66(3) of the Insolvency Act 
24 of 1936, which authorises a person presiding over a creditors’ meeting to imprison a 
recalcitrant witness, unconstitutional. The Court confirmed the High Court’s order only to 
the extent that it held that s 66(3) is unconstitutional for authorising a presiding officer who 
is not a magistrate to commit a recalcitrant witness to prison. The Court held (para 74) that 
‘[a]lthough committal to prison under s 66(3) is not incarceration following upon a criminal 
conviction; it is, from the perspective of the persons deprived of their freedom, analogous.’ 
The Court found this to be an unjustifiable infringement of s 12(1) of the Bill of Rights. 
Although this case dealt with a different situation its reasoning can be applied analogously.  
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same point. In Canada, the Office of the Judge Advocate General concluded 
that ‘[a] summary trial is...‘by nature’ a criminal proceeding’ and went 
further and stated that ‘[o]nce the ‘by nature’ test is passed it is irrelevant if 
the summary trial awards penal sanctions.’115 Following this reasoning and 
the views held in Canada, New Zealand has decided to take a similar policy 
position regarding the application of the rights in question in relation to 
summary trials by commanding officers.116 
Similarly, and as already noted, it was held in Bell v the United 
Kingdom117 that British summary trials were offensive to Art 6(1) and (3) of 
the European Convention of Human Rights (the Convention). The most 
relevant part of that article for our purposes is Art 6(1) which provides that 
‘[i]n the determination...of any criminal charge against him, everyone is 
entitled to a fair and public hearing...by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law.’ The features of this article are similar to those 
of s 35(3)(c) of the Bill of Rights in the sense that they both refer to an 
accused person faced with a criminal prosecution, and both provisions 
entitle the accused to a right to a public hearing before an independent 
court or tribunal.118 This means, therefore, that the interpretation of the 
European Court of Human Rights can be relied on with some profit. 
One of the critical questions the Court had to consider was whether 
Art 6 of the Convention was applicable to summary trials. In deciding the 
question, the Court applied a two legged test which was developed in the 
earlier cases of the Court. The starting point is whether the offence charged 
belongs to criminal law, disciplinary law or both.119 In the present case, we 
have already noted that proceedings before the CODH arguably assume both 
                                                          
115 Office of the Judge Advocate General, Canada, Summary Trial Working Group Report, vol. 
I (2 March 1994) 51 (referred to in Griggs (note 74 above) 71. 
116 See Griggs (note 72 above) 69-72 outlining the policy stance adopted recently. 
117 Note 65 above. Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution provides that ‘[w]hen interpreting the 
Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum...must consider international law’. It is on that 
basis that the above-mentioned case and other international cases are considered. 
118 Although s 35(3)(c) of the Bill of Rights does not explicitly refer to an independent court, 
all courts in South Africa are independent in terms of s 165 of the Constitution. 
119 Note 65 above, para 35. 
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a criminal and disciplinary character, which means that the first criterion is 
met according to the logic of that case.  
However, in terms of that case, the supervision of the court in relation 
to the offence goes further, and takes into consideration the degree of 
severity of the penalty that the person concerned risks incurring. The court 
looks at the maximum potential penalty for which the relevant law provides. 
In Bell v The United Kingdom, the Court considered a sentence of detention 
for a period of 28 days to be a deprivation of liberty which was serious 
enough to render the charge against the accused to be of a criminal nature 
which attracts the application of Article 6 of the Convention.120  
In the case of the CODH, the maximum sentence in respect of 
deprivation of liberty is confinement to barracks for a period of 21 days. 
Although the offender is not necessarily under lock and key, this sentence is 
analogous to the sentence considered in Bell v The United Kingdom, 
especially if it is imposed on an offender who does not ordinarily reside in 
the barracks in question. The freedom of movement of both offenders is 
severely restricted except that in the case of confinement to barracks, the 
offender is not necessarily under lock and key but is required by law to 
remain within a designated space. Moreover, I have already argued that 
confinement to barracks is worse than the sentence of detention given the 
manner in which the former is executed.121 
                                                          
120 Paras 41-42. It may be worth pointing out that some states entered a reservation to the 
effect that Art 6 of the Convention would not apply to discipline within their armed forces. 
The United Kingdom did not do so, and hence a number of attacks were launched against 
its military justice system based on Art 6 of the Convention. There have been calls in 
Parliament for the United Kingdom to withdraw from the Convention and re-ratify with an 
appropriate reservation. (see Rowe (note 108 above) 202 highlighting this point) 
121 Compare, however, Nel’s view (note 21 above) 215-216 who states that the sentence of 
confinement to barracks does not constitute serious deprivation of liberty where a member 
is confined to his living quarters after hours. Furthermore she argues that this sentence is 
not appropriate for members not living in the single quarters or barracks, such as married 
members. However, the Act does not say that this sentence can only be imposed on living- 
in members. As things stand, nothing prevents the court from imposing the sentence on a 
non-living in member provided facilities exist for the execution of the sentence. In line with 
the European Court of Human Rights rulings in Bell v United Kingdom etc, one has to focus 
on the maximum sentence risked by the accused for purposes of evaluating the severity of 
the sentence. This means that the sentence of confinement to barracks must be evaluated 
on the basis of the worst case scenario risked by the offender. The worst case scenario 
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That said, in Engel and Others v The Netherlands (Engel) the European 
Court of Human Rights considered a similar sentence (aggravated arrest for 
twelve days) and held (by a majority) that it did not constitute deprivation of 
liberty or criminal punishment for purposes of Art 5.122 This sentence 
(aggravated arrest) required that while off-duty, soldiers serve the arrest in a 
specially designated place which they may not leave in order to visit the 
canteen, cinema or recreation rooms, but they were not kept under lock and 
key.123 The Court took the view that the punishment of aggravated arrest did 
not constitute deprivation of liberty or criminal punishment for purposes of 
Arts 5 and 6 of the Convention respectively124 because the soldiers involved 
remained ‘more or less, within the ordinary framework of their army life.’125  
In Stavros’s view, the majority of the Court was apparently trying to 
avoid a heavy judicialization of army discipline as a matter of policy.126 He 
adds further that the conclusion of the Court was not necessarily based on 
the letter of the Convention or legal considerations but fear of ‘...excessive 
judicialization of proceedings which remain non-judicial in the majority of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
would be a situation where this sentence is imposed on an offender who does not live in the 
barracks in which he or she has to be confined. In such a situation, the sentence of 
confinement to barracks is analogous to the sentence of detention. In any event, even if the 
sentence is imposed on an offender who lives in military barracks, it still constitutes a 
severe limitation on his freedom because it means the offender cannot spend time outside 
the barracks for any purpose if he or she wished to do so. Experience has shown that some 
single living-in members often spend nights out for various purposes. This means that it is 
incorrect to assume that the sentence of confinement to barracks does not have a severe 
impact on single living-in members. Moreover, this sentence would be redundant if its 
imposition did not alter the offender’s situation. A case by case analysis adopted by Nel 
which only focuses on the ideal situation is, with respect, not helpful. See Nel 391 
discussing the ideal situation where she thinks the sentence is suited. 
122 Note 111 para 62. Compare, however, Nel’s view (note 21 above) 215 that the sentence of 
confinement to barracks is comparable with light arrest instead. Again, with respect, Nel is 
mistaken because under light arrest, soldiers in Engel paras 61-62 were entitled to make 
use of recreational facilities such as visiting the canteen etc. whereas soldiers under 
confinement to barracks would not be entitled to make use of such facilities as Nel 
describes in her thesis. In my view, therefore, aggravated arrest is the appropriate sentence 
for purposes of comparison with confinement to barracks. 
123 Engel v The Netherlands (note 111) para 62. 
124 In the context of South Africa, the equivalent provision would be s 12 of the 
Constitution. 
125 Engel v The Netherlands (note 111 above) paras 61-62. This was despite the fact that 
Engel’s arrest prevented him from preparing for his doctoral examination. 
126 See Stephanos Stavros (ed.) The Guarantees for Accused Persons under Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (1993) 13. 
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the States Parties...’127 He observes that the need for procedural protection 
at military disciplinary hearings is clear and the problem remains.128 
However, in his dissenting opinion, Judge Thór Vilhjálmsson came to 
a different conclusion─that aggravated arrest is deprivation of liberty within 
the meaning of Art 5 of the Convention because of its nature and legal 
character.129 He noted that servicemen undergoing aggravated arrest were 
not allowed the same freedom of movement as other servicemen.130 
Furthermore, Vilhjálmsson went on to  note that the servicemen concerned 
had to remain during off-duty hours in a specially designated place, could 
not go to the recreation facilities open to others in the same barracks and 
often slept in special rooms.131 In addition, the judge also saw the treatment 
associated with aggravated arrest as punitive.132 
The conclusion by Vilhjálmsson that ‘aggravated arrest’ amounted to 
deprivation of liberty has been supported by Stavros.133 For reasons already 
set out above in relation to the sentence of confinement to barracks as a 
punishment similar to ‘aggravated arrest’, I align myself with the minority 
opinion of Vilhjálmsson in Engel and the observations by Stavros. 
The divergence of views on the characterization of aggravated arrest 
and similar sentences is not surprising. Given the severity of punishments 
available to commanders, Rowe observes that ‘...it may be difficult to draw a 
clear line between those punishments which might be considered to be 
criminal and those which, although described as disciplinary, are in reality 
little different from criminal punishments.’134 The sentences of aggravated 
arrest and confinement to barracks are classic examples. They have both 
                                                          
127 Ibid 13, 15. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Engel v The Netherlands (note 111 above) para 1. Equally, the European Commission of 
Human Rights found that ‘aggravated arrest’ could not be justified by reference to normal 
conditions of army life. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid. However, despite his findings above, Judge Vilhjálmsson did not find a breach of 
Art 5 of the Convention because of his interpretation of the article in question and the fact 
that one of the parties had served aggravated arrest after a decision by the Supreme 
Military Court of the Netherlands. 
133 Stavros (note 126 above) 13. 
134 Rowe (note 21 above) 74. 
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disciplinary and punitive elements, which in turn attract the application of 
relevant human rights standards.  
 I have argued that a person appearing before the CODH qualifies as 
an accused person for purposes of s 35(3)(c) of the Constitution.135 In fact, 
both the Military Discipline Act and the Rules of Procedure refer to a person 
appearing before the CODH as an ‘accused person’. It is proposed, therefore, 
that the inevitable conclusion is that the CODH limits the right of an 
accused ‘to a public trial before an ordinary court’ provided for in s 35(3)(c) 
because the CODH is not a court of law and yet it has the power to impose a 
sentence which constitutes a criminal punishment or which is analogous to 
a criminal punishment. At best, the CODH can be classified as a tribunal or 
a disciplinary hearing which is analogous to a criminal process.136 
Section 36 of the Bill of Rights provides that the rights in the Bill of 
Rights may be limited in terms of law of general application to the extent 
that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open democratic 
society based on certain factors.137 In this respect, the South African 
Constitution differs from many other bills of rights and international human 
rights instruments.138  The analysis ‘involves the weighing up of competing 
values, and ultimately an assessment based on proportionality...which calls 
                                                          
135 Unsurprisingly, Nel (note 21 above) 254 comes to a different conclusion: that an accused 
person before the CODH cannot be considered to be an accused person for purposes of s 
35(3) of the Constitution and therefore the rights in that provision are not applicable.  
136 See Stavros (note 126 above) 9. Compare Nel’s suggestion (note 21 above) 237, 255 that 
the CODH should be regarded as a ‘court sui generis’. 
137 The full section is as follows: ‘The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms 
of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in 
an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
account all relevant factors, including – (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the 
purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between 
the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.’ The 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms represents the primary model for the South 
African Bill of Rights. 
The European Convention of Human Rights does not have a general limitation clause but 
certain rights have internal qualifiers. This means that an infringement of a right which 
does not have an internal qualifier such as Art 6 cannot be justified under the Convention. 
138 Ian Currie & Johan de Waal (eds.) The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 165. These include 
the United States Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
European Convention of Human Rights does not have a general limitation clause but 
certain rights have internal qualifiers. This means that an infringement of a right which 
does not have an internal qualifier such as Art 6 cannot be justified under the Convention. 
75 
 
 
 
for the balancing of different interests.’139 It is to the limitation analysis that 
attention will now turn.140  
A s 36 enquiry involves two stages.141 The first question is whether a 
right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or limited by law or conduct of 
the respondent, which is essentially a matter of interpretation of the right in 
question as already attempted above. The second stage, the justification 
enquiry, often involves an assessment of factual evidence. The minimum 
requirement for a limitation is that the law in question must be a law of 
general application in the sense that it must be sufficiently clear, accessible 
and precise142―and also that it must equally apply to all people similarly 
situated and must not be arbitrary in its application.143  
There is no doubt that the Military Discipline Act is law of general 
application and therefore easily qualifies for purposes of s 36(1) of the Bill of 
Rights. The second question is whether the limitation of the right can be 
justified―whether or not the second stage will be reached will depend on the 
positive answer to the first question. A positive answer has already been 
established to the first question and the next step is to consider the second 
question―whether the limitation of the right in s 35(3)(c) can be justified. 
The onus of proving that the limitation is justifiable rests on the person 
relying on the limitation (usually the state). 
The second stage of the analysis is usually referred to as the 
proportionality  test which focuses on whether the law in question is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant 
factors listed in s 36(1)(a)-(e). The following paragraph in S v Makwanyane 
                                                          
139 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 104. 
140 In this section I draw heavily from the comprehensive and incisive work of Currie & de 
Waal (note 136 above) pp 164-188 regarding the general analysis of the limitation clause. 
Their work is based on the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of South Africa. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) para 47. 
143 See Currie & Johan de Waal (note 138 above) in this regard. 
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and Another144 has become a standard point of reference when the 
Constitutional Court considers the justifiability of the limitation: 
The limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose that is reasonable and necessary 
in a democratic society involves the weighing up of competing values, and ultimately 
an assessment based on proportionality…The fact that different rights have different 
implications for democracy and, in the case of our Constitution, for 'an open and 
democratic society based on freedom and equality', means that there is no absolute 
standard which can be laid down for determining reasonableness and necessity. 
Principles can be established, but the application of those principles to particular 
circumstances can only be done on a case-by-case basis. This is inherent in the 
requirement of proportionality, which calls for the balancing of different interests. In 
the balancing process the relevant considerations will include the nature of the right 
that is limited and its importance to an open and democratic society based on 
freedom and equality; the purpose for which the right is limited and the importance 
of that purpose to such a society; the extent of the limitation, its efficacy and, 
particularly where the limitation has to be necessary, whether the desired ends 
could reasonably be achieved through other means less damaging to the right in 
question. In the process regard must be had to the provisions of s 33(1) and the 
underlying values of the Constitution, bearing in mind that, as a Canadian Judge 
has said, 'the role of the Court is not to second-guess the wisdom of policy choices 
made by legislators'.145 (footnotes omitted) 
What follows is an analysis of each of the factors involved in the 
proportionality enquiry in the light of the paragraph quoted above. The 
starting point is s 36(1)(a) dealing with the nature of the right limited by the 
law in question―the right to a public trial before an ordinary court which is 
part of the right to a fair trial. Although this is a procedural right, it is 
clearly important in ensuring that the interests of the accused are protected, 
and also crucial in making sure that people have confidence in the justice 
system. Moreover, courts are better placed to ensure fairness and curb 
abuse of authority.146  
As for the importance of the purpose of the limitation, reasonableness 
requires the limitation of a right to serve some purpose, and justifiability 
requires that purpose to be worthwhile and important in a constitutional 
democracy.147 It is common cause that the purpose of using disciplinary 
hearings is to ensure a swift enforcement of military discipline under all 
                                                          
144 Note 139 above. 
145 Ibid para 104. Although the Court was referring to the limitation clause in the Interim 
Constitution, its views apply with equal force to the interpretation of s 36 because this 
provision is substantially similar to the limitation clause in the Interim Constitution. 
146 See De Lange v Smuts (note 114 above) para 63 where the Constitutional Court 
expressed similar sentiments. 
147 Currie & de Waal (note 138 above) 179. 
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circumstances as already discussed. The importance of the maintenance of 
military discipline, which is also a constitutional imperative as highlighted 
in s 200(1), cannot be gainsaid. Kriegler J puts it well in Potsane, that 
military discipline ‘is about having an effective force capable and ready to 
protect the territorial integrity of the country and the freedom of its 
people.’148 The level of discipline of any military force can mean life or death 
for a particular country and its people, and sometimes impacts on the 
international community as well. It is the ‘primary object of the defence force 
to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its 
people…’149 Only a disciplined force can do so effectively. All this means that 
the importance of the purpose of the limitation cannot be questioned in a 
constitutional democracy. 
Let us now consider the nature and extent of the limitation.150 What is 
required is an assessment of the way in which the limitation affects the 
rights concerned.151 The question that is usually asked is whether the 
limitation is a serious or relatively minor infringement of the right.152 On the 
face of it, the infringement of the right in the present case is serious because 
instead of being tried by a court, an accused is tried by another forum which 
is not a court―his commanding officer or his nominee, and  a member of the 
executive branch of the military (the military command).  
However, there are a number of factors which seem to compensate for 
the extent of the infringement. These relate to the irreparability of the 
infringement of a right. This aspect was considered by the Constitutional 
Court in S v Makwanyane in relation to the death penalty and weighed 
heavily in the court’s conclusion.153 The first factor is that the damage that 
may be caused as a result of trial by the CODH is reparable because ‘every 
finding of guilty, any sentence imposed and every order made by a military 
                                                          
148 Note 103 above, para 38. 
149 Section 200(2) of the Constitution. 
150 Section 36(1)(c) of the Constitution. 
151 Currie & de Waal (note 138 above) 181. 
152 Ibid. 
153 See in particular para 146. 
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court shall be subject to the process of review.’154 This process happens 
automatically. The only flaw with the automatic review process is that it is 
not conducted by a court of law as discussed in Chapter Two. However, in 
terms of s 34(5) of the Military Discipline Act ‘[a]n offender may within the 
time limits and in the manner prescribed in a rule of the Code, apply for the 
review of the proceedings of his or her case by a Court of Military Appeals.’ 
This arguably compensates for the flaw with regard to the automatic review 
process in this context.  
Another point which could be considered is the fact that an accused is 
tried before the CODH as a matter of choice. In other words, the accused 
has the right to elect to be tried by a military court instead of the CODH. 
This means that the accused can be understood to have validly waived 
certain rights.155 Viewed cumulatively, all these factors suggest that the 
nature and the extent of the infringement are not that serious because there 
are checks and balances built into the system.156 Be that as it may, let us, 
nevertheless, run the enquiry to its conclusion for completeness’ sake. 
The next factor to consider is the relation between the limitation and 
its purpose.157 This requires that the law must serve the purpose that it is 
designed to serve.158 A law which does not do this or which only marginally 
contributes to achieving its purpose cannot be an acceptable justification for 
a limitation of a right. A disciplinary hearing by a commanding officer 
significantly contributes to a swift maintenance of discipline. The reason for 
this is that commanders are always on the spot at which transgressions 
occur, and are best placed to take swift action which follows a relatively 
                                                          
154 Section 34(1) of the Military Discipline Act. 
155 In a dissenting opinion in Bell v The United Kingdom (note 65 above) Maruste J arrived at 
a similar conclusion regarding the British summary trial system which provided the 
accused with an option to be tried by a court martial instead of the summary trial. Maruste 
J took the view that, in those circumstances, an accused who chooses to be tried by a 
summary trial validly waives applicable rights. However, the majority found that the waiver 
was not valid because, for the accused, the election essentially entails choosing between his 
commander and a military court. 
156 Commenting on summary trials of the United Kingdom, Rowe (note 110 above) 214-215 
appears to favourably consider similar safeguards in relation to how a summary trial by a 
commanding officer should be viewed. 
157 Section 36(1)(d) of the Constitution. 
158 Currie & de Waal (note 138 above) 183. 
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simple procedure as they are in control of all relevant military personnel. 
They can easily enforce discipline, more visibly and effectively than any 
other authority. They are the central pillar of military discipline. 
This brings me to the last factor―whether less restrictive means exist 
to achieve the same purpose.159 A legitimate limitation must achieve benefits 
which are proportionate to the costs of the limitation.160 If other means 
could be used to achieve the same result that will either not restrict the 
rights at all, or will not restrict them to the same extent, the limitation will 
not be proportionate.161 However, the alternative method must be equally 
effective, and a margin of appreciation is given to the state in assessing the 
effectiveness of the alternative method because it is not the role of the courts 
to second guess the wisdom of policy choices made by the legislature.162 
Most limitation arguments stand or fall on whether or not less restrictive 
means exist to achieve the same purpose. 163 
In the present case, the potentially less restrictive means for swift 
maintenance of discipline would be to make use only of fully fledged military 
courts which are already in place. However, it is questionable whether 
military courts can achieve swift military discipline in the manner that 
commanding officers do in the light of their special position within the 
military establishment. The main problem with this option is that courts are 
generally associated with delays in finalising cases. It is common cause that 
this is generally a universal phenomenon. This has been captured well by 
Wade and Forsyth when they state that ‘[t]he process of the courts of law is 
elaborate, slow and costly’164 in comparison with administrative tribunals 
which generally follow a relatively simple procedure. Delays in court 
                                                          
159 Section 36(1)(e) of the Constitution. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid 184. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Cited with approval in Sidumo and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mine Ltd and Others 
(2) SA 24 (CC) para 125. This case dealt, among other things, with the question whether 
PAJA applied to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA). The 
Court held, by a majority, that although the just administrative clause applied to the 
CCMA, PAJA did not apply to the CCMA mainly because of the principle that ‘general 
legislation, unless specifically indicated does not derogate from special legislation.’ PAJA is 
the general legislation while the LRA is the special legislation. 
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processes cannot be attributed to a single factor, but to a combination of 
factors whose influence will vary according to the circumstances of each 
case. That said, factors that are commonly associated with delays in military 
court proceedings are highlighted below.165 
The lack of availability of witnesses and sometimes even that of 
accused persons is arguably the most common factor. Military court officials 
have to arrange for witnesses and accused persons to appear before courts 
because an overwhelming majority of military units do not have military 
courts on site. The process of arranging for witnesses and for the accused to 
appear does not always go smoothly due to many factors which need not be 
dealt with here;―suffice to say that sometimes the reasons could be 
operational or administrative. For example, military units sometimes go on 
deployment at sea or some other remote places. This would affect the 
expeditious conclusion of cases because some key witnesses may be part of 
the deployment. Furthermore, when military units are on the move or at 
sea, they do not always travel with military court personnel for many 
reasons. One of the reasons is sustainability, given the magnitude of 
operational deployments at times. In addition, if each and every 
transgression were to be dealt with by a court, military units would be 
operationally weakened because many military personnel will spend too 
much time moving back and forth attending court cases. That would affect 
military capacity and the effectiveness of the defence force.  
Another related point is that court rolls are usually clogged, and in 
some instances, military courts cannot go through all the cases set down for 
trial in a particular court session. The situation is likely to be made worse if 
commanders are to be stripped of their disciplinary powers. This means that 
if commanders were to rely solely on military courts for military discipline, 
swift maintenance of military discipline would not be guaranteed, and this 
would have disastrous consequences for discipline, and be in contravention 
of the Constitution which requires the defence force to be structured and 
                                                          
165 The factors highlighted here refer to South Africa but it is likely that they could be of 
general application as military organizations the world over share common attributes. 
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managed as a disciplined military force. Another factor which causes delays 
in court proceedings is the manner in which lawyers conduct themselves in 
litigation, which could be informed by many factors. Some of the tactics 
employed by lawyers can be unnecessarily time-consuming. Delays can also 
be caused by the lack of availability or shortage of court personnel.  
 It could be argued that the challenges highlighted above can be 
addressed with proper planning, management and the hiring of a far greater 
number of judges and court personnel to fill the gap that may be left by the 
disbandment of the CODH. In my view, it is unrealistic to expect that the 
government would direct more resources towards this effort, given the 
challenges this country faces regarding its civilian criminal justice system 
which deals with a far greater number of people―let alone the socio-
economic situation in the country arising from the legacy of apartheid.  
Another reason against the alternative option is that it is not good 
military policy for commanders to lose direct control of the formal 
disciplinary structures of the military completely, because they bear final 
responsibility for the enforcement of discipline in any military force. 
Commanders have (for good reasons) lost direct control of military 
courts―the CODH is the only remaining formal weapon for them to have a 
direct say in the enforcement of discipline of those under their command. As 
James points out and as is quoted with approval by the Constitutional 
Court in Potsane: ‘[i]t is the responsibility of those who command to instil 
discipline in those who they command.’166 Similarly, Griggs says that ‘[a]s a 
consequence of the need for officers to directly maintain discipline in their 
commands, disciplinary offences are heard by those officers rather than 
courts.’167 All these are consistent with the principle of command 
empowerment and the need for expeditious maintenance of military 
discipline.168 
                                                          
166 Note 103 above para 38. 
167 Note 74 above 69. 
168 Ibid 79. 
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I propose that a strong conclusion can be drawn from the above 
analysis which is that there are no less restrictive means to ensure the swift 
maintenance of discipline for minor transgressions than using the CODH. In 
the circumstances, it can be concluded that the harm caused by the law 
which creates the CODH is proportionate to the purpose sought to be 
achieved, and I therefore argue that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in terms of s 36 of the Bill of Rights.  
I will now briefly consider the possible application of s 34 of the Bill of 
Rights, ‘the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application 
of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, 
another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.’ This provision does 
not apply to criminal proceedings because these are not ordinarily referred 
to as ‘disputes’.169 Furthermore, criminal proceedings are specifically 
regulated in s 35 of the Bill of Rights as we have already noted. That 
disposes of the possible application of s 34 to the proceedings of the CODH. 
However, it should be pointed out that the High Court in Freedom of 
Expression Institute and Others v President of the Ordinary Court Martial NO 
and Others170 wrongly assumed (without analysis) that s 34 applied to 
military courts despite the fact that there were Constitutional Court 
authorities which suggest otherwise.171 The High Court applied both s 
35(3)(c) and s 34 to the issues raised in that case instead of just focusing on 
s 35(3)(c). The approach in that Court in relation to the application of s 34 
does not disturb the conclusion reached because, it is, with respect, wrong. 
Finally, it might be worth considering the possible application of the 
just administrative action clause172 to the CODH, together with the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA) which has been 
                                                          
169 S v Pennington 1997 SA 1076 (CC) para 46. See also De Lange v Smuts (note 114 above) 
para 65 in support of this view. The Court stated that s 34 governs ‘other legal proceedings’. 
Compare the view by Nel (note 21 above) 238-239 that s 34 of the Constitution constitutes 
appropriate testing criteria for the CODH. 
170 Note 20 above. 
171 For example, De Lange v Smuts (note 114 above) which the High Court ironically 
considered in its judgment. 
172 Section 33 of the Constitution. 
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enacted to give effect to the just administrative clause. Section 33 of the 
Constitution provides as follows: 
(1)  Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable 
and procedurally fair. 
(2)  Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative 
action has the right to be given written reasons. 
(3)  National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and 
must— 
(a)provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where 
appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal; 
(b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsections (1) and 
(2); and 
(c) promote an efficient administration. 
 
In my view, the argument for the possible application of the just 
administrative action clause quoted above falls at the first hurdle for the 
reasons similar to those advanced with respect to the possible application of 
s 34 of the Constitution. Chief among these is that the CODH is analogous 
to a criminal process which necessitates the application of s 35. This means 
that it would be unnecessary to apply the just administrative action clause 
to the CODH because a purposive approach would require that all criminal 
process or analogous proceedings be dealt with under s 35. Recently, the 
Constitutional Court affirmed the principle that ‘the Constitution recognises 
the need for specificity and specialisation in a modern and complex society 
under the rule of law.’173 Furthermore, the Court stated that ‘[o]nce a set of 
carefully crafted rules and structures has been created for the effective and 
speedy resolution of disputes and protection of rights in a particular area of 
law, it is preferable to use that particular system.’174 Section 35 of the 
Constitution, read with the Military Discipline Act, creates rules and 
structures to deal with the criminal process and analogous matters within 
the military. The CODH should therefore be dealt with in accordance with 
                                                          
173 Gcaba v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 2010 (1) SA 238 para 56. This case 
was an application for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Eastern Cape High Court. 
One of the key issues that had to be determined was whether failure by the State to appoint 
the applicant to a particular position which he applied for amounted to an administrative 
action triggering the application of s 33 of the Constitution. The Court answered the 
question in the negative mainly because s 33 does not regulate the relationship between the 
State as employer and its workers. It stated that the remedy for the applicant lied in the 
structures created within the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
174 Ibid. 
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those rules and mechanisms. Of course, rigid compartmentalisation in a 
system such as ours should be avoided because human rights are 
interdependent, indivisible and inseparable.175 However, by way of 
emphasis, there are good policy reasons for preferring specialist rules, such 
as ensuring certainty, avoiding duplication and festering of a dual system of 
law.176 
That said, there may still be those who persist in arguing that the 
CODH is an administrative tribunal which should be regulated in terms of s 
33 of the Constitution. I would counter that the powers exercised by the 
CODH cannot be regarded as administrative for purposes of the just 
administrative action clause. In Chirwa v Transnet Ltd and Others, it was 
held that as to whether conduct constitutes administrative action is not 
dependent on the position which the functionary occupies ‘but rather on the 
nature of the power being exercised.’177 In the context of this discussion, it 
means that we should not focus on the fact that the power is being exercised 
by an official who is part of the chain of command of the military (the 
commanding officer). The power to sentence an individual to confinement to 
barracks for a period of 21 days in the manner described above is analogous 
to detention and cannot be regarded as an administrative function. As 
already discussed, the CODH exercises this type of power, among others. 
This is not the kind of power that can be exercised administratively. In De 
Lange v Smuts it was held that the power to commit a person to prison did 
not involve administrative action.178 As stated above, confinement to 
barracks is analogous to committal to detention which falls within the realm 
of imprisonment for purposes of deprivation of liberty. In line with De Lange 
v Smuts this power does not involve an administrative action but can only be 
described as judicial in character. Even if the CODH constituted an 
administrative tribunal for purposes of s 33, PAJA would still not apply 
because general legislation does not derogate from special legislation, unless 
                                                          
175 Ibid paras 53-54. 
176 These reasons were generally referred to by the Constitutional Court in its reasoning 
ibid. 
177 2008 (4) SA 367 (CC) para 72. 
178 Note 114 above. 
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specifically indicated.179 In this context, PAJA is the general legislation while 
the Military Discipline Act is the special legislation. This means that the 
question would be whether the relevant provisions of the Military Discipline 
Act (together with the rules) are constitutionally compliant with the just 
administrative action clause. No further attempt will be made at answering 
that question any in the light of the conclusions already reached regarding 
the applicability of s 33 to the CODH.  
Given its powers and organization, the CODH is more like a court of 
law on a sliding scale than an administrative tribunal of a disciplinary 
nature which functions in the context of an employment relationship. In 
addition, it might be worth pointing out that in Gcaba v Minister of Safety 
and Security and Others the Constitutional Court held that s 33 does not 
regulate the relationship between the State as employer and its workers. 
Although proceedings before the CODH assume a criminal character, it does 
not change the fact that this happens in the context of an employment 
relationship, albeit of an unusual type as acknowledged in South African 
National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and Another.180 
The difficulty of finding the right place for the CODH is not surprising 
given the uniqueness of the military discussed in Chapter Two. 
Interestingly, not even the Labour Relations Act (LRA) 66 of 1995 
applies to the Defence Force despite the fact that some constitutional labour 
relations rights have been found to apply to the Defence Force by the 
Constitutional Court. The Act is expressly excluded from application to the 
Defence Force, among others.181  This, again, signifies the unique position of 
the defence force in society. The effective and fair running of the military 
                                                          
179 This long standing principle was applied by the Constitutional Court in Sidumo v 
Rustenburg Platinum Mine Ltd (note 164 above). This case dealt, among other things, with 
the question whether Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 2000 (PAJA) applied to the 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) created by the Labour 
Relations Act 66 1995. The Court held, by a majority, that although the just administrative 
clause applied to the CCMA, PAJA did not apply to the CCMA mainly because of the 
principle that the ‘general legislation, unless specifically indicated does not derogate from 
special legislation.’ 
180 1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC) para 27. 
181 Section 2 of the LRA. It also does not apply to the National Intelligence Agency. 
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justice system simply requires the application of the right to a fair trial (s 
35). Elements of that right may be limited in terms of the limitation clause 
and the CODH represents an example of that. What all this means is that 
the framework that applies to the CODH consists of the right to a fair trial 
and the relevant defence legislation i.e. the Defence Act and the Military 
Discipline Act. 
However, my proposals regarding the defensibility of the CODH as 
currently constituted do not necessarily suggest that it cannot be improved 
in order to ensure that it becomes fairer. Far from it, much can be done to 
make certain that the accused before the CODH is adequately assisted but 
this is not the place for that topic. Furthermore, there could also be greater 
emphasis on the impartiality of commanders and improvement of their 
training.182 
 
3.5 Concluding remarks 
 This Chapter has attempted to consider the status of the 
Commanding Officer’s Disciplinary Hearing within the South African 
military court system. Specifically, its aim was to show that this forum is 
not a court of law, and was not meant to be a court of law. In the process of 
argument, it considered the possible application of a number of rights to the 
CODH. These include certain aspects of the right to a fair trial; the right to 
be heard by an independent court or, where appropriate, another 
independent and impartial tribunal and forum; and the just administrative 
action clause. The chapter also drew some lessons from comparative 
military justice in relation to the status of the said forum.  
 
                                                          
182 The study conducted by Rowe (note 110 above) 205-206 in respect of the workings of the 
United Kingdom’s Summary Appeal Court shows that a lot can be done to improve the 
fairness and training of commanders regarding their role in summary trials. The study 
shows that between October 2000 to September 2002, only 14 per cent of commanding 
officer’s decisions were upheld by the Summary Court. Many of the reasons proffered for 
this phenomenon suggest that there is a need to improve the process of summary trials and 
the training of commanding officers. Although the study only looked at the United Kingdom, 
it could prove to be instructive to other jurisdictions as well. 
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The major findings of this Chapter can be summarised as follows: 
 Although the CODH is more like a court of law on a sliding scale than 
an administrative tribunal, it is not a court of law because it does not 
have some of the key attributes of what constitutes a court. Its 
character and stature are in line with similar forums in selected open 
and democratic societies, some of which have recently reformed their 
military justice systems. At best it could be identified as a unique 
disciplinary tribunal. 
 There are difficulties in identifying the actual status of the CODH. The 
difficulty is not surprising given the uniqueness of the military. The 
CODH sits between an administrative tribunal of a disciplinary nature 
and a court of law. 
 The Constitution sanctions the CODH to function not as a court of law 
because the utilisation of this forum is permitted by it and constitutes 
a reasonable and justifiable limitation of an accused’s right to a public 
trial before an ordinary court. A fundamental shift in character and 
composition of the CODH will most likely compromise the operational 
effectiveness of the armed forces, which the Constitution requires to 
be structured and managed as a disciplined military force. 
The result of the conclusions reached is that the CODH cannot be expected 
to comply with the requirements of judicial independence as provided for in 
s 165 of the Constitution since those only apply to courts of law or tribunals 
envisaged in s 34 of the Constitution. It is on this basis that an assessment 
of judicial independence of military courts in Chapter Six will not include 
the CODH. 
Having attempted to clarify the status of the CODH, the next chapter 
focuses on the history and the meaning of the notion of judicial 
independence.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE MEANING OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
 
 
4.1 Introductory remarks 
 
Judicial independence is one of the fundamental principles in 
most democratic societies. In Chapter Two, it was established that 
military courts are courts of law and part of the judicial system of the 
Republic South Africa with the result that the principle of judicial 
independence applies to these courts. Both the Constitution and 
international instruments do not define judicial independence. They 
simply declare and require that courts must be independent without 
explaining what it means to be independent and how such 
independence must be secured. The aim of this chapter is, therefore, 
to assess the meaning of judicial independence with a particular focus 
on the South African Constitution but also drawing from international 
principles where appropriate. The chapter will be used as the 
theoretical framework for assessing the judicial independence of 
military courts in Chapter Six. 
 
 
4.2 Historical background to the notion of judicial 
independence 
 
The principle of judicial independence derives from the doctrine 
of the separation of powers.1 The principle of the separation of powers 
primarily requires that there should be separation between the three 
spheres of the state: namely the executive, the legislature and the 
                                                 
1 International Commission of Jurists, International Principles on the Independence 
and Accountability of Judges, Lawyers and Prosecutors A Practitioners’ Guide (2004), 
online: <http://www.icj.org/IMG/pdf/Guide.pdf> [accessed on 30 June 2005]. See 
also C Okpaluba ‘Institutional independence and the constitutionality of legislation 
establishing lower courts and tribunals: Part I’ (2003) 28 (2) Journal for Juridical 
Science 109, 120-125 for a further discussion. 
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judiciary. The English political philosopher (Locke: 1632-1704), is 
generally seen by some authors as a major writer on the separation of 
powers doctrine.2 He considered the following three powers of the 
Commonwealth: the legislative, the executive and the federative 
power.3 Locke said very little about judicial power.4 It would appear 
that he regarded the judicial branch as part of the executive given that 
his ideas concerning the implementation of the laws include their 
application to particular individual cases.5 However, he understood 
the need for a judicial branch to judge the controversies between 
subjects and Princes.6 He also understood that the judge must be 
impartial and independent.7 
 
The above-mentioned philosopher discussed the administration 
of justice in Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina (1669).8 He 
contemplated a system of justice in the hands of judges and juries 
although he did not specifically refer to the separation of judicial from 
the other powers as noted above.9 His thinking does suggest a 
separation of judicial power from other powers but it appears that he 
did not give much substance to this suggestion. Although Locke’s 
work is generally seen as historically important, it has had little 
impact on contemporary judicial thinking compared to one of Locke’s 
successors.10 
 
The key successor to Locke is the French writer Charles-Louis 
de Secondat Montesquieu (1689-1755). He is most often referred to as 
                                                 
2 See David Clark (ed.) Principles of Australian Public Law (2007) 87. 
3 In Clark, Ibid. 
4 Ibid 88. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Clark ibid, quoting Mark Goldie (ed.) Locke, Political Essays 1997, 160-181 Arts 
55-64 (at 172-4). 
9 Clark (note 2 above) 88. 
10 Ibid. 
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the principal writer on separation of powers.11 In his most famous 
book, The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu discussed the concept of 
diffused power among the organs of the state and he divides them as 
follows: legislative power; executive power over things depending upon 
the right of nations; and executive powers over things depending on 
civil right.12 Although Montesquieu does not mention judicial power, 
his second kind of power can be seen to be judicial in nature.13 In 
explaining this power, he stated that ‘[t]he last will be called the power 
of judging…’14 He observed further that there is no ‘liberty if the power 
of judging is not separate from legislative power and from executive 
power.’15 According to him, ‘[t]ribunals of the judiciary must…be 
coolheaded and, in a way, neutral in all matters of business.’16 
According to Clark, Montesquieu treatment of separation of powers 
was distinctive17 but not original. Nevertheless, his philosophy was 
widely received in the 18th century.18 
 
 
4.3 Judicial independence in liberal democratic theory19 
 
It has to be stated from the outset that there is no general 
theory of judicial independence in the world of liberal democracy.20 
                                                 
11 Ibid 89. Others even regard him as ‘the father of the doctrine of the separation of 
powers’ (see, for instance, Dion Basson & Henning Viljoen (ed.) South African 
Constitutional Law (1988) 23. 
12 Many of the following sentences are based on the translation of M Cohler et al 
(trans and eds.), Montesquieu The Spirit of the Laws 1989 as cited in Clark ibid. 
13 Clark ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid 90. Evidence shows that he was familiar with the work of Locke. See Robert 
Shackelton Montesquieu: A Critical Biography 1961 298-301 in this regard. 
18 Ibid 90-91. For another brief description of his work on the doctrine of the 
separation of powers, see Basson & Viljoen (note 11 above) 23-25. 
19 South Africa is generally regarded as a liberal democracy and perhaps its 
founding provisions, a sophisticated Bill of Rights and constitutional structures 
supporting democracy (so called Chapter Eight Institutions) are a clear testament of 
the correctness of this characterisation. It is mainly for this reason that an 
introduction to the notion of judicial independence in liberal democratic theory is 
considered here to provide some general context to the discussion of the widely 
recognised concept of judicial independence. 
91 
 
This is despite the fact that judicial independence is generally viewed 
as an essential feature of liberal democracy.21 In political science, the 
concept of judicial independence is about connections or absence of 
connections between the judiciary and other components of the 
political system.22 The treatment of judicial independence by different 
liberal democracies is not the same.23 There are tremendous 
differences in the arrangements which liberal countries put in place to 
secure the various components of judicial independence.24 These 
differences have led Russell to even ask the question whether there is 
any basis for comparative analysis in this field or the concept is so 
fundamentally variable that there is really no basis for comparative 
analysis. However, he believes that ‘it must be possible to arrive at an 
understanding that makes comparative study of judicial independence 
possible.’25 I might add that it seems what brings most liberal 
democracies closer on the issue of judicial independence are 
international standards (discussed in Chapter Five) and comparative 
analysis.  
 A general discussion on the rationale and meaning of judicial 
independence follows. 
 
 
The meaning and rationale of judicial independence 
 
Judicial independence has been used (in political science) to 
refer to the concepts of collective and individual autonomy of judges 
                                                                                                                                            
20 See Peter H. Russell ‘Toward a General Theory of Judicial Independence’ in Peter 
H. Russel & David M. O’Brien (ed.) Judicial Independence in the Age of Democracy 
(2001) 1. See also Kate Malleson ‘Judicial Training and Performance Appraisal: The 
Problem of Judicial Independence’ (1997) Vol. 60 Modern Law Review 657, stating 
that there is no universally agreed definition of the principle of judicial 
independence.  
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid 2-3. 
25 Ibid. 
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from other individuals and institutions.26  In the context of 
dimensions of judicial independence, this is the most widely 
recognized dimension – with its focus on the external forces. The 
second dimension refers to sources of influence and control within the 
judiciary itself. In the former dimension, it is the independence of the 
judiciary as a collective or an institution whose independence is at 
stake whereas in the latter dimension it is the independence of the 
individual judicial officer which is at stake.27  
 
Judicial independence is also used to refer to judicial decision 
making that is considered indicative of judges enjoying a high 
measure of autonomy.28 According to Russell, judges who frequently 
hand down decisions against the government ‘may well enjoy a high 
degree of independence from that government but might be very 
susceptible to control by nongovernmental forces.’ He gives examples 
of judges who rule against state prosecutors because they are being 
bank-rolled by organized crime, or who overturn government policy 
because they are closely aligned with the opposition interest group, or 
that they may be dependent on the media as is the case with Italian 
magistrates.29 All these suggest that when one talks of judicial 
independence, the focus should not exclusively be on the 
independence from the government as there are other role players as 
well; but the government is undoubtedly the key player and, it is, 
therefore, not surprising that the main focus is on it. It will be no 
different in this study. 
 
The two senses of the concept of judicial independence are 
considered to be closely related and one is generally seen as a means 
to another although this is not always the case.30 A high measure of 
                                                 
26 Ibid 6.  
27 See ibid 11-12 for a brief discussion of these two dimensions of judicial 
independence.  
28 Ibid.  
29 See ibid 8 in this regard. 
30 Ibid. 
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autonomy does not necessarily guarantee that judges will think and 
act in an independent manner. Although institutional arrangements 
considered to be conducive to an independent-minded judiciary can 
be established and maintained, judicial independence of mind and 
behaviour cannot be manufactured.31 Furthermore, Russell also 
points out that an absence of crucial aspects of autonomy does not 
always translate into judges not acting independently as some judges 
may defy the odds and act independently.32 
 
Another word which should be defined in this debate is the 
meaning of ‘judicial’ or ‘judiciary’. According to Shimon Shetreet the 
judiciary could be defined as ‘the organ of government not forming 
part of the executive and the legislature, which is not subject to 
personal, substantive and collective controls, and which performs the 
primary function of adjudication.’33 It is evident that the CODH hardly 
fits into this definition for the reasons discussed in Chapter Three. 
 
What is the rationale for judicial independence? Russell deals with 
this question and explains it beautifully as follows: 34 
 
We want judges to enjoy a high degree of autonomy so that, when disputes 
arise about our legal rights and duties to one another and in relation to public 
authorities…we can submit them for resolution to judges whose…independence 
gives us reason to believe they will resolve the issues fairly, according to their 
understanding of the law, and not out of fear of recrimination or hope of 
reward. 
 
                                                 
31 Ibid 7.  
32 Ibid 7-8. 
33 S Shetreet and J Deschenes (ed.) Judicial Independence: the contemporary debate 
(1985), 597-598. Shetreet arrived at this definition after surveying judicial 
independence of 29 countries. This approach is informed by the concern that 
judicial independence is sometimes undermined by transfer of judicial functions 
from an autonomous judiciary to officials and agencies that have very little 
independence (Russel (note 20 above) 8). South Africa adopts an interesting position 
on the characterization of courts or the judiciary in its Constitution. A court or 
judicial officer does not constitute an organ of state (s 239). However, Russel takes a 
pragmatic or functional approach as opposed to the formal approach adopted by 
Shetreet above. In his view, the judiciary are the officials and institutions that 
perform the central function of adjudication. 
34 Russell (note 20 above) 10. 
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It is clear from the above quotation that people want the judiciary to 
be independent because the fair resolution of disputes is important to 
them. A fair adjudication of disputes can hardly take place if judicial 
officers are susceptible to external influences or pressure. That said, 
full judicial autonomy or independence cannot be realized.35 This is 
mainly for the following reasons: (i) because judges make the law in 
the process of rendering authoritative judgments, they are part of the 
system of governance and are therefore state functionaries; (ii) judicial 
institutions are established, protected and maintained by other arms 
of the state and this means that their autonomy from other arms of 
the state can only be partial; (iii) judicial officers take office with 
predispositions based on their pre-judicial experience and affiliations 
and these are not easily shed even if they are challenged by new 
orientations after taking judicial office.36 
 
However, none of the above justifies abandoning the ideal of 
judicial independence given that a sound principle of government 
should not be discarded on the basis that it cannot be fully realized.37 
In my view, this suggests that judicial independence is more of an 
ideal than a principle which can be achieved fully. With this reality in 
mind, how then, should one approach judicial independence? From 
the eye of a political scientist, Russell suggests figuring out ‘what 
kinds of independence it is most essential to maintain.’38 He suggests 
four critical points of control and undue influence. They are as 
follows: structural―which refers to the power of government bodies 
outside the judiciary to create and modify judicial institutions; 
personnel―these include the methods of appointing, remunerating, 
                                                 
35 Indeed, Russell’s comparative study of 12 commonwealth countries from different 
legal traditions, concludes that ‘judicial independence is never a condition that is 
established fully or that is enjoyed without controversy or challenge’ (ibid 301). 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid 11. 
38 Ibid. Russell speaks of focusing on the points where the absence of independence 
is most telling and destructive of the institution’s claim to legitimacy. He argues that 
judicial independence is at risk if influences undermine the judicial officer’s capacity 
to adjudicate. That is if the judge faces the risk of not being accepted as a common 
judge by the disputing parties (ibid 12). 
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and disciplining judges; court administration; and finally, direct 
approaches.39 In legal terms, the equivalent of Russell’s approach 
would be ascertaining the basic requirements of or essential 
conditions for judicial independence. 
 
Judicial independence can be protected through various 
institutional arrangements. A constitutional guarantee is often looked 
to as the most effective way of protecting judicial independence.40 
However, the challenge of constitutional guarantees is their 
interpretation and enforcement by the judiciary due to the fact that 
such an exercise effectively requires judges to act as judges in their 
own case.41 On this basis, and given the complex and multifaceted 
nature of the principle of judicial independence, Russell argues that 
judges should not be given the last word in working out the practical 
meaning of the concept.42  
 
This is an interesting view point. However, Russell does not tell 
us who should have the last word on the issue. Entrusting the last 
word to the legislature, for example, could pose a real threat to 
judicial independence. This is a difficult issue which requires some 
kind of compromise on both ends―perhaps in the form of a dialogue 
between the three key branches of state, that is the executive, the 
judiciary and the legislature. However, managing such a dialogue can 
prove to be difficult. Recently, South Africa has been battling with this 
issue, which arose in the context of the proposed package of Judicial 
Bills aimed at regulating a number of aspects on the judiciary.43  
 
                                                 
39 See ibid 13-22 for an insightful discussion of the above critical points of control 
and undue influence. Although these points largely emanate from political thought, 
they are persuasive, practical and also have resonance in legal thinking. 
40 Ibid 22. 
41 Ibid 23. 
42 Ibid.   
43 See Democratic Rights and Governance Unit (ed.) The Judicial Institution in 
Southern Africa (2006) (153-155), for a brief account of the resulting tensions 
between the executive and the legislature on the one hand and the judiciary on the 
other. 
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In any event, the point which Russell raises is moot in the 
context of South Africa because the Constitution entrusts the courts 
with the last word on the meaning of judicial independence.44 This 
brings me to the discussion of the South African Constitutional 
Court’s approach to matters of separation of powers and judicial 
independence. 
 
 
4.4 Separation of powers and judicial independence under the 
South African Constitution 
 
The separation of powers was central in the making of South 
Africa’s democratic Constitution. It was one of the 34 Constitutional 
Principles with which the final Constitution had to comply.45 The 
Constitutional Court certified the final Constitution in Ex Parte 
Chairperson of the National Assembly: In Re Certification of the 
Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(second certification case).46 
Principles VI and VII provided for the separation of powers and 
judicial independence respectively. Principle VI stated that ‘[t]here 
shall be a separation of powers between the legislature, executive and 
judiciary, with appropriate checks and balances to ensure 
accountability, responsiveness and openness.’ On the other hand 
Principle VII provided that ‘[t]he judiciary shall be appropriately 
qualified, independent and impartial and shall have the power and 
jurisdiction to safeguard and enforce the Constitution and all 
fundamental rights.’ 
                                                 
44 However, it must be borne in mind that this, of course, does not preclude other 
institutions of state from participating in the debate as long as this is done within 
the constitutional framework. 
45 This was required in terms of s 71 of the Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993. 
This section required that constitutional text passed by Constitutional Assembly in 
terms of chapter 5 of the Interim Constitution be certified by Constitutional Court as 
complying with Constitutional Principles set out in Schedule 4 of that Constitution. 
46 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC). 
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In the first certification judgment,47 the Constitutional Court 
made some remarks which are of general and particular interest with 
regard to its understanding of the separation of powers doctrine.48 The 
Court observed that there was ‘no universal model of separation of 
powers, and in democratic systems of government in which checks 
and balances result in the imposition of restraints by one branch of 
government upon another, there is no separation that is absolute.’49 
However, it is worth noting that in De Lange v Smuts NO and Others 
(De Lange), Ackermann J for the majority stated that ‘over time our 
courts will develop a distinctively South African model of separation of 
powers, one that fits the particular system of government provided for 
in the Constitution….’.50 The Court stated further that ‘no 
constitutional scheme can reflect a complete separation of powers: the 
scheme is always one of partial separation.’51 Separation of powers is 
not a fixed or rigid constitutional doctrine.52 CP VI did not prescribe 
what form of separation should be adopted in the Constitution. 
However, the principle of separation of powers ‘recognizes the 
functional independence of the branches of government.’53 
 
More importantly, the Court said that an independent judiciary 
is an essential part of the separation of powers.54 The Constitution 
                                                 
47 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC). In this case, the 
Court held that it was unable to certify that all the provisions of the adopted text 
complied with the constitutional principles in Schedule 4 and remitted the text to 
the Constitutional Assembly. 
48 The Court embarked on this exercise because some parties raised objections 
which bordered on the doctrine of separation of powers. See paras 106-107 of the 
first certification judgment. 
49 Ibid para 108. 
50 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) para 60. This case dealt with an application for confirmation 
of a High Court order declaring s 66(3) of the Insolvency Act, which authorises a 
person presiding over a creditors’ meeting to imprison a recalcitrant witness, 
unconstitutional. The Court confirmed the High Court’s order only to the extent that 
it held that s 66(3) is unconstitutional for authorising a presiding officer who is not a 
magistrate to commit a recalcitrant witness to prison. 
51 Ibid para 109. 
52 Ibid para 111. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid para 123. It is worth noting that in Van Rooyen and Others v The State and 
Others (General Council of the Bar South Africa Intervening) 2002 (5) SA 246 (CC) 
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recognizes this. Judicial independence and other related matters are 
provided for in s 165 of the Constitution. It vests the judicial authority 
of the Republic in the courts and provides that ‘[t]he courts are 
independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which 
they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice.’55 
Organs of state have the responsibility to ensure the ‘independence, 
impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the courts.’56 
This has to be done through legislative and other measures.57 This 
suggests that there is a whole range of things that could be done to 
meet the objectives in s 165(4) of the Constitution.  
 
Furthermore, s 165(3) provides that ‘[n]o person or organ of 
state may interfere with the functioning of the courts.’  
 
While the Constitution declares all courts to be independent, it 
does not prescribe the exact measures which must be adopted by 
organs of state in order to assist and protect the courts aimed at 
ensuring their independence. It mainly provides for general guidelines 
which should shape the legislative and other measures to be adopted. 
This is particularly the case in relation to measures which must be 
adopted to protect and assist the lower courts.58 The Constitution is 
clearer on some aspects of the nature of independence of superior 
courts and their judges. It provides for their appointment, terms of 
office and to some extent their remuneration.59 It does not do so for 
                                                                                                                                            
para 17, the Constitutional Court stated that ‘[j]udicial independence and 
impartiality are also implicit in the rule of law…’ which is foundational to the 
Constitution (s 1(c)). This case primarily dealt with the independence of magistrates 
in South Africa. Judicial independence of magistrates was challenged on several 
grounds. The Constitutional Court upheld some of the challenges and dismissed 
others. 
55 Section 165(1)(2). 
56 Section 165(4). 
57 Ibid. 
58 For example, see s 174(7) in relation to the appointment of ‘other judicial officers’. 
These ‘must be appointed in terms of an Act of Parliament which must ensure that 
their appointment, promotion, transfer or dismissal of, or disciplinary steps against, 
these judicial officers take place without favour or prejudice.’ 
59 See ss 174-178. 
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‘other judicial officers’. As already argued in Chapter Two, military 
judges can be regarded as ‘[o]ther judicial officers’ for the purposes of 
the Constitution as they are not, among other things, appointed 
through procedures involving the Judicial Service Commission.60 All 
these factors mean that one has to look elsewhere for an answer on 
the meaning of judicial independence―particularly in relation to lower 
courts.  
 
Globally, legal scholarship that has dominated the literature on 
judicial independence derives its ideas from the precedents and 
practices of particular legal traditions.61 
 
 
Constitutional Court’s interpretation of judicial independence 
The Constitutional Court has had the opportunity to consider the 
question of judicial independence on a few occasions. The first crucial 
case which pointed the direction of the Constitutional Court on its 
interpretation of judicial independence is De Lange.62 In this case, the 
Court mainly quoted, with approval, several passages from the leading 
Canadian case of R v Valente (Valente) on the essential conditions for 
judicial independence.63 In the same case (De Lange), the Court also 
drew from the following cases Canada v Beauregard,64 (Beauregard), R 
v Généreux (Généreux),65 both also from the Canadian Supreme Court. 
The Constitutional Court found the views of the Canadian Supreme 
                                                 
60 See Aifheli Enos Tshivhase ‘Military Courts in a Democratic South Africa: An 
Assessment of their Independence’ (2006) 6 New Zealand Armed Forces law Review 
96, 105.  
61 Russell (note 20 above) 11. 
62 Note 50 above. 
63 (1985) 24 DLR (4th) 161 (SCC). This case primarily dealt with the question of 
whether or not the Provincial Court (Criminal Division) was independent within the 
meaning of s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
64 (1986) 30 DLR (4th) 481. 
65 (1992) 88 DLR (4th) 110. For an analysis of this judgment see, Michael Doi ‘The 
Judicial Independence of Canadian Forces General Court Martials: An Analysis of 
the Supreme Court of Canada Judgment in Regina v. Genereux’ (1993) 16 Dahousie 
Law Journal  234. 
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Court to be instructive in deciding what is meant by ‘an independent 
tribunal or forum’ 66 for the purposes of s 34 of the Constitution which 
provides everyone’s right ‘to have any dispute that can be resolved by 
the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court 
or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or 
forum.’ 
As a starting point the Court referred to the following views of the 
Canadian Supreme Court in Canada v Beauregard as a summary to 
the essence of judicial independence:67 
Historically, the generally accepted core of the principle of judicial 
independence has been the complete liberty of individual judges to hear and 
decide the cases that come before them: no outsider — be it government, 
pressure group, individual or even another judge — should interfere in fact, or 
attempt to interfere, with the way in which a judge conducts his or her case and 
makes his or her decision. This core continues to be central to the principle of 
judicial independence.  
 
The above principle is entrenched in s 165(3) of the Constitution 
which provides that ‘[no] person or organ of state may interfere with 
the functioning of the courts’ read with s 165(1) which vests judicial 
authority of the Republic in the courts.68 
 
 The Constitutional Court (relying on the Canadian Supreme Court) 
adopted the following as the essential conditions for judicial 
independence which could be applied independently and were capable 
of achievement by a variety of legislative schemes or formulas: 
 
 Basic degree of financial security free from arbitrary interference by 
the Executive in a manner that could affect judicial independence.  
                                                 
66 De Lange v Smuts (note 50) para 69. 
67 Para 70. 
68 In R v Généreux it was held that ‘the status of a tribunal must guarantee not only 
its freedom from interference by the executive and legislative branches of 
government but also by ‘any other external force, such as business or corporate 
interests or other pressure groups.’ This interpretation was adopted by the 
Constitutional Court in De Lange v Smuts at para 72. 
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 Security of tenure ‘which embodies as an essential element the 
requirement that the decision-maker be removable only for just 
cause;’ ‘secure against interference by the Executive or other 
appointing authority.’ 
 Institutional independence ‘with respect to matters that relate 
directly to the exercise of the tribunal's judicial function… judicial 
control over the administrative decisions that bear directly and 
immediately on the exercise of the judicial function.’69  
 
These aspects guarantee external independence.70 At a global level, 
Lehtimaja and Pellonpaa correctly state that it is not easy to compile 
an exhaustive list of criteria for the independence of the judiciary 
given the variety of existing judicial systems.71 However, they assert, 
correctly, that the following are the most crucial areas: manner of 
appointment and discharge; degree of stability and non-removability 
from office; conditions of service as well as physical, political, legal 
and logistical protection against outside pressures and harassment.72 
Although the Constitutional Court shied away from the international 
debate when discussing the essential requirements for judicial 
independence, it can be seen that the requirements adopted by the 
Court and suggestions by Lehtimaja and Pellonpaa are very similar. 
 
 Recently, the Constitutional Court acknowledged in an 
unprecedented case of Justice Alliance of South Africa v President of 
the Republic of South Africa and Others that ‘[j]udicial independence in 
a democracy is recognised internationally.’73 The expansive 
                                                 
69 Ibid para 70 (footnotes omitted). The Court also highlighted the distinction 
between independence and impartiality. I revert to this later in this further below. 
70 J Franco & C Powell ‘The Meaning of Institutional Independence in Van Rooyen v 
The State’ (2004) 121 (4) South African Law Journal 562, 564. 
71 L Lehtimaja & M Pellonpaa ‘Article 10’, in Gundmundur Afredsson & AsbjØrn 
Eide (eds.) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: a common standard of 
achievement 228. 
72 Ibid. 
73 2011 (5) SA 388 (CC) para 38. This case considered the constitutionality of an Act 
of Parliament which purported to give the President the power to extend the term of 
office of the incumbent Chief Justice. In a unanimous judgment the Court found 
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requirements of judicial independence are found in numerous 
international declaratory instruments. The most important of these is 
the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of Judiciary 
(UN Principles).74  
 
 The UN Principles are designed to secure and promote the 
independence of the judiciary.75 The Principles focus on the 
independence of the judiciary, freedom of expression and association, 
qualifications, selection and training, conditions of service and tenure, 
professional secrecy and immunity and discipline, suspension and 
removal from office. Most of these principles are generally captured in 
chapter eight of the Constitution in varying degrees.76 Closer to home, 
the African Union has adopted the Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa (African Union 
Principles and Guidelines).77 Both the African Union and the UN 
Principles have, in general, been referred to with approval by the 
Constitutional Court.78  
                                                                                                                                            
that both the Act and the subsequent extension of the term of office of Ngcobo CJ to 
be constitutionally invalid because they were offensive to s 176(1) of the 
Constitution. 
74 Adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention and the 
Treatment of Offenders held in Milan from 26 August to 6 September 1985 and 
endorsed by GA res 40/32 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985.  According to the 
Preamble of the Principles, they are formulated to assist Member States in their task 
of securing and promoting the independence of the judiciary and ‘should be taken 
into account and respected by the Governments within the framework of their national 
legislation and practice…’ (own emphasis). The African Commission has referred to 
these principles on numerous occasions to justify its conclusions on the violation of 
the right to fair trial in the African Charter. Another declaratory document adopted 
recently is the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct. It was adopted by the 
Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity in November 2002. I should also 
point out that, apart from these two, there are numerous documents on judicial 
independence (for a brief indication, see The Judicial Institution in Southern Africa 
(2006) 1-13; but the most frequently cited is the UN Basic Principles on Judicial 
Independence. 
75 Preamble of the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of Judiciary. 
76 See in particular ss 165, 174-178 and s 180. 
77 DOC/OS(XXX)247. 
78 Justice Alliance of South Africa v President of the Republic of South Africa (note 73 
above) paras 38-39. 
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However, the most rigorous and elaborate conditions of judicial 
independence cannot feasibly be applied to a variety of tribunals.79 
This suggests that the elaborate and rigorous conditions of judicial 
independence may be applied differently to a range of tribunals. 
However, ‘the essence of the security afforded by the essential 
conditions of judicial independence must be provided or guaranteed;’80 
but this does not need to be done by any particular legislative or 
constitutional scheme.81 In the context of s 165 of the Constitution 
which constitutionalises the core values of judicial independence and 
accords such values to all courts, it means that ‘all courts are entitled 
to and have the basic protection that is required.’82  
In De Lange, the Constitutional Court did not elaborate on the 
essential conditions for judicial independence. It simply just 
introduced them; but the Court did elaborate on these conditions in 
the subsequent cases, especially in Van Rooyen.83 An analysis of each 
of the above requirements drawn from these cases follows. 
 
(a) Basic degree of financial security 
 Judicial officers must have a basic degree of financial security.84 In 
relation to the position of magistrates, the Constitutional Court has 
indicated that it is unclear whether it should be the executive or the 
legislature to determine what is meant by basic financial security.85 
                                                 
79 R v Valente (note 63 above) 175.  This statement appears to have paved the way 
for the Court to accept a lower standard of judicial independence for magistrates’ 
courts in Van Rooyen. In this case, the Court attached significant weight to the fact 
that the Constitution itself differentiates between the different courts and between 
the procedures for the appointment of different judicial officers. 
80 De Lange v Smuts (note 50 above) para 72. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Van Rooyen v The State (note 54 above) para 22. 
83 Ibid. 
84 De Lange v Smuts (note 50 above) para 70. 
85 Van Rooyen v The State (note 54 above) para 138. However, it is worth noting that 
the UN Principles require that the law should secure adequate remuneration and 
conditions of service for judicial officers. This suggests that the legislature, as the 
law making body, should somehow be involved in determining basic financial 
security of judicial officers. 
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The Court acknowledges that this is a difficult area for which there are 
no easy solutions.86 The Court was nevertheless able to establish 
three requirements of basic financial security while grappling with it 
in the context of magistrates. These are (a) adequate remuneration;87 
(b) safeguards to avoid arbitrary reduction of salaries of judicial 
officers;88 and (c) an assurance that judicial officers should not be put 
in a position to engage in negotiations with the executive over their 
salaries because they are not employees and cannot resort to 
industrial action to advance their interests in their conditions of 
service.89 
 
 However, it must be noted that in the second Certification case, the 
Constitutional Court held that there is no obligation to establish 
independent structures to serve as a filter between the judiciary and 
the executive; and that this is a matter of political choice, not 
mandatory for securing judicial independence.90 On the other hand, 
the Court recognises, in Van Rooyen, that such structures play a 
crucial role in the determination of salaries and conditions of service 
for judicial officers.91 The views of the Court in the second Certification 
case and in the latter case of Van Rooyen appear to signal confusion 
or uncertainty on the part of the Constitutional Court on whether 
independent structures are an imperative requirement in dealing with 
the salaries of judicial officers.92 
 
  That said, in Valente, financial security and security of tenure were 
seen as safeguards of the individual judge’s freedom from outside 
influence.93 In the later Canadian cases of Reference re: Public Sector 
                                                 
86 Ibid.  
87 Van Rooyen v The State (note 54 above) para 138. 
88 Ibid para 149. 
89 Ibid para 139.  
90 Note 46 above paras 59 and 124. 
91 Van Rooyen v The State  (note 54 above) paras 145-148. 
92 The UN Principles do not completely clarify this issue and simply require that 
these matters ‘shall be adequately secured by law’. See Principle 11 in this regard. 
93 (1985) 24 DLR (4th) 161 (SCC). 
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Pay Reduction Act (PEI), Attorney General of Canada et al, Interveners; 
Reference re: Independence of Judges of Provincial Court, Prince 
Edward Island, Provincial Court Act and Public Sector Pay Reduction 
Act; Attorney General of Canada et al, Interveners,94 the Court held 
that financial security and security of tenure are essential to the 
protection of both the individual and institutional independence.95 The 
importance of basic financial security and security of tenure clearly 
requires that strong measures be taken to secure them adequately. 
 
 
(b)  Security of tenure 
 
The Constitution does not say much on the security of tenure of 
‘other judicial officers’ such as military judges or magistrates. Terms 
of office for South African judges are regulated in s 176 of the 
Constitution. The terms of office for ‘other judicial officers’ such as 
military judges and magistrates are regulated in national legislation.96 
Section 174(7) of the Constitution states that  
 
other judicial officers must be appointed in terms of an Act of Parliament 
which must ensure that the appointment, promotion, transfer or dismissal 
of, or disciplinary steps against, these judicial officers take place without 
favour or prejudice. 
 
 On the tenure of appointment, judicial officers need not necessarily 
be appointed for life97 but it is essential that judicial assignments be 
ordinarily fixed for a longer period of time.98 It has been suggested 
that judicial appointments should at least be fixed for several years.99 
Recently, the Constitutional Court has made some remarks about 
renewability of a judicial term of office. In Justice Alliance v The 
President of South Africa the Court spoke against renewability of a 
                                                 
94 (1997) 150 DLR (4th) 577. 
95 Ibid para 123. 
96 For example, those of military judges are mainly (but not specifically) regulated in 
the Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act 16 of 1999. 
97 Manfred Nowak (ed.) UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights CCPR Commentary 
(1993) 245. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
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term of office of a judicial officer when it stated that ‘[i]t is well 
established on both foreign and local authority that a non-renewable 
term of office is a prime feature of independence (footnotes 
omitted).’100 The problem with short-term renewable appointments is 
that these may potentially compromise judicial independence.101 The 
possibility of a judicial officer working for the renewal of his or her 
term instead of administering justice cannot be ruled out.102 The 
Constitutional Court stated, further, in Justice Alliance of South Africa,  
that ‘non-renewability is the bedrock of security of tenure’ and ‘fosters 
confidence in the institution of the judiciary as a whole, since its 
members function with neither threat that their terms will not be 
renewed nor any inducement to seek to secure renewal.’103 
Furthermore, if a judicial term is renewable, a judicial officer ‘may feel 
obliged not to offend anyone who might influence his or her re-
appointment.’104 In addition, the Court also stated that extension of a 
term of office may be seen as a benefit conferred upon those judges 
favoured by the executive or by Parliament.105 
 
 That said, it is not entirely clear if appointments fixed for a 
reasonable period of time and which are renewed by an independent 
structure would be offensive to the principle of judicial independence.  
In my view, this may not necessarily be offensive because the 
existence of an independent structure would serve as a balancing 
mechanism. I revert to this point in Chapter Seven. 
  
The Constitutional Court has not said much on the 
requirements of security of tenure for judicial officers. It has, to a 
limited extent, only dealt with some aspects of removal and discipline 
                                                 
100 Note 73 above, para 73. 
101 See Tshivhase (note 60 above) 115. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Para 73. 
104 The Judicial Institution in Southern Africa (note 43 above). 
105 Justice Alliance of South Africa v The President of South Africa (note 73 above) 
para 75. 
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of judicial officers. Borrowing from the Canadian Supreme Court, the 
Court has stated that the requirement for security of tenure is that 
the decision―maker must be removable only for just cause and must 
be secure against interference by the Executive or other appointing 
authority.106 In Van Rooyen, it was held that ‘protection against 
removal from office lies at the heart of judicial independence.’107 This 
protection enables judicial officers to apply the law impartially and 
without the fear of being removed from the office or securing their 
future.  
 
 On the issue of disciplining judicial officers, the Court has 
established the principle that this should be done appropriately and 
by appropriate authorities. This principle is evident from the 
Constitutional Court’s view in Van Rooyen that the executive should 
not have the power to exercise discipline over judicial officers and to 
punish them for misconduct.108 The Court further stated that doing so 
would place judicial officers in a subordinate position in relation to 
the government and this is inconsistent with judicial independence.109 
The Court made these remarks with regard to the Minister of Justice 
who had the power to exercise discipline over magistrates and to 
punish them for misconduct. 
 
 Although the Constitutional Court is yet to make pronouncements 
on the requirements of security of tenure and the term of office for 
‘other judicial officers,’ the above discussion shows that it has made 
some remarks which offer some guidance on what would likely pass 
constitutional muster on these aspects. 
 
 
 
                                                 
106 De Lange v Smuts (note 50 above) para 70. 
107 Van Rooyen v The State para 161. 
108 Ibid para 179. 
109 Ibid. 
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(c)  Institutional independence 
 Institutional independence is the independence between the courts 
from other arms of government110 and other sources of undue 
influence. In the context of military courts, it would also include 
independence of military courts from the military command. It 
protects judges as a collective.111 It is an essential condition of judicial 
independence that the tribunal is institutionally independent with 
respect to matters that relate directly to the exercise of the tribunal's 
judicial function and judicial control over the administrative decisions 
that bear directly and immediately on the exercise of the judicial 
function.112 This relates to the overall control that judges have over 
the job they do and matters related to their job.  
 
 The Constitutional Court has stated that structural independence 
proclaimed in s 165 of the Constitution is an indispensable part of 
judicial independence.113 This suggests that institutional 
independence is one of those requirements which under no 
circumstances can be compromised. All courts have to be 
institutionally independent from other arms of government. As will be 
seen in Chapter Seven, this requirement is difficult to apply to military 
courts given the hierarchical nature of the military and the 
relationship between the military and its members. 
 
(d) Distinction between judicial independence and 
impartiality: The elusive tests 
 There is no doubt that ‘access to courts that function fairly and in 
public is a basic right.’114 The Constitutional Court has recently stated 
                                                 
110 Van Rooyen v The State (note 54 above) paras 18-20. 
111 Franco & Powell (note 70 above) 564. 
112 De Lange v Smuts (note 50 above) para 70. 
113 Ibid para 59. 
114 S v Basson 2007 (3) SA 582 (CC) para 23. This case dealt with application for 
leave to appeal against the outcome of criminal proceedings involving a high profile 
accused in relation to some activities of the apartheid era. The judgment of the 
Court considered, among other things, allegations of bias. The Court held that 
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that the impartiality of judicial officers is an essential requirement of a 
constitutional democracy and is closely linked to the independence of 
courts.115 How are the two linked? Can one be viewed to be 
independent from the other? 
 
 The distinction between impartiality and independence is not 
always clear; but in Valente, the two were held to be distinct and 
separate requirements,116 and this approach was endorsed by the 
Constitutional Court in De Lange.117 The Canadian Supreme Court 
stated that ‘impartiality refers to a state of mind or attitude in relation 
to the issues and the parties in a particular case.’118 It connotes the 
absence of bias, actual or perceived.119 This relates to an internal or 
subjective facet of independence.  
 
 Similarly, Findlay v The United Kingdom (Findlay) refers to two 
aspects of impartiality.120  Firstly, the tribunal must be subjectively 
free of personal prejudice or bias. Secondly, it must be impartial from 
an objective point of view in that it must offer sufficient guarantees to 
exclude any legitimate doubt of impartiality.121  
 
 What is the legal test for impartiality? In South Africa, the test for 
impartiality is one of reasonable apprehension of bias, as established 
                                                                                                                                            
although some of the judge’s remarks and behavior could be considered 
inappropriate, it could not be said to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. 
115 Ibid para 24. 
116 Note 63 above, 169-70. 
117 De Lange v Smuts (note 50 above) para 73. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. This is in contrast with a political science perspective where everything in 
the political system is connected to everything and ‘nothing in the political system is 
without bias.’ See Russell (note 20 above) 2 in this regard. According to him, the 
analytical challenge is to ascertain what kinds of independence and impartiality are 
possible and desirable. 
120 Findlay v The United Kingdom (1997) ECHR 8, para 73. 
121 Ibid para 73. These are guarantees of independence and this requirement 
emphasises the strong relationship between impartiality and independence. 
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in South African Rugby Football Union and Others v President of the 
Republic of South Africa (SARFU)122 and confirmed in S v Basson:123 
  
The question is whether a reasonable, objective and informed person would on 
correct facts reasonably apprehend that the judge has not or will not bring an 
impartial mind to bear on the adjudication of the case, that is a mind open to 
persuasion by the evidence and the submissions of counsel. The reasonableness 
of the apprehension must be assessed in the light of the oath of office taken by 
the judges to administer justice without fear or favour. 
 
The perception of the impartiality of a judicial officer is crucial in the 
administration of justice.124 The test in both SARFU and Basson is 
similar to that in Cooper v The United Kingdom (Cooper).125 In this 
case, the European Court of Human Rights reiterated its holding in 
Findlay that the standpoint of the accused is important, without being 
decisive in deciding whether a particular court lacks independence 
and impartiality.126 Instead, what is decisive is whether the doubts of 
the accused are objectively justified.127 However, the test in Cooper is 
not very helpful for the purposes of drawing a clear distinction 
between impartiality and independence because the Court used the 
said test to establish whether a military court lacked both 
independence and impartiality. 
                                                 
122 1999 (4) SA 147 (CC). This case was an application for recusal, which implicated 
each of the members of the Constitutional Court, but was directed at five judges 
only. The fourth respondent laid claim to a reasonable apprehension on his part that 
the specified justices would be biased. The Court held that the question was 
whether a reasonable, objective and informed person would reasonably apprehend 
that the judicial officer in question had not or would not bring an impartial mind to 
bear on the adjudication of the case. The Court set out its reasons for finding that 
on an application of this test to the facts, the application for recusal fell to be 
dismissed. 
123 Note 114 above para 25.  
124 The State v Basson (2005) (1) SA 171 (CC), para 27. In De Lange v Smuts (note 50 
above) para 71, the Court stated that: ‘Both independence and impartiality are 
fundamental not only to the capacity to do justice in a particular case but also to 
individual and public confidence in the administration of justice. Without that 
confidence the system cannot command the respect and acceptance that are 
essential to its effective operation. It is, therefore, important that a tribunal should 
be perceived as independent, as well as impartial, and that the test for independence 
should include that perception.’  
125(2003) ECHR 686 http://www.worldlii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2003/686.html 
(accessed on 10 February 2006).  
 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid. 
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How does impartiality differ from judicial independence? Both 
relate to a state of mind in the actual exercise of judicial functions but 
judicial independence also includes a status or relationship resting on 
objective conditions or guarantees.128 What then is the test for judicial 
independence? In Valente, the Court took the view that the test for 
judicial independence should be ‘whether the tribunal may be 
reasonably perceived as independent’ as is the case for impartiality as 
well.129 In Van Rooyen v The State, the Court, borrowing from a United 
States court, explained that the question for independence and 
impartiality was how things appeared to to the well-informed, 
thoughtful and objective observer, rather than the hypersensitive, 
cynical, and suspicious person.130 This means that the test for both 
impartiality and judicial independence should generally be the same 
i.e. reasonable perception. However, the perception must be ‘whether 
the tribunal enjoys the essential objective conditions or guarantees of 
judicial independence and not a perception of how it will in fact act, 
regardless of whether it enjoys such conditions or guarantees.’131 
 
In the final analysis, it is important that a tribunal should be 
perceived as independent as well as impartial.132 The two have been 
held to be important for two reasons―that they are fundamental to the 
capacity to do justice in a particular case but also to individual and 
public confidence in the administration of justice.133 The two appear 
to be two sides of the same coin although they are tested differently 
but using the same principle―reasonable perception. To summarise, 
the test for impartiality focuses on the existence of a factor or factors 
                                                 
128 De Lange v Smuts (note 50 above) para 71.  
129 Ibid. The Court stated that the test for independence should also include 
perception. 
130 Van Rooyen v The State (note 54 above) para 34. 
131 De Lange v Smuts (note 50 above) para 104. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid. In the same breadth, the Court stated that a system without individual and 
public confidence cannot command the respect and acceptance that are essential for 
its operation. 
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which will lead to a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the 
court. On the other hand, the test for judicial independence focuses 
on the reasonable perception informed by the existence or lack 
thereof, of the objective conditions or guarantees of judicial 
independence.  Finally, the Constitutional Court has to be 
commended for having developed a clearer test for impartiality as 
evidenced in SARFU and Basson. 
 
However the court has followed a controversial approach to the 
independence of lower courts. 
 
 
(e)  Lower Courts and the Constitutional Court’s approach to 
their independence 
 In Van Rooyen,134 the Constitutional Court has followed a 
controversial approach to the independence of lower courts. The Court 
accepted a lower standard of independence in relation to magistrates’ 
courts than it requires of the High Courts. It did this for several 
reasons: (a) that the Constitution provided for a hierarchy of courts 
and in its view this justifies the different degrees of independence;135 
(b) that higher courts deal with matters which were seen to be ‘the 
most sensitive areas of tension between the Legislature, the Executive 
and the Judiciary;’136 and (c)  that the increased level of institutional 
independence at the higher level was justified because the High 
Courts are in themselves a means of ensuring and guarding the 
independence of lower courts through the mechanism of judicial 
review.137 
 
 The central argument of the Court suggests that judicial review is 
the remedy by which the lowered standard of independence is 
                                                 
134 Van Rooyen v The State (note 54 above). 
135 Ibid para 28. 
136 Ibid para 25. 
137 Ibid paras 21-24. 
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justified.138 In the context of military courts, this would mean that the 
remedy to the lower standard of independence of military courts is 
judicial review by the Court of Military Appeals and higher civilian 
courts.139 That said, the Constitutional Court did not say that it is 
acceptable for lower courts not to enjoy the basic requirements of 
judicial independence or the essential conditions for judicial 
independence. All the Court said was that lower courts do not 
necessarily have to be independent in the same way as superior 
courts. This means that all courts must meet the basic requirements 
or essential conditions for judicial independence regardless of their 
status. It is on that premise that military courts will be evaluated in 
the chapter assessing their independence. 
 
 
4.5  Concluding remarks 
 
 The main aim of this chapter has been to assess the meaning of 
judicial independence. The chapter started by considering the notion 
of judicial independence in an historical context in order to 
understand its philosophical foundation.  In this chapter, a number of 
key aspects were established regarding judicial independence. 
  
The key observations and findings can be summarised as follows:  
 There is no general theory on judicial independence among 
liberal democracies. 
 Judicial independence is an essential part of the separation of 
powers but it cannot be fully realized, just as the Constitutional 
Court has observed that there is no separation that is absolute.  
                                                 
138 The Constitutional Court’s approach has been criticized by Franco and Powell, 
note 70 above, 575 for two reasons: Firstly, that judicial review is not a unique 
protective mechanism. It is rather a feature available to all South Africans. 
Secondly, reliance on judicial review remedies infringements of independence but 
does not prevent them. This means that Franco and Powell basically argue for 
prevention than cure which is almost always a better approach to many things in 
life; but this approach is not always applicable. 
139 Tshivhase (note 60 above) 127. 
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It can therefore be seen as an ideal to strive towards although 
one must at least aim at achieving an acceptable degree of 
independence rather than full independence. This can be done 
by ensuring that courts enjoy the basic requirements of judicial 
independence. 
 There is a whole range of things that could be done to satisfy 
the requirements of judicial independence given that the 
Constitution speaks of legislative and other measures. The 
Constitution provides very limited detail on measures that could 
be adopted in order to guarantee the independence of lower 
courts.  
 By way of summary, the cases of De Lange v Smuts and Van 
Rooyen show that the essential requirements for judicial 
independence are: individual judge’s freedom to decide cases as 
they see fit, institutional independence of the courts, basic 
degree of financial security and security of tenure. Each of these 
requirements has been described as either at the centre of 
judicial independence, at the heart of judicial independence or 
indispensable. This marks the equal importance of each of these 
requirements for all courts regardless of their status.  
 In between the above-mentioned requirements, there is much 
detail which needs to be filled by the executive, the legislature 
and ultimately the courts. Each of these requirements has been 
given some interpretation and there is no single correct formula 
for achieving them. Moreover, the most rigorous and elaborate 
conditions of judicial independence may be applied differently to 
a variety of tribunals―as long as the basic protection is 
guaranteed.  
 
The Constitutional Court’s approach to the independence of lower 
courts in Van Rooyen forms an important part of that Court’s 
jurisprudence on judicial independence. Although the approach in 
question sanctions different degrees of independence for a variety of 
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courts, it does not detract from the uniform application of the basic 
requirements of judicial independence to all courts. This means that 
all courts (military courts included) must at least enjoy the essential 
requirements for judicial independence. 
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CHAPTER 5 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MILITARY COURTS: ASSESSING THE 
APPLICABILITY OF FAIR TRIAL AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
STANDARDS 
 
 
5.1 Introductory remarks 
 
The application of the right to a fair trial and to be tried by an 
independent and impartial tribunal in a military context is not without 
difficulty in international law. The difficulty arises because the relevant 
international legal instruments provide room for arguments that such 
instruments do not apply to military courts. This state of affairs provides a 
partial explanation as to why military courts in many parts of the world 
have operated in ignorance of elements of fair trial and judicial 
independence standards for decades. As will be noted further below, some 
countries in Europe have even entered reservations to the effect that articles 
dealing with the right to a fair trial and the right to be tried by an 
independent and impartial tribunal would not apply to their military courts 
in the context of the European Convention on Human Rights. This shows 
that there is a strong view against the application of fair trial standards to 
military courts.  
 
Building on the discussion in Chapters Two and Three this chapter 
assesses the application of the international legal framework on judicial 
independence and the right to a fair trial to military courts, with some 
emphasis on South Africa for obvious reasons. It seeks to answer the 
question whether this framework applies to military courts. Its objective is to 
show that despite the technical difficulties, it is possible to conclude that 
these standards apply to military courts. It has already been concluded in 
Chapter Two that the principle of judicial independence applies to South 
African military courts because they are part of the judicial system provided 
for in the Constitution. The question raised in this chapter might appear to 
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be moot in the light of that conclusion, nevertheless it is essential for several 
reasons. One of the reasons is that military courts also operate 
internationally such as when they are involved in peace keeping and other 
similar missions.  Moreover, the Constitution requires security services to 
operate in accordance with international law. It is therefore important to 
clarify the applicability of the relevant law. 
 
The Chapter also analyses developments at the United Nations (UN) 
specifically aimed at the universal regulation of military tribunals, and 
generally expresses a view in support of the move to regulate military courts 
internationally.  
 
 
5.2 Does the international legal framework on judicial independence 
and fair trial apply to military courts? 
 
 South African military courts cannot operate in ignorance of 
international law particularly because section 199(5) of the Constitution 
provides that ‘[t]he security services must act...in accordance 
with...customary international law and international agreements binding on 
the Republic.’ A number of international instruments binding on the 
Republic require independent and impartial courts. Almost all of these 
instruments are in the field of human rights. They link judicial 
independence with the right to a fair trial. Thus, judicial independence is 
seen as a prerequisite for the enjoyment of the right to a fair trial. 
 
The starting point is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR).1 Article 10 of the UDHR provides that ‘[e]veryone is entitled in full 
equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial 
tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any 
                                                 
1 Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948. 
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criminal charge against him.’2 Similarly, Art 14(1) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides that ‘[i]n the 
determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and 
obligations in a suit of law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public 
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by 
law.’3  
 
The concern with regard to the language used in the UDHR and the 
ICCPR above is that the two articles leave room for an argument that they 
do not apply to military courts in certain circumstances. For example, where 
military courts only have jurisdiction to try military personnel for pure 
military offences, arguments could be raised that the relevant provisions of 
the UDHR and the ICCPR do not apply. In such a situation, when a military 
court tries a soldier for a military offence, it is clearly not acting in 
determination of a criminal charge, and some could argue that it is also not 
acting in determination of ‘rights and obligations’ of the military accused 
person. However, a counter to that argument is that when a military court 
tries a person for a military offence, it is in effect deciding on the rights and 
obligations of that person―in the context of the offence in question. For 
example, many military offences carry a sentence of imprisonment which 
has an impact on the freedom rights of the convicted soldier. 
 
 The UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), which monitors the 
implementation of the ICCPR, has, in any event, stated that the right to be 
                                                 
2 The UDHR was adopted as a declaratory instrument not meant to be binding. However, 
some scholars have argued that ‘[b]y virtue of its widespread acceptance, the Universal 
Declaration has gradually assumed an independent status as a statement of customary 
international law’: see H Phillip, ‘Human Rights and Economic Policy Discourse: Taking 
Economic and Social Rights Seriously’ (2002) 33 Columbia Law Review 2. In the terms of 
the South African Constitution, s 232: ‘Customary international law is law in the Republic 
unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution.’ It can hardly be argued that Art 10 of the 
UDHR is inconsistent with the Constitution. South Africa is bound by those aspects of the 
UDHR which have attained the status of customary international law. 
3 Opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, (entered into force 23 May 
1976). Another international instrument recognising the principle of judicial independence 
is the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families, opened for signature 18 December 1990, GA res 45/158, Art 18 
(entered into force 1 July 2003). 
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tried by an independent and impartial tribunal ‘[i]s an absolute right that 
may suffer no exception.’4 Moreover, ‘[t]he provisions of article 14 apply to 
all courts and tribunals within the scope of that article whether ordinary or 
specialized.’5 Unfortunately, the HRC did not discuss the interpretive 
difficulties highlighted above but its assertions help in clarifying the 
application of Art 14 to military courts. The comment of the HRC suggests 
that even specialised courts such as military courts which have powers to 
try criminal offences are no exception to the requirement of judicial 
independence.6  
 
 Pleasingly, the interpretive problems discussed above are of little concern 
in the context of South Africa because South African military courts have 
jurisdiction to try both military and criminal offences. In the light of this 
fact, it is not difficult to conclude that these courts fall within the scope of 
the relevant articles by virtue of their wide jurisdiction. 
Moving on to other international instruments, the Geneva Convention 
(III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War offers something different. 
It is the only universal instrument which explicitly requires military courts 
to be independent and impartial.7 The only problem is that the Convention 
is not a full cure to the interpretive problems highlighted above because it 
only applies ‘to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which 
may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties…’ and ‘to all 
cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting 
                                                 
4 UN Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 263/1987, M. Gonzalez del Rio v Peru, 
UN Doc CCPR/C/46/D/263/1987 (1992), para 5.2. 
5 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 13 (Equality before the courts and 
the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent court established by law) Twenty-
first session (1984), para 4. 
6 In its 1999 concluding observations on Colombia, the HRC recommended that ‘the new 
draft Military Penal Code, if it is to be adopted, must comply in all respects with the 
requirements of the Covenant.’: UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: 
Columbia, UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.76 (1997), para 18. 
7 Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature 
12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135, Art 84 (entered into force 21 October 1950): this article 
requires prisoners of war to be tried in a military court which offers essential guarantees of 
independence and impartiality. It does not stipulate the nature of offences or trial as is the 
case with the UDHR and the ICCPR. South Africa has ratified this Convention. 
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Party’8 and can only be invoked if one is dealing with prisoners of war or 
victims of war.  
However, the fact that the Prisoners of War Convention specifically 
requires military courts to be independent in the above circumstances 
suggests that international humanitarian law generally expects military 
courts to be independent. If that is not how we should read the Convention, 
it will be difficult to expect countries to be able to comply with the provisions 
of Art 84 of the above-mentioned Convention because it might be impractical 
or unrealistic, during an armed conflict, to expect a country which generally 
operates non-independent military courts for its citizens, all of a sudden to 
set up independent military courts in order to satisfy the provisions of Art 
84 in relation to prisoners of war or victims of war. 
 In addition to the universal instruments referred to above, regional 
instruments must also be considered as they form part of international law. 
The American Convention on Human Rights9 and the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR)10 follow the path of the UDHR and the ICCPR. 
Article 6(1) of the ECHR stipulates that ‘[i]n the determination of his civil 
rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is 
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent tribunal established by law.’  
 
 Although not binding on South Africa, the European Court of Human 
Rights has developed a useful criterion to tackle interpretive problems 
associated with that article as seen in the context of a similar article in the 
ICCPR. This refers to the two-fold criterion developed in the earlier cases of 
the Court, most notably in Engel v Netherlands.11 The criterion has already 
been discussed in Chapter Three. By way of emphasis and at the risk of 
repetition, the starting point of the enquiry is whether the offence charged 
                                                 
8 Article 2. 
9 American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature 22 November 1969, 1144 
UNTS 123, Art 8 (entered into force 18 July 1978). 
10 European Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature 4 November 1950, Art 6(1) 
(entered into force 3 September 1953). 
11 (1976) 1 EHRR 647. 
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belongs, according to the legal system of the state concerned, to criminal 
law, disciplinary law or both.12 Proceedings before military courts assume 
both a criminal and disciplinary character because the principles of liability 
are those applied in criminal law, the procedure followed is similar to that in 
criminal courts, and the sentencing processes assume a criminal character 
but with some emphasis on discipline. This means that the first criterion 
would be met with respect to military courts at least according to the logic of 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
 Furthermore, the supervision of the court in relation to the offence goes 
further, and takes into consideration the degree of severity of the penalty 
that the person concerned risks incurring. The court looks at the maximum 
potential penalty for which the relevant law provides. In Bell v United 
Kingdom, the Court considered a sentence of detention for a period of 28 
days to be a deprivation of liberty which was serious enough to render the 
charge against the accused to be of a criminal nature which attracts the 
application of Art 6 of the Convention.13 Most military offences carry a 
sentence of imprisonment, among other sentences. It would therefore be 
easy to conclude that the right in question applies to military courts without 
any doubt.  
 
  Apart from applying the right under discussion to summary trials, the 
European Court of Human Rights has also applied the same right to cases 
involving fully-fledged military courts. Some of the most famous cases which 
dealt with the said rights in the context of military courts are Findlay v The 
United Kingdom (1997) ECHR 8 and Cooper v The United Kingdom (2003) 
ECHR 686.14 In both cases, the British military court system was found to 
fall short of the right to a fair trial provided for in the European Convention. 
                                                 
12 Ibid, para 82. See also Bell v United Kingdom (2007) 45 EHRR 24. 
13 Ibid, para 41-42. As a result of attacks launched against the UK’s military justice system 
based on Art 6 of the Convention, there have been calls in Parliament for the United 
Kingdom to withdraw from the Convention and re-ratify with an appropriate reservation 
against that article. See Peter Rowe ‘A New Court to Protect Human Rights in the Armed 
Forces of the UK: The Summary Appeal Court’ (2003) 8 J Conflict & Security Law 201, 202. 
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Findlay led to a substantial reform of the British military court system 
which culminated in the enactment of the Armed Forces Act of 1996 while 
further changes were introduced by the Armed Forces (Discipline) Act 2000 
and the Armed Forces Act 2001.  
 
 That said, some states entered a reservation that articles dealing with the 
right to a fair trial and the right to be tried by an independent and impartial 
tribunal would not apply to disciplinary structures within their military 
establishments.15 This illustrates the sensitivity of applying the right to a 
fair trial in the context of military courts. However, the United Kingdom did 
not enter a reservation―which made it possible to reach the outcomes in 
Findlay and Cooper respectively.16 
 
 Attention now turns to the Americas. Article 8(1) of the American 
Convention provides that  
 
[e]very person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable 
time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal…in the substantiation of any 
accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights 
and obligations of a civil, labour, fiscal, or any other nature. 
 
Based on the above article, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
questioned the independence of military courts in Peru in the case of Castillo 
Petruzzi et al17 because it found the members to be lacking impartiality as 
the armed forces were engaged in the counter-insurgency struggle and also 
prosecuting persons associated with insurgency groups.18 The Court found 
this to weaken the impartiality of members of military courts considerably.19 
Furthermore, the Court also raised the concern that members of military 
                                                 
15 Among those countries are Portugal, Spain, Slovakia, Moldova, France, The Czech 
Republic, Turkey, Lithuania and Ukraine. 
16 See Rowe (note 13 above) 202. 
171999 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, online: < 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_52_ing.pdf> (Accessed 12 July 
2012), in particular paras 130-134. This case dealt with trial of civilians facing treason 
charges before the FAP Special Military Court of Inquiry and the Special Tribunal of the 
Supreme Court of Military Justice respectively. The Court found (unanimously), among 
other things, that Peru had violated Art 8(1) of the American Convention. 
18 Ibid para 130. 
19 Ibid. 
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courts were appointed by the relevant minister.20  However, the holding of 
the Inter-American Court is of little value because it was made in the 
context of trial of civilians by a military court and not trial of soldiers by a 
military court. This fact appears to have weighed heavily in the reasoning of 
the court as to the nature of standards required of such courts.21 It is 
common cause that civilians should be tried by independent and impartial 
tribunals. 
 
  Moving on to the African continent, the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) follows a different approach from its 
counterparts.22 Article 7(1) of the Charter provides, among other things, that 
‘[e]very individual shall have his cause heard’ and have ‘[t]he right to be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty by a competent court or tribunal’ and 
‘[t]he right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or 
tribunal.’ Unlike all other instruments referred to above, Art 7(1) of the 
Charter refers to the right to be tried by an impartial court or tribunal 
without being specific about the nature of the trial or accusations. This 
means that the trial referred to in this article is not limited to a criminal 
trial. To cement these rights, Art 26 of the African Charter stipulates that 
the States parties ‘[s]hall have the duty to guarantee the independence of 
the Courts.’ As will be seen further below, courts referred to in Art 26 
include military courts. The result of this is that South Africa has an 
international obligation to ensure that all courts are independent including 
military courts. 
 
 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Commission) has dealt with numerous complaints concerning military 
courts. It has noted in a resolution that 
 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
21 See in particular paras 128-129. 
22 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, opened for signature 27 June 1981, OAU 
Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5 (entered into force 21 October 1986). South Africa has ratified 
the African Charter. 
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in many African countries military courts and special tribunals exist alongside regular 
judicial institutions. The purpose of military courts is to determine offences of a pure 
military nature committed by military personnel. While exercising this function, military 
courts are required to respect fair trial standards (emphasis added).23  
 
As already mentioned, fair trial includes a trial by an independent and 
impartial tribunal. Furthermore, the Commission has stated that the 
establishment of a ‘military tribunal per se is not offensive to the rights in 
the Charter nor does it imply an unfair or unjust process’ but went on to 
point out that these courts ‘must be subject to the same requirements of 
fairness, openness, and justice, independence, and due process as any other 
process.’24  
 
 The position adopted by the African Commission augurs well for the 
growing recognition in international law of the idea that military courts 
should act consistently with principles of judicial independence and the 
right to a fair trial. The work being undertaken on the question of 
administration of justice through military courts by the UN Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, expected to 
be completed with the development of international standards on military 
jurisdiction, confirms that recognition.25 
 
 
5.3 The United Nations move towards the universal regulation of 
military courts 
 
 An analysis of the international instruments above has shown that some 
interpretive problems exist regarding the application of such instruments to 
                                                 
23 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Dakar Declaration and 
Recommendations Twenty-sixth Session (1999), para 3 in Christof Heyns (ed.) Human 
Rights in Africa: Vol 1 (2004) 586. 
24 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2001) Communication 218/98 
(Nigeria), para 44. 
25 See the following reports of the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights, Administration of Justice: Issue of the administration of justice through 
military tribunals, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/4, Fifty-fourth session (2002), 
Administration of Justice Report of the sessional working group on the administration of 
justice UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/7, Fifty-third session (2001). These developments will 
be considered is some detail further below. 
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military courts. Almost all the international instruments considered do not 
make explicit reference to military courts or military offences. As the UN 
Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights notes in his report, relevant treaty bodies have, however, 
‘developed a restrictive interpretation in this area’26 presumably in order to 
fill some of the gaps. The lack of clear international regulation of military 
courts has created an environment which is conducive to the establishment 
of military courts that operate with limited or lack of respect to the principle 
of judicial independence and the right to a fair trial.  
 
 The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) studied military courts in 
various jurisdictions and concluded that  
 
on the whole, as far as ensuring that justice is dispensed independently and impartially 
is concerned, military courts do not adhere to the general principles and international 
standards and their procedures are in breach of due process. In many countries, so-
called ‘military justice’ is organizationally and operationally dependent on the 
executive.’27  
 
More importantly, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights has been studying the issue of 
the administration of justice through military courts for several years. This 
process produced a number of reports and recommendations which were 
submitted to the Sub-Commission.28 Finally, the several studies conducted 
by the Special Rapporteur have culminated in the submission of a report 
which includes Draft Principles Governing the Administration of Justice 
through Military Tribunals (draft principles).29 These principles were 
                                                 
26 (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/4), report submitted to the Sub-Commission by Mr. Louis Joinet. 
27 International Commission of Jurists Military jurisdiction and international law 
www.icj.org/news.php3?id_article=3254&lang=en [Accessed 20 June 2007]. The study 
included countries such as Poland; Spain; Norway; Switzerland, the United Kingdom; the 
United States; a number of South American countries to name but a few. Unfortunately, 
none of the African countries were studied. 
28 See reports drawn up by Mr. Louis Joinet (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/WG.1/CRP.3, 
(E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/4), and the reports by Mr. Emmanuel Decaux to the fifty-fifth session 
(E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/4), fifty-sixth session (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/7) and fifty-seventh 
session (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/9). 
29 E/CN.4/2006/56 published on 13 January 2006. See Michael R. Gibson ‘International 
Human Rights Law and Administration of justice through Military Tribunals: Preserving 
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submitted to the Commission on Human Rights at its sixty-second session 
in 2006. It is hoped that this may lead to the international regulation of 
military courts. 
 
Analysis of the Draft Principles Governing the Administration of  
Justice through Military Tribunals 
 
The publication of the draft principles is a progressive step, and 
perhaps one which could also be described as long overdue in the light of 
gross non-compliance with international standards by military courts in 
many countries. The final report referred to above contains twenty draft 
principles governing the administration of justice through military tribunals. 
The majority of the principles are followed by an explanatory note of each 
principle, and some of these focus on the relevant treaty which informs the 
principle. However, the principles are not flawless.30 
 
What led to the development of these principles? In the words of the 
Special Rapporteur 
 
either military justice conforms to the principles of the proper administration of 
justice and becomes a form of justice like any other, or it constitutes exceptional 
justice, a separate system without checks or balances, which opens the door to all 
kinds of abuse and is justice in name only…’31  
 
Bearing this in mind, the Special Rapporteur suggests that there must be a 
process of normalizing or civilizing military justice instead of following the 
path of sanctification and demonization of the system.32  
 
The principles are not intended to be seen as an end in themselves 
but rather as ‘...a minimum system of universally applicable rules, leaving 
                                                                                                                                                        
Utility while Precluding Impunity’ (2008) Journal of International Law and International 
Relations Vol. 4(1) 1 for more detail about the report. 
30 See Gibson Ibid for a critical analysis of the Draft Principles. 
31 Draft Principles para 11. 
32 Ibid. 
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scope for stricter standards to be defined under domestic law.’33 A brief 
analysis of only those principles which are directly relevant to this study 
follows. 
 
 
(a)  Establishment of military tribunals by the constitution or the 
law 
 According to this principle, ‘[m]ilitary tribunals, when they exist, may be 
established only by the constitution or the law, respecting the principle of 
the separation of powers. They must be an integral part of the general 
judicial system.’34 Although it is not entirely clear what is meant by making 
military tribunals an integral part of the general judicial system, this is 
undoubtedly one of the crucial principles for purposes of proper 
administration of justice through military tribunals. It addresses the legality 
of military justice, and not the legitimacy of the system.35 In addition, it is 
also relevant to two areas of concern in relation to the administration of 
justice in the context of military tribunals. First, in some jurisdictions, 
military courts are organised or structured in such a way that does not give 
due regard to the principle of separation of powers.36 In such jurisdictions, 
one would find no clear separation between the military justice system and 
the military command or the executive. This makes it possible for the 
military command or the executive to abuse the system in order to achieve 
illegitimate goals. While the military justice system exists to be used by 
military commanders to help them enforce military discipline in the armed 
forces, the system should not be abused. As explained in Chapter Four, 
separation between the judicial system and the executive is an important 
element of the principle of the separation of powers. 
 
                                                 
33 Ibid para 10. 
34 Ibid, Principle No. 1. 
35 Ibid para 14. 
36 See for example, the study done by the ICJ (note 27 above) analysing the systems of the 
following counties: Peru, Switzerland, the United States of America showing that military 
justice system in these countries is in one way or another attached to the executive. 
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 The second area of importance which this principle will help address is 
the state of affairs which prevails in military justice systems in the majority 
of countries―the fact that military courts are not an integral part of the 
general judicial system. They operate as a separate entity with little respect 
for the rules of natural justice and principles of judicial independence or 
they have no relationship with civilian courts.37 Ensuring that military 
tribunals are an integral part of the general judicial system may be achieved 
in many ways. In some countries, it might require an overhaul of the 
relevant military justice system and a great deal of political will on the part 
of military commanders. It may require military commanders to relinquish, 
to a greater extent, the long existing autonomy of the system depending on 
the model chosen with respect to integration of military courts in the general 
judicial system.  
 
 
(b)  The right to be tried by a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal 
 The above-mentioned principle requires that military tribunals be 
organised and operated in such a way that ensures the right of everyone to 
be tried by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal at every stage 
of legal proceedings.38 This is an important principle and re-iterates the 
requirements of Arts 10 and 14 of the UDHR and the ICCPR respectively 
which guarantee everyone’s right to a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal. As the ICJ study shows, there are many 
jurisdictions where the above-mentioned right is not guaranteed for soldiers, 
and this was also the case in South Africa before the reform of the military 
justice system in 1999. 
 
 Furthermore, the principle also requires military judges to ‘have a status 
guaranteeing their independence and impartiality.’39 The implementation of 
                                                 
37 This may mean that civilian courts may have no supervisory jurisdiction over military 
courts. 
38 Draft Principles, No. 13. 
39 Ibid. 
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this principle requires adoption of measures to guarantee the independence 
and impartiality of military judges.  
 
As suggested in the introductory chapter, there are various ways of 
guaranteeing the independence and impartiality of military judges; and what 
may be suitable for one jurisdiction may not necessarily be suitable for 
another, but the principle remains the same. Whatever measures are 
adopted, the guiding principle must be guaranteeing the independence and 
impartiality of military courts. In elaboration of the principle under 
discussion, the report suggests that ‘[t]he statutory independence of judges 
vis-à-vis the military hierarchy must be strictly protected, avoiding any 
direct or indirect subordination...’ of military judges.40 
 
 Providing for the independence and impartiality of military judges in 
an enforceable legal instrument is important. It will provide an opportunity 
for enforcement action in the event of any deviation from the guaranteeing 
instrument. It is even better if such guarantees are provided for in the 
constitution given that the constitution would usually be the supreme law in 
many constitutional democracies such as that of South Africa. The 
independence of the general (civilian) judicial system is constitutionally 
guaranteed in many countries. Unfortunately, military courts do not form an 
integral part of the general judicial system in such countries. It is therefore 
almost impossible for them to benefit from the relevant constitutional 
guarantees on judicial independence.  
 
 
(c) Functional authority of military courts 
 This principle deals with the jurisdiction of military courts regarding the 
offences they may deal with. It states that ‘[t]he jurisdiction of military 
courts should be limited to offences of a strictly military nature committed 
by military personnel.’41 This principle is problematic.42 It fails to recognise 
                                                 
40 Ibid para 46. 
41 Ibid. 
130 
 
 
 
that there is a fine line between a military offence and a criminal offence. A 
soldier who commits a criminal offence offends military discipline, and 
should be dealt with in the military justice system concerned. The exception 
could perhaps be a situation where military personnel have committed 
serious human rights violations43 or serious criminal offences such as 
murder involving civilians.44 Under normal circumstances, such offences are 
not common in the military (at least in some countries) and the stakes 
relating to the commission of such offences are high to the extent that it 
would be appropriate for such offences to be dealt with by civilian courts. 
 
 There is also a practical point which should be mentioned regarding the 
principle under discussion. Soldiers commit minor criminal offences from 
time to time. If they are tried by civilian courts, it would become difficult for 
military commanders to have proper command and control over their 
members given that the accused will be attending trials outside military 
spaces.45 In some countries, civilian court rolls are clogged and it takes a 
very long time to finalise trials. This may have a negative impact on military 
capacity and readiness.  In South Africa, it is common knowledge that 
civilian courts are overstretched, and it would not be advisable to load them 
with minor criminal offences which take place in military spaces. As pointed 
out in Chapter Three, trial by military courts is usually speedy and 
efficient46 for several reasons. For example, the level of cooperation between 
the defence and the prosecution is usually higher─without necessarily 
compromising the rights of either side; and there is easier availability of 
                                                                                                                                                        
42 See also Gibson (note 29 above) 37 arguing that this principle is one of the most 
significant areas of difficulty with the Draft Principles because there is a clear nexus 
between criminal offences and the maintenance of military discipline. 
43 As suggested in the Draft Principles, No. 9. 
44 However, Gibson is of the view that there is no principled reason to exclude certain 
classes of offences from the jurisdiction of military courts provided that these courts 
possess ‘sufficient integrity, independence and impartiality to try such grave offences.’ He 
argues, further, that military courts can be effective tools for ending impunity if organised 
properly (see note 29 above, 39-40). 
45 In the military world military Commanders sometimes have a role in deciding matters 
such as determining priority cases in the system which is usually dependent on the 
operational needs of military units concerned. 
46 However, one should concede that, in some jurisdictions, this happens at the expense of 
justice. 
131 
 
 
 
witnesses and many aspects crucial for the effective running of a trial are 
within easier reach.  
 
 Another problem which the principle under consideration is likely to 
create is the deepening of the thinking of non-applicability of international 
standards to military courts. If military courts are only confined to military 
offences, this will make it easier for military authorities to take advantage of 
interpretive gaps that exist in the UDHR and the ICCPR regarding the 
applicability of relevant articles of these instruments as discussed earlier. 
 
 Finally, taking away the legitimate jurisdiction of military courts 
contributes towards demonization of military courts, something which the 
report seeks to avoid.47 As the report suggests, the correct approach is the 
normalization of the system, and not demonization. Normalization requires, 
among other things, directing energies towards ensuring that military courts 
enjoy sufficient guarantees for their independence and impartiality. This will 
potentially bring confidence regarding positive performance of military 
courts even when they exercise jurisdiction over minor criminal offences 
committed by military personnel. 
 
For the above reasons, I agree with Gibson who argues that the principle 
which limits the scope of jurisdiction of military courts should be rejected.48 
 
 
(d)  Review of codes of military justice 
 Principle No. 20 provides that ‘[c]odes of military justice should be 
subject to periodic systematic review, conducted in an independent and 
transparent manner.’ According to Gibson, this is an excellent suggestion 
because it ensures that military justice systems will receive some attention 
in what may be crowded legislative programmes of governments.49 Indeed, 
this is the case in South Africa. The envisaged Military Justice Bill has been 
                                                 
47 Draft Principles para 11. 
48 See Gibson (note 29 above) 38. 
49 Ibid 45. 
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discussed and shelved several times as a result of the busy legislative 
schedule of the Government, among other reasons. Furthermore, another 
explanation of the suggested principle is that the regular review must be 
done ‘to ensure that the authority of military tribunals corresponds to strict 
functional necessity, without encroaching on the jurisdiction that...belongs 
to ordinary civil courts’. 
 
  However, two things have to be said about the principle under 
discussion. This relates to the aspects which must be covered by the review 
process and the purpose of the envisaged reviews. The purpose for which 
reviews are to be conducted is narrow in that it focuses on matters of 
jurisdiction of military courts instead of focusing on all aspects of the 
system including its structure and organization.50 In many instances, the 
reform of military justice systems will not be a once-off event. It will be a 
continuous process given the enormity of the challenges and changing 
circumstances. For example, Canada and the United Kingdom have 
embarked on the process of review of their systems on more than one 
occasion covering wide ranging aspects of the system. South Africa too, is in 
the process of overhauling its system once again. The review will focus on 
almost all aspects of the system. This bears testimony to the fact that 
military justice systems require continuous reform focusing on different 
aspects of the system. In the light of all these, the principle on the review of 
codes of military justice requires reconsideration.51 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 See also Gibson ibid 46 for similar sentiments. Gibson is concerned that the commentary 
to the principle suggests that the primary purpose of review would be to continually narrow 
the scope of jurisdiction of military courts. 
51 Other principles which deal with challenging aspects (in the context of international 
regulation of military courts)  but not covered here relate to the following areas: respect for 
the standards of international law, jurisdiction of military courts to try civilians, 
conscientious objection to military service, limitations on military secrecy, military prison 
regime, public nature of hearings, guarantee of the rights of the defence and the right to a 
just and fair trial, access of victims to proceedings and non-imposition of the death penalty. 
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5.4 Concluding remarks 
 
 This chapter has analysed international legal instruments relating to the 
rights to a fair trial and to be tried by an independent and impartial 
tribunal. It has found that there is, in general, limited regulation of military 
courts in international law. However, there is evidence to suggest that 
international law requires military courts to be independent, irrespective of 
their apparent limited regulation in international law, particularly in the 
light of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War and the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights and the African Commission. Of all 
the instruments analysed, the African Charter is better formulated in terms 
of its scope. On an international plane, it is easier to establish South Africa’s 
obligation to ensure that its military courts are independent and impartial 
based on the African Charter. Furthermore, moves at the UN to ensure 
specific and universal regulation of military courts signal the need to rethink 
the organization of military courts in the modern age. Such moves should, 
in principle, be welcomed, and would hopefully steer countries towards 
positive reform of military justice systems the world over. As Gibson points 
out, these moves, however, must not forestall or discount the utility of 
military courts.52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
52 Gibson (note 29 above) 48. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ASSESSING THE JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE OF MILITARY 
COURTS IN SOUTH AFRICA1 
 
6.1 Introductory remarks 
 
 It has been established that the principle of judicial independence applies 
to military courts and that the South African Constitution declares all 
courts to be independent. However, the fact that the Constitution considers 
all courts to be independent does not mean that particular provisions of 
legislation governing the structure and functioning of the courts are immune 
from constitutional scrutiny.2  This chapter, therefore, looks at the question 
whether military courts in South Africa meet the constitutional and 
international standards of judicial independence discussed above. It 
primarily measures military courts against the objective conditions of 
judicial independence and argues that there are a number of problem areas 
in this respect. Specifically, military courts will be assessed on the 
appointment, security of tenure and removal from office of military judges; 
the basic financial security of judges and aspects of institutional 
                                                          
1 This chapter has benefited from my following publication: Aifheli Enos Tshivhase ‘Military 
Courts in a Democratic South Africa: An Assessment of their Independence’ (2006) 6 New 
Zealand Armed Forces Law Review 96. However, my ideas about the subject have expanded 
considerably since I wrote that article. 
2 Van Rooyen and Others v The State and Others (General Council of the Bar South Africa 
Intervening) 2002 (5) SA 246 (CC), para 22 (Van Rooyen). This case primarily dealt with the 
independence of magistrates in South Africa. The judicial independence of magistrates was 
challenged on several grounds. The Constitutional Court upheld some of the challenges and 
dismissed most of the challenges. The main challenges upheld were as follows: that the 
executive power to recall certain members of the Magistrates Commission was not based on 
an objective criteria and had to be remedied in order to avoid any perception that the power 
to recall permitted the Executive to exercise control over members of the Commission and 
that the Minister’s power to exercise discipline over magistrates was inconsistent with 
judicial independence. However, in the context of the protection given to magistrates’ courts 
and magistrates at an institutional level by the Constitution and by other guarantees, the 
relevant legislation viewed as a whole was held to be consistent with the core values of 
judicial independence. 
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independence and impartiality; and the effect of the powers of the military 
judicial review authority.  
 The chapter, does not, however, propose solutions to the problems 
identified. These will be dealt with in Chapter Seven.  
 
6.2 Do South African military courts meet the basic requirements of 
judicial independence? 
 The following areas need examination in order to determine the 
appropriateness of the degree of independence of military courts. 
 
6.2.1 Appointment, security of tenure and removal of military 
judges - flaws at various levels 
 There are fundamental concerns regarding the independence of the 
processes for appointment and removal of military judges as well as their 
security of tenure. According to s 14(1) of the Military Discipline 
Supplementary Measures Act 16 of 1999 (the Act or Military Discipline Act), 
South African military judges are first and foremost military law officers who 
are then assigned to the function of senior military judge or military judge.3 
In practice, military law officers are appointed for terms of five or ten years 
which are usually renewed.4 This means that military judges are essentially 
                                                          
3 Section 14(1)(b) provides that ‘[t]he Minister shall assign officers to the functions…of 
senior military judges or military judge on the recommendation of the Adjutant General...’ 
(emphasis added). To qualify for assignment, a  candidate must satisfy the following 
requirements:  be an officer of not less than a major (in the case of a court of military judge) 
or equivalent and in the case of a senior military judge, be an officer not below the rank of a 
colonel or equivalent; hold a degree in law; must also have passed a departmental course in 
military law; be appropriately qualified in the sense of being fit and proper person of sound 
character; and finally, must have three years relevant practice experience and five years in 
the case of a court of senior military judge. See ss 9, 10 and 14 of the Military Discipline Act 
in this regard.  
4 See Michelle Nel Sentencing Practice in Military Courts (2012) Thesis submitted for LLD 
Degree, University of South Africa 196. 
http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/5969/dissertation_nel_m.pdf?sequence=1[
accessed on 26 July 2012]. 
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not appointed to a judicial office but are assigned to act as judicial officers.5 
It also means that one cannot talk of the existence of a term of office for 
military judges but rather a period of assignment to a judicial function. 
 The Constitution does not speak of assignments to a judicial office. It 
refers to judicial appointments in all instances. For example, s 174(1) 
provides that ‘any appropriately qualified woman or man...may be appointed 
as a judicial officer.’ (emphasis added). There are strong indications that the 
use of the word ‘assign’ instead of ‘appoint’ was intended by the drafters of 
the Act to convey a specific message. For example, the Adjutant General 
(AG) and members of the Military Court of Appeals are appointed by the 
Minister.6 There is no talk here of ‘assignments.’  
 Speculatively, the choice of words in this instance may have been 
informed by the following factors. First, a well known saying in the military 
is that everyone serving in that institution is first and foremost a soldier 
before anything else. This is one of the slogans candidate officers hear when 
training to become a soldier. Alternatively, it may have been informed by the 
need for flexibility in the deployment of military law officers to the various 
functions in the system coupled with the realisation that law officers desire 
to advance their careers in other areas of the system than just the military 
judiciary. The system of short assignments fits in well with the suggested 
ideas.  
  In my view, the current system of assignments lowers the level of 
confidence in the military judicial office. It does not guarantee a judicial 
office to the person assigned to the function of a military judge. Given this 
set up, it may plausibly be suggested that a judicial office is not 
institutionalised in the military. I revert to this point in Chapter Seven. 
                                                          
5 However, the distinction between the two forms of appointment is not entirely clear since 
both involve entrusting a person with a particular function. This aspect is discussed in 
some detail in the next chapter. 
6 See ss 27 and 7 of the Act respectively. 
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 As noted already, the Act requires assignments to be fixed or coupled 
with some deployment, operation or exercise;7 but it does not stipulate the 
length of the period for which the assignment must be fixed. This means 
that a judicial assignment could be fixed from just a day, to one of many 
years, considering the open endedness of the provision. In practice, however, 
assignments were (initially) usually fixed for two years, but recently, the 
practice has been changed, and military judges are assigned for one year.8 
  Fixed-term judicial appointments are generally consistent with judicial 
independence, since judges need not necessarily be appointed for life.9 The 
South African Constitution supports this view as it does not prescribe the 
period of service for ‘other judicial officers’, and it does not grant a life 
tenure to Constitutional Court judges.10 Generally, military judges enjoy a 
certain degree of security of tenure because they are assigned as military 
judges for a determinate period; but ideally, judicial assignments must be 
ordinarily fixed for a longer period of time11 because very short and 
renewable appointments are potentially problematic.12 Nowak speaks of 
                                                          
7 Military Discipline Act, s 15. 
8 Nel (note 4 above) 195. The system should be commended for the practice which moves 
away from ad hoc judicial appointments. It should be seen as part of the evolving process of 
judicial independence in the military. The Constitutional Court in South Africa sees judicial 
independence in this light: see Van Rooyen & Others v The State (note 2 above) para 146.  
9 Manfred Nowak (ed.) UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights CCPR Commentary (1993) 
245. That said, fixing judicial assignments for a period of one year is obviously a regressive 
step, in relation to their independence. It may be worth pointing out that in R. v. Lauzon 
[1998] CMAC No. 5 para 27 (Lauzon) the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada held that 
‘fixed terms, when protected from interference by the executive for the period of the term, 
met the requirements of security of tenure, and that the principle that the terms of military 
judges were renewable did not infringe on the required institutional independence if “the 
reposting process is accompanied by substantial and sufficient guarantees to ensure that 
the Court and the military trial judge in question are free from pressure on the part of the 
Executive that could influence the outcome of future decisions”’. As will be seen in Chapter 
Seven, the views of that Court have evolved significantly on the subject. Before Lauzon, 
there had been a number of conflicting decisions of the Court Martial in Canada on the 
subject. 
10 Constitutional Court judges generally hold office for a non-renewable term of 12 years (s 
176(1) of the Constitution) while High Court judges hold office until retirement. 
11 Ibid. See also  C.J. Botha ‘Jungle justice and the fundamental rights – military courts in a 
future constitutional dispensation’ (1994) 17 African Defence Review 1, 4 calling for a 
serious consideration of security of tenure for the members of military courts in the new 
dispensation. 
12 See a discussion of some of the problems by the Canadian Supreme Court in Généreux v. 
The Queen [1992] 1 SCR 259. Compare a view by Nel (note 4 above) 199-202, 490 that the 
tenure of South African ‘...military judges does not lie in their assignment as military judge, 
but rather in their appointment as military law officers and would therefore comply with the 
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fixing judicial appointments for at least several years.13 In Incal v Turkey the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) expressed concerns about the 
independence of the Turkish National Security Court on the basis that the 
court was composed, among others, of a military judge whose tenure was 
only for a four-year renewable term.14 As already discussed, the possibility 
of a judicial officer working for the renewal of his or her term instead of 
administering justice cannot be ruled out. In the Canadian case of Généreux 
v The Queen Stevenson J summed it up when he stated that ‘[a]s the 
tenured term draws to a close, military judges may wish to secure a re-
appointment or to advance their careers in some other respect. It would 
thus be in the interest of these judges to please the ‘executive.’15 
  Currently, the Act does not make provision for renewal of judicial 
assignments. Strictly speaking, it could be argued that there are no 
renewals under the Act but rather re-assignments which take place on the 
recommendation of the AG in the context of s 14 of the Act. Re-assignments 
are done frequently (usually every two years or every year) because judicial 
assignments are fixed for short periods of time. It has become common 
practice to offer military judicial re-assignments to the incumbents.  This 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
requirement of security of tenure.’ With respect, this is a misconception of the requirement 
of security of tenure for judicial officers because security of tenure cannot be guaranteed by 
the incumbents’ continued holding of another office which is not a judicial office. The 
relevant principles and authorities on the subject do not support the view proffered by Nel 
above. In any event, as it will be shown further below, fixed renewable terms of office are 
problematic and constitutionally questionable in the light of a recent ruling of the 
Constitutional Court in Justice Alliance of South Africa v President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others 2011 (5) SA 388 CC, already discussed in Chapter Four. 
13 Nowak (note 9 above). 
14 European Court of Human Rights case of Incal v. Turkey [1998] ECHR 48. Following the 
reasoning in Incal, amongst others, M Carnelley ‘The South African Military Court System – 
Independent, Impartial and Constitutional?’ (2005) 33(2) Scietia Militaria: South African 
Journal of Military Studies 55, 67 suggested that the ‘South African military judicial system 
may not be regarded as independent, as the appointments are not permanent but for fixed 
periods or coupled with specific operations.’ With respect, this suggestion is incorrect 
because fixed judicial appointments do not necessarily undermine judicial independence 
unless they are renewable, a factor which Carnelley does not refer to in her observation. 
Moreover, Constitutional Court judges are appointed for a fixed and non-renewable term. 
15 [1992] 1 SCR 259, 317. This case dealt with the question whether a General Court 
Martial is an independent and impartial tribunal for the purposes of s 11(d) of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The majority held that the General Court Martial was not 
independent because it did not meet the essential conditions of judicial independence set in 
R v Valente (1985) 24 DLR (4th) 161 (SCC). This case primarily dealt with the question of 
whether or not the Provincial Court (Criminal Division) was independent within the 
meaning of s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
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practice, coupled with public opinion, may serve as an effective restraint 
upon executive action which may interfere with judicial independence.16 
However, it is not by itself sufficient to safeguard judicial independence as it 
cannot supply essential conditions of independence.17 Moreover, public 
opinion hardly focuses on the affairs of the military justice system for 
various reasons. For example, many aspects of the system are not open to 
public scrutiny.18 It is for that reason that calls for specific legislative 
guarantees of judicial independence are in order. 
 Furthermore, the status of the AG is worrying in the context of re-
assignments. The AG is appointed by the Minister of Defence,19 and is 
responsible, among other things, for the overall management of the military 
justice system and military legal services.20 This officer does not seem to be 
protected from executive and command interference compared to other 
officers such as military judges.21 Although the AG occupies a unique 
position with no civilian equivalents, he or she is more or less part of the 
executive in the light of the fact that he or she is responsible to the Minister 
and exercises certain functions under the control of the Minister.22  
                                                          
16 R v Valente ibid para 36. 
17 Ibid. 
18 However, it must be pointed out that with the dawn of democracy in South Africa, the 
military is beginning to open up to public scrutiny. For example, military court proceedings 
are now open to members of the public although it must be pointed out that most members 
of the public are not aware of such courts. 
19 Section 27 of the Military Discipline Act. 
20 Section 28 of the Act. However, in 2006, the Minister of Defence created a civilian post of 
Chief Defence Legal Services (CDLS) whose powers appear to be in conflict with that of the 
AG because the former exercises overall control of the Military Legal Services Division, 
which includes the military justice system. While one values civilian oversight over the 
military justice system, the creation of the post of CDLS without amending the relevant Act 
is probably illegal. It is possible that in creating the post in question, the Minister relied on 
s 202(2) of the Constitution which provides that ‘[command] of the defence force must be 
exercised in accordance with the directions of the Cabinet member responsible for defence.’ 
It is not entirely clear whether the power conferred on the relevant Minister in that 
provision can be used a basis to over-step legislation enacted validly by Parliament as this 
raises the question of rule of law. For a discussion on the tension resulting from the 
creation of the CDLS’s post, see Information Bulletin, Defence Legal Services Division Vol. 4 
Issue 5 (2008), 2 
http://www.dlsdiv.mil.za/infobulletins/Info%20Bulletin%20October%202008.pdf  
(accessed 13 July 2012). 
21 See s 28(1)(b) which requires the AG to ‘submit to the Minister a written report on all his 
or her functions during that year.’ 
22 For example, the AG is empowered in terms of s 14(3) to assign officers to certain 
functions but under the control of the Minister. 
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 If the AG does not recommend a further assignment, that could be the 
end of the incumbent’s military judicial career. It is not entirely clear what 
criteria are used to decide whether a re-assignment should be offered to 
officers with a judicial track record since the Act does not make provision for 
renewals.23 As a result, there is no objective guarantee that the career of a 
military judge would not be affected by decisions tending in favour of an 
accused rather than the prosecution. This system does not ensure that the 
appointment of military judicial officers takes place without favour and 
prejudice as required in the terms of s 174(7) of the South African 
Constitution. Although the powers exercised by the AG and the Minister 
regarding judicial assignments are subject to constitutional control, the 
current system requires some improvement for it to be more in line with s 
174(7) of the Constitution. It is proposed that the arrangement discussed 
above leads to a reasonable perception that military judges are not 
independent from the AG and the Minister of Defence both of whom are part 
of the executive. This does not impugn the personal integrity of the serving 
AG or that of the Minister of Defence. Both may well be persons of highest 
integrity but that does not guarantee that the independence of incumbent 
judges will not be affected by their potential decisions. 
 Turning to removal from office, the requirement for security of tenure is, 
among other things, that the decision-maker must be removable only for a 
just cause and be secure against interference by the executive or other 
appointing authority.24 In Van Rooyen, it was held that ‘protection against 
removal from office lies at the heart of judicial independence.’25 South 
African military judges may be removed by the Minister of Defence on the 
recommendation of the AG. He or she may recommend the removal of any 
military judge for reasons of incapacity, incompetence or misconduct, or at 
                                                          
23 Presumably, the AG is guided by s 14(2) which provides that ‘[t]he Adjutant General shall 
not recommend any officer for assignment to any function...unless, upon due and diligent 
enquiry, the Adjutant General is convinced that the officer is a fit and proper person of 
sound character who meets the requirements prescribed in this Act for such assignment.’ 
This is the same provision that guides new judicial assignments. 
24 De Lange v Smuts & Others 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) para 70 (constitutionality of s 66(3) of 
the Insolvency Act 24 (1936)). 
25 Note 2 above para 161. 
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the request of the judge concerned.26 These grounds are similar to the 
grounds of removal for superior court judges and those in the UN Principles 
on Judicial Independence27 except that in the case of high court judges, the 
incompetence or misconduct must be gross.28 Section 17 of the Act clearly 
meets the requirement that judicial officers be removed for just cause only.  
 The problem, however, lies in two areas. The first relates to the lack of 
procedure for removal, and the functionaries involved in the process of 
removal of military judges. In Van Rooyen, the Constitutional Court stated 
that ‘[t]he Minister, a member of the government, should not have the power 
to exercise discipline over judicial officers and to punish them for 
misconduct. That would place the judicial officers concerned in a 
subordinate position in relation to the government which is inconsistent 
with judicial independence.’29 As things stand, military judges are put in a 
subordinate position in relation to the Minister of Defence regarding 
discipline. 
 In addition, the UN Principles on Judicial Independence (UN Principles) 
require that a complaint made against a judicial officer in his or her 
professional capacity should be dealt with swiftly, fairly and under 
appropriate procedure. Of paramount importance is that the judicial officer 
must have the right to a fair hearing.30 All proceedings concerning 
discipline, removal or suspension of judicial officers must be subject to 
independent review except where such decisions are made by the highest 
court or legislature in impeachment or similar proceedings.31  
 The current mechanism for the removal of military judges is problematic. 
A finding as to whether or not a military judge is guilty of misconduct 
should be made by a judicial officer, and not by a member of the executive 
                                                          
26 Military Discipline Act, s 17. 
27 Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted by the Seventh United 
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held at Milan 
from 26 August to 6 September 1985 and endorsed by General Assembly resolutions 40/32 
of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985. 
28 Section 177(1) of the Constitution. 
29 Van Rooyen v The State (note 2 above) para 179. 
30 UN Principles (note 27 above). 
31 Ibid. 
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branch of the government or the military command.32 The procedure for the 
investigation relating to the conduct in question ought to be conducted in a 
manner consistent with natural justice.33 
 
6.2.2  Basic degree of financial security of military judges  
 Judicial officers must have a basic degree of financial security.34 In 
relation to the position of magistrates, the Constitutional Court has 
indicated that it is unclear whether it should be the executive or the 
legislature to determine what is meant by basic financial security.35 The 
Court acknowledged that this is a difficult area for which there are no easy 
solutions.36  
 As discussed in Chapter Four, the Constitutional Court grappled with 
financial security in the context of magistrates in Van Rooyen37 where the 
Court established that basic financial security entails (a) adequate 
remuneration;38 (b) safeguards to avoid arbitrary reduction of salaries of 
judicial officers;39 and (c) an assurance that judicial officers should not be 
put in a position to engage in negotiations with the executive over their 
salaries because they are not employees and cannot resort to industrial 
action to advance their interests in their conditions of service.40 
  Unlike in the case of High Court judges and magistrates, there is no 
special dispensation for determining salaries and benefits for military 
judges. As will be discussed further below, these judges are not adequately 
                                                          
32 The Constitutional Court supports this approach in Van Rooyen v The State (note 2 
above) para 195 when it states the following  in relation to magistrates: ‘...the person 
charged with the responsibility of making a finding as to whether or not the magistrate 
concerned has been guilty of misconduct, should be a judicial officer. It is not consistent 
with judicial independence that a person other than a judicial officer should be charged 
with this responsibility.’ 
33 Ibid para 196. 
34 De Lange v Smuts (note 24 above) para 70. The 2004 Ministerial Task Team Report did 
not address financial security of military judges. 
35 Van Rooyen v The State (note 2 above) para 138. 
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid para 149. 
40 Ibid para 139.  
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remunerated except those who have been in service for a very long period of 
time who receive better remuneration on the basis of their experience and 
performance. This can be discerned from the Occupation Specific 
Dispensation for military law practitioners (OSD MLP) adopted in 2009.41  
According to the OSD MLP, the same scale that applies to military 
prosecutors or defence counsel is also applicable to military judges. That on 
its own may not necessarily be a problem. The issue is the adequacy of the 
remuneration provided for in the OSD MLP. The key features of the OSD 
MLP are experience, qualifications, and consistent above average 
performance of the military law officer concerned. 
 According to the OSD MLP salary grades for the 2011 financial year, a 
military judge with legal experience of between three (minimum required) 
and ten years earns between R188, 73642 and R309, 216 per annum 
depending on the exact years of service and experience, qualifications, and 
performance.  In contrast, an entry level magistrate earns R671, 219.43 In 
the next chapter, I argue that magistrates provide an appropriate 
comparator for military judges. To illustrate another possible scenario, a 
senior military judge with legal experience of between 11 and 13 years earns 
between R434,451 and R527,232 per annum (all inclusive package) in 
comparison with a total remuneration package of R738, 262 earned by a 
senior magistrate.44 The most experienced judge (30 years and more) with 
appropriate qualifications coupled with satisfactory performance will earn 
up to R910,518 per annum.  
                                                          
41 On file with the author. 
42 For comparison purposes, it is an equivalent of about $23.592 per annum. At this level, 
the package is not all inclusive—meaning that it excludes benefits such as medical aid and 
housing allowance. These are difficult to quantify, suffice to say that the military offers the 
most generous medical benefits than any State department. The current (2012-2014) 
housing allowance for public servants is R900 per month.  
43 See Proclamation 54 of 23 September 2011 made in terms of the Magistrates’ Act No. 90 
of 1993. This amount is a total remuneration package—in other words there are no benefits 
over and above that amount. For comparison purposes, it is an equivalent of about $83, 
902, 375. I revert back to this point in the next chapter. The accuracy of the figures 
presented here may be disputed given the varied nature of the application of the OSD MLP 
in relation to specific individuals. However, the range is generally accurate in terms of the 
OSD MLP on file with the author. 
44 See Proclamation ibid. 
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 The remuneration of military judges described above is inadequate; 
especially in the lower to mid-level (from three to ten years of experience).45 
Furthermore, it is glaringly lower when compared with similar judicial 
officers in the civilian setting. Inadequate remuneration opens up judges to 
influences such as corruption.46 It also affects their independence as 
individuals because the inadequacy of remuneration forces them to perform 
in a way that will get them to the next higher notch instead of focussing on 
administering justice as they see fit. I make this point because military law 
officers’ (military judges included) advancement to the next salary notch is 
dependent on their performance or promotion. Military judges can hardly be 
perceived to be independent in such conditions.  
 In the current set up military judges are public servants.47 Prior to 2004, 
the salaries of soldiers, including military judges, were determined in 
accordance with the Public Service Act. This situation has been altered by 
the Defence Act of 2002.48 Salaries of military personnel are now determined 
by the Military Bargaining Council (MBC), failing which by the Minister of 
Defence taking into account recommendations of the recently established 
Defence Force Commission but with the approval of the Minister of 
Finance.49  In the recent past, the MBC has failed to resolve many of the 
disputes between the SANDF and the military trade unions concerning 
transformation and conditions of service of soldiers. Some of the matters 
                                                          
45 Compare, however, the view of Nel (note 4 above) 202 that ‘...the salaries and benefits of 
military judges are sufficiently protected and governed by legislation and policy 
documents...’  (emphasis added).While one accepts that there is legislation and policy 
dealing with salaries of military law officers in general, Nel does not pay sufficient attention 
to the ‘adequacy’ of remuneration as one of the crucial elements of financial security as 
stated by the Constitutional Court in Van Rooyen (note 2 above) para 138 . She compares 
military law officers with other ordinary military officers in the SANDF. I argue in Chapter 
Seven that military judges should be compared with their peers in the civilian setting to 
ensure appropriate recognition of their status. 
46 However, to date, the author is not aware of a single case of corruption involving military 
judges. 
47 Public Service Act, 1994 (Proclamation No. 103 of 1994), s 8 read with s 1 classifies the 
Permanent Force of the South African National Defence Force as part of the public service. 
48 Defence Act 2002. However, the SANDF is still part of the public service although the 
conditions of service of military personnel are now extensively regulated by the new Defence 
Act. 
49 Defence Act 2002, s 55. The Defence Force Commission deals with conditions of service 
of all military personnel. 
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ended in the Constitutional Court and more recently soldiers have engaged 
in industrial action.50 
  Although the extent to which the above scenario has affected military 
judges is unclear, it is inconsistent with judicial independence for military 
judges to be caught up in the situation described above.51 The remuneration 
arrangement described above is not suitable for judicial officers. It ignores 
the status of military judges as judicial officers and this is inconsistent with 
the UN Principles which require that the law should secure adequate 
remuneration and conditions of service for judicial officers.52  Section 165 of 
the Constitution read with the UN Principles presuppose the adoption of 
special measures which ensure basic financial security for judicial officers.53 
 As argued in Chapter Two, military courts are part of the South African 
judicial system and must be treated as such. While one acknowledges the 
uniqueness of the relationship between the military and its members, there 
is no military imperative which justifies the disregard of basic financial 
security of military judicial officers. In any event, the Constitutional Court 
has stated that judicial independence is a principle and a norm that went 
beyond and lay outside of the Bill of Rights and therefore not subject to the 
limitation clause.54 This means that non-compliance with the basic 
conditions of judicial independence cannot be justified. Measures must be 
adopted to address financial security of military judges in such a way that 
their financial packages are appropriately determined and adequate.  
 
                                                          
50 SANDU v Minister of Defence and Others 2007 (5) SA 400 for an account of some of the 
events on this issue.  
51 See Van Rooyen v The State (note 2 above) para 139 for remarks which support this view. 
52 Note 27 above. 
53 In Van Rooyen v The State (note 2 above) para 148, the Constitutional Court held that 
salaries of magistrates must be determined in accordance with s 165 of the Constitution 
and that the power to determine such salaries is subject to constitutional control.  
54 Ibid para 35. 
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6.2.3 Institutional independence and impartiality of military 
courts55 
 
 Judicial independence is not satisfied if an individual judge enjoys basic 
conditions of judicial independence but the court or tribunal over which he 
or she presides is not independent of the other branches of government.56 As 
discussed in Chapter Four, one of the essential conditions of judicial 
independence is the tribunal’s institutional independence with respect to 
matters that relate directly to the exercise of the tribunal's judicial function 
and judicial control over the administrative decisions that bear directly and 
immediately on the exercise of the judicial function.57 Institutional 
independence protects judges as a collective.58  
 
 The Constitutional Court has stated that structural independence 
proclaimed in s 165 of the Constitution is an indispensable part of judicial 
independence.59 That section provides, among other things, that ‘[n]o person 
or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of the courts.’ In the 
process of discussing institutional independence in Valente, the Supreme 
Court of Canada drew a distinction between adjudicative independence and 
administrative independence.60  
 
 Military judges seem to enjoy reasonably sufficient guarantees for 
institutional independence with respect to adjudicative aspects. Complete 
freedom to make judicial decisions is probably the ultimate criterion of 
judicial independence. The Military Discipline Act declares that military 
judges are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law.61 
                                                          
55 Independence and impartiality are jointly discussed here because the two are closely 
linked and often referred to together in many legal instruments (including the South African 
Constitution) and some judicial precedents. 
56 R v Valente (note 15 above) para 20. While this distinction might be helpful, there is a fine 
line between the two. 
57 De Lange v Smuts (note 24 above) para 70. 
58 J Franco & C Powell ‘The Meaning of Institutional Independence in Van Rooyen v The 
State’ (2004) 121(4) SALJ 562, 564. 
59 De Lange v Smuts (note 24 above) para 59. 
60 R v Valente (note 15 above) para 47. 
61 Military Discipline Act, s 19(a). 
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In addition, s 14(4) of the same Act provides that officers and members 
assigned shall perform their functions free from executive or command 
interference. This means that military judges must be free from the military 
command and the executive in the exercise of their judicial function. Read 
together, it can be argued that ss 14 and 19 of the Military Discipline Act 
entrench, to a large degree, the institutional independence of military courts 
in relation to adjudicative aspects.  
 
 Attention now turns to the administrative independence of military 
courts. Assignment of judges, sittings of the court, allocation of court rooms 
and direction of administrative staff engaged in carrying these functions are 
generally considered the minimum requirement for institutional 
independence.62 This is often a highly contested area between the courts 
and the executive. Who performs the functions described above with respect 
to military courts in South Africa? 
 
 The above matters are largely governed in terms of ss 28(1)(a) and 32(2) 
of the Act. Section 28(1)(a) provides, among other things, that ‘[t]he Adjutant 
General shall - be responsible for the overall management, promotion, 
facilitation and co-ordination of activities in order to ensure the effective 
administration of military justice and the military legal services...’. This 
provision effectively means that, administratively, the AG sits at the apex of 
the military justice system in all respects. This is because the words ‘overall 
management, promotion, facilitation and co-ordination’ are broad enough to 
encompass almost everything one can think of, at least administratively.63 
That said, s 32(2) of the Act brings another dimension with respect to the 
availability and scheduling of military judges. It provides that ‘[t]he local 
representative of the AG shall, in consultation with the Director: Military 
Judges or the military judges in question, as the case may be, plan and 
schedule the availability of military judges and military assessors within his 
                                                          
62 See R v Valente  (note 15 above) para 49. 
63 Moreover, in terms of s 7(6) of the Act the AG determines which particular case or classes 
of cases are to be brought before which Court of Military Appeals as the Minister may 
appoint more than one such Court at a time. 
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or her area or field of responsibility’ (emphasis added). This provision 
suggests that the planning and scheduling of military judges is shared (at 
least to some extent) between the AG and military judges concerned.  
 
 Does the above arrangement amount to interference with the functioning 
of the courts in the context of s 165(3) of the Constitution given that military 
judges have no overall control over any administrative aspects of military 
courts? Is this arrangement consistent with judicial independence? These 
are difficult questions to answer conclusively. In my view, the answers to the 
questions depend on whether the phrase ‘functioning of the courts’ is given 
a narrow or broader interpretation. 
 
 If the phrase ‘functioning of the courts’ is given a narrow interpretation, it 
could mean functioning of the courts in relation to pure judicial decision 
making. A broader interpretation would also include certain administrative 
aspects concerning the functioning of military courts. It is proposed that the 
latter is the correct interpretation of that provision because it furthers the 
independence of the courts while the former may impact negatively on the 
structural independence of the courts. The functioning of the courts 
includes the day to day administration of such courts. It is not, however, 
contended that other structures of the military have no role to play in the 
administration of military courts. In fact, the Constitution requires ‘organs 
of state’ to assist the courts64 but this assistance must support the 
independence of the courts.65 Any assistance that is inconsistent with 
judicial independence amounts to interference with the courts. In the 
circumstances, it is contended that military courts do not enjoy institutional 
independence on the administrative aspects because military judges do not 
have overall-control of the day to day running of military courts.  
 
 Attention now turns to the impartiality of military courts. Section 165(2) 
of the Constitution requires all courts to apply the law impartially and 
                                                          
64 See s 165(4). 
65 Ibid. 
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without fear, favour or prejudice. In the context of military courts, this 
constitutional requirement is brought home through s 19 of the Act. This 
provision, like the Constitution, requires military judges to be impartial in 
the exercise of their functions. 
 
 A strong institutional link exists between military judges and the Defence 
Force. This is by virtue of military judges being active members of that 
institution. They serve in military uniform, carry a military rank, are subject 
to the military discipline code, and share the values of the service 
community. Admittedly, there is nothing wrong in sharing the values of the 
service community. What matters is that military judges should be in a 
position to ‘[p]ut aside any prejudices they may have and act and be seen to 
act independently and impartially in deciding the issues in the case before 
them.’66  
 
 The fact that military judges are also officers serving in the Defence Force 
raises questions about their impartiality. On the basis of this attachment, 
military judges could be understood to be affiliated to one of the litigants in 
military court proceedings and be exposed to institutional bias. It has been 
pointed out that ‘the impartiality of the judge corresponds to the equality of 
the parties.’67 Both the military and the offending soldier should generally be 
treated equally by a military judge. On a similar note, the Constitutional 
Court has stated that ‘access to courts that function fairly and in public is a 
basic right.’68 The Court added that the impartiality of judicial officers is an 
essential requirement of a constitutional democracy and is closely linked to 
the independence of courts.69 
                                                          
66 R v Boyd (2002) UKHL 31, para 57. This case dealt, among other things, with the 
question whether the British courts-martial created in 1996 lacked independence and in 
violation of Art 6(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights. The House of Lords held 
that the courts-martial in question were objectively independent and impartial because they 
were safeguards built into the system. The judgment of the House of Lords was largely 
confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights in Cooper v The United Kingdom (2003) 
ECHR 686. 
67 L Lehtimaja & M Pellonpaa ‘Article 10’, in Afredsson and Eide (eds.) (1999) The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement 228.  
68 S v Basson 2005 (1) SA 171 (CC) para 23. 
69 Ibid para 24. 
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 Impartiality connotes the absence of bias, actual or perceived. According 
to Fawcett, impartiality is ‘...absence in the members of the tribunal of 
personal interest in the issues to be determined by it, or some form of 
prejudice.’70 This relates to an internal or subjective facet of independence. 
In South Africa, the legal test for impartiality is one of reasonable 
apprehension of bias, as established in South African Rugby Football Union 
and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa71 as discussed in 
Chapter Four. This test was also referred to in S v Basson:72 
  
The question is whether a reasonable, objective and informed person would on correct 
facts reasonably apprehend that the judge has not or will not bring an impartial mind 
to bear on the adjudication of the case, that is a mind open to persuasion by the 
evidence and the submissions of counsel. The reasonableness of the apprehension 
must be assessed in the light of the oath of office taken by the judges to administer 
justice without fear or favour. 
 
The above test suggests that the answer to the question would depend on 
the circumstances surrounding a particular judge or tribunal coupled with 
the oath of office taken by the judge. Similarly, Findlay v The United 
Kingdom (Findlay) refers to two aspects of impartiality.73  Firstly, the 
tribunal must be subjectively free of personal prejudice or bias. Secondly, it 
must be impartial from an objective point of view in that it must offer 
sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt of impartiality.74 In 
Cooper v The United Kingdom (Cooper), the European Court of Human Rights 
reiterated its holding in Findlay v The United Kingdom that the standpoint of 
the accused is important without being decisive in deciding whether a 
particular court lacks independence and impartiality.75 Instead, what is 
decisive is whether the doubts of the accused are objectively justified.76 
                                                          
70 Referred to in R v Valente (note 15) para 16. 
71 1999 (4) SA 147 (CC). 
72 S v Basson (note 68 above) para 25. 
73 Findlay v The United Kingdom (1997) ECHR 8, para 73. This case is particularly 
important because it dealt with the independence and impartiality in the context of military 
courts and was cited with approval in Freedom of Expression Institute and Others v 
President, Ordinary Court Martial and Others 1999 (2) SA 471 (C) para 27. 
74 Findlay v The United Kingdom Ibid para 73. 
75Cooper v The United Kingdom (note 66 above) para 104. Like Findlay v The United 
Kingdom, this case is also an important authority on the subject of judicial independence of 
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 Applying the test, the Court held that since all the members of the court-
martial which decided Findlay’s case were subordinate in rank to the 
convening officer and fell within his chain of command, Findlay’s doubts 
about the tribunal’s independence and impartiality could be objectively 
justified.77 Although South African military judges fall within the general 
command of the AG, the South African military court system is not actually 
exposed to the complaints raised in Findlay v The United Kingdom for two 
reasons. Firstly, military judges do not fall under the chain of general 
military command nor the command of the AG in the exercise of their 
judicial function in so far as this relates to deciding cases that come before 
them. This means that the general military command cannot lawfully 
interfere (at least directly) with the judicial decision making of military 
judges. Secondly, subsequent to Freedom of Expression Institute and Others 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
military courts because it dealt with the question whether the British courts-martial in the 
Royal Air Force created post Findlay were independent and impartial in the context of Art 
6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. This time, the European Court held 
that the British courts-martial convened in the Royal Air Force had sufficient safeguards to 
ensure their independence and impartiality mainly because of the presence of a Judge 
Advocate (a legally qualified civilian appointed by the Lord Chancellor (also a civilian) who 
possessed qualifications and played a pivotal role in the proceedings of a court-martial. See 
Cooper paras 117, 121-123, and 126. This confirms the idea that having civilians on 
military courts enhances the judicial independence of such courts. In another (important) 
case decided at the same time as Cooper, this time concerning courts-martial in the Royal 
Navy (Grieves v The United Kingdom (2004) 39 EHRR) (Grieves), the same Court also 
emphasised the value added by civilians on courts-martial with regard to judicial 
independence. It found the court-martial convened by the Navy to be in violation of Art. 6(1) 
of the Convention mainly because the position of the Judge Advocate (JA) (a serving officer 
in the Royal Navy) contrasted with the Judge Advocate for courts-martial in the Air Force 
did not constitute a strong guarantee of the independence of a naval court-martial. The 
following factors weighed heavily with the Court: that the JA was a serving naval officer in a 
post which may or may not be a legal one and who sits in courts-martial only from time to 
time; there were certain reporting practices at the relevant time which could result in a 
situation where the Judge Advocate Fleet could pass comments about the JA’s court-
martial performance to the Chief Naval Judge Advocate, a Naval officer answerable to the 
senior Admiral responsible for personnel planning or whose report could be forwarded to 
the JA’s reporting officer. 
However, I do not read the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights to be 
suggesting that having military personnel serving as military judges is on its own, without 
more, problematic. What matters is whether sufficient safeguards exist to guarantee the 
independence of military courts. In both Findlay and Grieves the Court answered the 
question in the negative for reasons already discussed. 
As will be argued in Chapter Seven, this may be achieved in a variety of ways and 
civilianisation (partial or full) could very well be an option for some countries as observed in 
the UK and New Zealand. 
76 Cooper v The United Kingdom (note 66 above) para 104. 
77 Findlay v The United Kingdom (note 73 above) para 76. 
152 
 
v President, Ordinary Court Martial, and Others,78 (Freedom of Expression) 
South Africa abolished a system of ‘convening authority’ where courts-
martial were convened on an ad hoc basis by such authorities. The system 
now comprises full-time permanent military courts. 
 
 However, a question could be raised as to whether these courts present 
an appearance of impartiality and independence on the basis that judges of 
these courts are members of the Defence Force and that there are numerous 
concerns about their independence discussed in this chapter. A tribunal 
must present an appearance of independence.79 Considering the attachment 
of military judges to the Defence Force, the fact that they have no overall 
control over administrative affairs of military courts, and their lack of basic 
financial security and security of tenure, a reasonable, objective and 
informed person would reasonably apprehend that a military judge may not 
bring an impartial mind to bear on the adjudication of military cases.80 
Guarantees are required to exclude legitimate doubts of impartiality and 
independence. The institutional independence on the adjudicative aspects 
currently enjoyed by military courts must be supported by other essential 
conditions of judicial independence because factors outside judicial decision 
making do impact on judicial independence of a judicial officer. 
 
  Many of the judges in the military may actually be impartial and their 
integrity of the highest order, but it is not only actual impartiality which 
matters. The perception of the impartiality of a judicial officer is crucial in 
the administration of justice.81 The importance of impartiality and 
independence was also illustrated in R v Valente which was referred to with 
approval by the Constitutional Court in De Lange v Smuts.82 
                                                          
78 Note 73 above. 
79 Findlay v The United Kingdom (note 73 above) para 73. 
80 See the European Court case of Incal v Turkey (note 14 above) paras 72-73 in general 
support of this proposition. 
81  S v Basson (note 68 above) para 27. 
82 De Lange v Smuts (note 24 above) para 71, the Court stated that: ‘[b]oth independence 
and impartiality are fundamental not only to the capacity to do justice in a particular case 
but also to individual and public confidence in the administration of justice. Without that 
confidence the system cannot command the respect and acceptance that are essential to its 
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 The following dictum by Corbett CJ in Mönnig v Council of Review 
(Mönnig) further illustrates the problem of apprehension of institutional bias 
in the military justice system:83 
 
[o]ne can theoretically conceive of a case where the Defence Force in response to orders 
from 'the top' undertakes an operation the legality of which is highly controversial; and 
a member of the Defence Force is charged with having disobeyed an order to 
participate in the operation. It may well be that in such a case the apprehension of 
institutional bias would be a reasonable one and that in the interests of justice the 
case should be heard in a civil court, not a military one. 
 
The reasoning of the Appellate Division (as then styled) in this case suggests 
that in some cases involving the Defence Force there may be grounds for 
reasonable apprehension of institutional bias against military judges as was 
the position in that case.  
  
 Let us now consider the oath of office of military judges and its effect on 
the status of military courts. It reads as follows:  
 
I...swear that, as (a military judge), I will be faithful to the Republic of South Africa, will 
uphold and protect the Constitution and the human rights entrenched in it, and will 
administer justice to all persons alike without fear, favour or prejudice, in accordance 
with the Constitution and the law of the Republic of South Africa, and will perform my 
duties to the best of my ability. So help me God. 
 
Undoubtedly, this is an oath of office which strongly affirms judicial 
independence. It does not, however, save military courts from the 
appearance that they may not be impartial and independent considering the 
numerous problems discussed above. A strong oath of office must be 
reinforced with basic requirements of judicial independence discussed in 
Chapter Four. The oath does not, without more, deliver the basic 
requirements of independence and impartiality. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
effective operation. It is, therefore, important that a tribunal should be perceived as 
independent, as well as impartial, and that the test for independence should include that 
perception.’  
83 (1992) 3 SA 482 (A) 493.  
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6.2.4 The system of military judicial review and its effect on the 
functioning, status and dignity of military courts 
 
Section 165 (4) and (5) of the Constitution provide that 
 
(4) Organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must assist and protect the 
courts to ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness 
of the courts. (5) An order or decision issued by a court binds all persons to whom and 
organs of state to which it applies.  
 
As noted in Chapter Two, persons convicted and sentenced by a military 
court have the right to automatic, speedy and competent review of the 
proceedings.84 Every acquittal or discharge of an accused is final but every 
finding of guilty, any sentence imposed and every order made by a military 
court are subject to a process of review by the military review authority 
which is composed of persons who are not judicial officers.   
 
 One of the difficulties is that the review authority exercises enormous 
judicial power despite the fact that it is not a court of law. As already 
pointed out, the review authority may uphold, vary or substitute a sentence 
or refuse to uphold a finding and set the sentence and/or finding of a 
military court aside.85 Moreover, the military review authority may direct a 
military court to give written reasons for any ruling or finding.86 The finding 
of the review authority is deemed to be the finding of the court which passed 
the original sentence or made the original finding or order.87 
 
 Review of decisions of military courts by a non-judicial authority is not 
unique to South Africa. It is a common feature in a number of jurisdictions 
including Namibia and Zimbabwe. In Cooper, the military review authority of 
the United Kingdom was challenged.88 The Court did acknowledge that the 
reviewing authority was an anomalous feature of the British court-martial 
                                                          
84 Military Discipline Act, s 25. 
85 Military Discipline Act, s 8(1). 
86 Ibid s 107.  
87 Ibid s 107. 
88 Cooper v The United Kingdom (note 66 above) 686. 
155 
 
system and added that it would express its concern about a criminal 
procedure which empowers a non-judicial authority to interfere with judicial 
findings.89 It is argued that aspects of the current system of review are 
unconstitutional because they amount to interference with the functioning 
of the courts and affect negatively the dignity of military courts.90 These 
review powers mean that orders or decisions issued by military courts are 
not binding until they are confirmed by the review authority. This is in 
contravention of s 165(5) of the Constitution which provides that ‘[a]n order 
or decision issued by a court binds all persons to whom and organs of state 
to which it applies.’91 This means that a court decision is binding unless it is 
overturned by another competent court. 
 
 In Cooper v The United Kingdom,92 however, the Court held that the role 
of the Reviewing Authority did not undermine the independence or 
impartiality of the court-martial mainly because the final decision in court-
martial proceedings will always lie with a judicial authority. This is indeed 
the case where the right of appeal is exercised; but the reasoning of the 
European Court is problematic because it relies on appeal procedures in 
order to remedy a serious anomaly in the system. A decision of a court-
martial where the right of appeal to the appeal court has not been exercised 
will be compromised by a non-judicial body. 
                                                          
89 Ibid para 130. 
90 However, there is precedent which suggests that the powers exercised by similar military 
review authorities are not problematic. For example, see a precedent emanating from 
Lesotho in Sekoati and Others v President of the Court Martial and Others 2000 (12) BCLR 
1373 (LesCm). This case dealt with the question whether the court-martial in Lesotho was 
independent and impartial in the context of the Constitution of that country. The Court 
stumbled with the question but in the end concluded that the Constitution did not require 
courts martial to be independent but also stated that, in any event, the courts were actually 
independent. With respect to the military review authority of Lesotho, the Court could not 
see how a subsequent review could be regarded as interference in the proceedings which 
had terminated. On appeal, the Court of Appeal of Lesotho reached similar conclusions in 
Sekoati and Others v President of the Court Martial and Others 2001 (7) BCLR 750 (Les). 
There was a great deal of constitutional argument, germane to the Constitution of Lesotho, 
which the two courts basically relied on for their conclusions. I will not go into the 
arguments here because they are not applicable to South African military courts as our 
Constitution and jurisprudence do not provide room for such arguments to be made. 
91 In Freedom of Expression (note 73 above) para 11 reached a similar conclusion but 
evaluating a different legislative scheme – at the time, decisions of courts-martial were 
reviewed by the Convening Authority. Both the current and former schemes involve the 
same principle- a non-court entity interfering with court decisions. 
92 Note 66 above. 
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 Even if it were correct to argue that the role of the reviewing authority 
does not compromise the independence or impartiality of a court-martial, it 
nevertheless affects negatively the dignity of a military court, at least in the 
context of South Africa where the Constitution requires the dignity of the 
courts to be protected. In a separate concurring opinion in Cooper v The 
United Kingdom, Costa J summed up the issue when he stated that ‘I still 
think that the intervention of the Reviewing Authority is anomalous, 
unfortunate and archaic and that it would be desirable to put an end to the 
practice.’93  It is therefore not surprising to note that the United Kingdom’s 
new Armed Forces Act of 2006 departs from the practice of reviewing 
decisions of courts-martial by an institution which is not a court of law.  
 
 While the value of automatic reviews must be acknowledged, the 
objective should not be achieved through means that compromise the 
judicial independence and dignity of military courts. The varying of court 
decisions by an authority which is not a court of law amounts to 
interference with the functioning of the courts. Furthermore, the State, 
through the current arrangement of the military review authority, acts 
contrary to its constitutional obligation which requires that it adopts 
measures that assist and protect the courts to ensure, among other things, 
the ‘dignity’ of courts. There is therefore a need to investigate appropriate 
options which retain the benefits of the current review system without 
tainting the independence and dignity of the courts. In the next chapter, I 
briefly discuss some of the options. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
93 Ibid, Costa J concurring opinion.  
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6.2.5 The Constitutional Court’s approach to judicial 
independence of lower courts: The possible role of the 
Military Court of Appeals 
 
 As discussed in Chapter Four, the Constitutional Court has followed a 
controversial approach to the independence of lower courts. In Van Rooyen94 
the Court accepted a lower standard of judicial independence in relation to 
magistrates’ courts than is required of the High Courts. To recap, it did this 
for several reasons: (a) that the Constitution provided for a hierarchy of 
courts and in its view this justified the different degrees of independence;95 
(b) that higher courts deal with matters which were seen to be ‘the most 
sensitive areas of tension between the Legislature, the Executive and the 
Judiciary’;96 and (c)  that the increased level of institutional independence at 
the higher level was justified because the High Courts are in themselves a 
means of ensuring and guarding the independence of lower courts through 
the mechanism of judicial review.97 
 
 The central argument of the Constitutional Court suggests that judicial 
review is the remedy by which the lowered standard of independence is 
justified.98 As pointed out already, this would mean that the remedy to the 
lower standard of independence of military courts is judicial review by the 
Court of Military Appeals (CMA) and possibly higher civilian courts on 
certain matters.99 While it is possible to agree with the essence of the 
Constitutional Court’s approach pertaining to the hierarchical nature of 
judicial independence of the courts established by the Constitution, the 
                                                          
94 Van Rooyen v The State (note 2 above ). 
95 Ibid para 28. 
96 Ibid para 25. 
97 Ibid paras 21-24. 
98 The Constitutional Court’s approach has been criticized by Franco & Powell (note 58 
above) 575 for two reasons: Firstly, that judicial review is not a unique protective 
mechanism. It is rather a feature available to all litigants. Secondly, reliance on judicial 
review remedies infringements of independence but does not prevent them.  
99 It is worth pointing out, however, that in Mbambo v Minister of Defence 2005 (2) SA 226 
(T), the High Court held that the CMA was the highest military court and an accused 
person’s right to approach it for review constituted a right to the meaningful 
reconsideration of the conviction and sentence in accordance with s 35(3)(o) of the 
Constitution and hence there was no right of appeal from the CMA to the High Court. 
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Court stated, however, that [t]he constitutional protection of the core values 
of judicial independence accorded to all courts by the South African 
Constitution means that all courts are entitled to...the basic protection that 
is required.’100 The effect of that Court’s approach is that the lower courts do 
not necessarily have to enjoy the same degree of independence enjoyed by 
the higher courts but have to enjoy the basic requirements of judicial 
independence discussed in Chapter Four, some of which have already been 
applied in this chapter. 
 
 As stated already in relation to the reasoning of the Constitutional Court 
above, the CMA would be expected to remedy the lower standard of 
independence of ordinary military courts. The CMA enjoys generally a higher 
degree of independence than the lower military courts. This is mainly 
enhanced by the presence of High Court judges or magistrates on the court. 
Members of the CMA are appointed, not assigned, as is the case with regard 
to military judges presiding on Courts of Military Judge and Courts of Senior 
Military Judge respectively.  
 
 Be that as it may, there are two concerns even if one follows strictly the 
line of thought outlined by the Constitutional Court on the independence of 
the lower courts. The first is that unlike magistrates’ courts, military courts 
at the lower levels do not even meet some of the basic requirements of 
judicial independence. The standard of independence of military judges is 
much lower compared to that of magistrates who bring with them a stronger 
pedigree of independence. This is despite the fact that military courts wield 
similar powers to those of magistrates’ courts, and sometimes even more 
powers when functioning outside the borders of South Africa as will be 
argued further in the next chapter.  
 
 The second concern is that, unlike the High Court, the CMA’s 
composition is not immune from criticism in certain respects.  For example, 
when that Court deals with matters other than those referred to in s 7(1)(a) 
                                                          
100 Van Rooyen v The State (note 2 above) para 22. 
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of the Act,101 it is composed of three members―what could be referred to as 
the regular composition of that Court. In the latter instance, its Chairperson 
must have the required experience as a high court judge or a magistrate.102 
The second member must be an appropriately qualified officer of the 
Permanent Force who holds a degree in law, with appropriate experience. 
Last but not least there must be a person with command experience in 
conducting field operations.103 The Act does not require the latter to be 
legally qualified.  
 
 The composition of the CMA in the scenario described above suggests 
that it is possible that the Court could be chaired by a magistrate or retired 
magistrate with other military members sitting with him or her. While the 
independence of a magistrate may possibly not be disputed, to have a 
magistrate sitting on appeal or review with two ‘unsecured’104 military 
officers does not make the Court of Military Appeals an appropriate court to 
remedy the lower levels of independence of military courts.105 Moreover, one 
of the unsecured members is a lay person who is not free from command 
influence, and the Act does not protect this person. In addition, it is not 
even clear whether the two members of the military sit on that Court as 
judicial officers or not. The Act does not clarify their designation except that 
it states that they are members of that Court. This may well be a unique 
feature of military courts but the Constitution demands some modification 
of features such as this. 
 
 There is one more problem with respect to the CMA―that the Act does 
not require appointments of members of the Court to be fixed. This raises 
the question whether members of that Court enjoy security of tenure. In 
                                                          
101 See CMA’s description in Chapter Two. 
102 The magistrate must have held that office for a continuous period of not less than 10 
years. To date, the Chairperson of the Court of Military Appeals has always been a High 
Court judge. 
103 Military Discipline Act s 7(b)(i), (ii), and (iii). 
104 By this I mean that there are no measures to ensure that the relevant members enjoy 
the necessary guarantees of judicial independence. 
105 Note, however, Carnelley’s suggestion (note 14 above) 66 that the independence of the 
Court of Military Appeals is beyond reproach. However, it is not entirely clear whether she 
is referring to the CMA as a whole or to specific members of that Court. 
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practice, it may very well be that they are appointed for a fixed period but as 
pointed out already, practice alone cannot be relied on in order to achieve an 
appropriate degree of judicial independence.  
 
 
6.3 Concluding remarks 
 
 In this chapter, it has been argued that there are still numerous 
challenges regarding the judicial independence of military courts. These can 
be discerned from the top (CMA) to the bottom (Court of Military Judge) of 
the hierarchy of the military court system. The key findings of this chapter 
may be summarised as follows: 
 
 The current system of judicial assignments does not guarantee a 
military judicial office. In other words, there is no institutionalisation 
of a judicial office within the military court system. 
 While military judges enjoy a certain degree of security of tenure due 
to fixed assignments provided for by the Act, the open-endedness of 
the relevant provisions and the lack of legislative clarity on the 
renewal of judicial assignments give rise to serious questions of 
independence. 
 The grounds of removal for military judges are consistent with judicial 
independence but there are problems with respect to the procedure for 
removal and the functionaries involved in the process. 
 The remuneration of military judges is inadequate compared to their 
civilian counterparts (magistrates). Furthermore, there are no special 
measures to guarantee the remuneration of military judges. The 
current system of remuneration involving the Military Bargaining 
Council and the Minister of Defence is not suitable for judicial officers. 
 Military courts enjoy institutional independence on the adjudicative 
aspect but the same cannot be said with respect to their 
administration.  
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 The current system of review of cases by the military judicial review 
authority compromises the dignity of military courts and it interferes 
with their functioning. 
 
On the whole, military courts do not meet most of the basic requirements of 
judicial independence and they are not likely to be perceived as impartial.106 
The use of the Constitutional Court’s approach to the independence of lower 
courts does not save military courts from the problems identified above 
because these courts do not meet the minimum requirements of judicial 
independence. Finally, the status of the Court that could save them (CMA) is 
also questionable in some respects. 
 
 The next chapter will attempt to offer some solutions to the challenges 
identified above. 
 
                                                          
106 Compare, however, Nel’s conclusion (note 4 above) 254, 491 that ‘[a]lthough there is 
clearly room for improvement, in general the CMA, CSMJ and CMJ appear to be adequately 
protected so that they can be regarded as sufficiently independent and impartial to comply 
with the Constitution.’ (emphasis added). As I have attempted to explain above, with 
respect, Nel misconceives the requirements of judicial independence and this has affected 
her overall conclusion on the subject in relation to its application to military courts. 
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CHAPTER 7 
ADDRESSING THE JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN 
MILITARY COURTS 
 
 
7.1 Introductory remarks 
 
This chapter makes suggestions on ways in which the independence 
of South African military courts could be improved. It seeks to craft a 
suitable model of judicial independence for these courts. The chapter draws 
inspiration from the observation established in Chapter Four that there is 
no single correct formula for achieving the basic requirements of judicial 
independence. The requirements of judicial independence are known but 
measures required to achieve them are always debatable. There is therefore 
a lot of scope to develop different ideas geared at meeting the requirements 
of judicial independence by military courts. In this chapter, an attempt is 
made to answer a wide range of questions relating to various aspects of 
independence of military courts. The chapter is divided into three parts. Part 
one deals with preliminary questions that should be considered before 
making any suggestions on improving the independence of military courts, 
while part two looks at possible approaches for improving their 
independence. Finally, part three makes suggestions for the improvement of 
judicial independence of military courts. 
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7.2 Preliminary questions 
In this part a number of preliminary questions are raised. The 
answers to the questions considered are critical in mapping out the correct 
path for crafting a model of judicial independence for military courts in the 
new South Africa. 
 
7.2.1 The place of military courts within the South African court 
hierarchy in the light of Van Rooyen v The State1 
It has already been established in Chapter Two that military courts 
are part of the South African judicial system.  It has also been noted that s 
166 of the Constitution establishes four types of courts. These are the 
Constitutional Court; the Supreme Court of Appeal; the High Courts, 
including any high court of appeal that may be established by an Act of 
Parliament to hear appeals from High Courts; and the Magistrates' Courts. 
Furthermore, s 166(e) also speaks of ‘any other court established or 
recognised in terms of an Act of Parliament, including any court of a status 
similar to either the High Courts or the Magistrates' Courts.’ The table below 
illustrates the different levels of various courts in order of superiority. 
 
 
                                                 
1 (2002) 5 SA 246 (CC). In this case, the Constitutional Court followed a controversial 
approach to judicial independence of lower courts when it accepted a lower standard of 
independence in relation to magistrates’ courts than it requires of the High Courts. It did 
this for several reasons: (a) that the Constitution provided for a hierarchy of courts and in 
its view this justifies the different degrees of independence; (b) that higher courts deal with 
matters which were seen to be ‘the most sensitive areas of tension between the Legislature, 
the Executive and the Judiciary;’ and (c) that the increased level of institutional 
independence at the higher level was justified because the High Courts are in themselves a 
means of ensuring and guarding the independence of lower courts through the mechanism 
of judicial review. The central argument of the Constitutional Court suggests that judicial 
review is the remedy by which the lowered standard of independence is justified. In the 
context of military courts, this would mean that the remedy to the lower standard of 
independence of military courts at lower levels is judicial review by the Court of Military 
Appeals and higher civilian courts 
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Table A: Levels of courts 
The Constitutional Court The Supreme Court  of Appeal 
The High Courts or courts of similar status 
Regional Magistrates’ Courts2 
The Magistrates’ Courts or courts of similar status 
 
The Constitutional Court is the highest court in all constitutional 
matters.3 It may decide only constitutional matters and issues connected 
with decisions on constitutional matters.4 On the other hand the Supreme 
Court of Appeal is the highest court of appeal except in constitutional 
matters,5 and may decide only appeals and issues connected with appeals.6 
Section 166(e) envisages a fifth type of court. The courts referred to in 
s 166 can be divided into two levels – high and lower courts. It is difficult to 
determine where each of the military courts falls within the hierarchy of 
South African courts given the uniqueness and hierarchical nature of 
military courts. The table below illustrates the hierarchy of military courts 
as provided for in the Act. 
 
Table B: Hierarchy of military courts 
The Court of Military Appeals 
The Court of Senior Military Judge 
The Court of Military Judge 
Commanding Officers’ Disciplinary Hearing 
 
                                                 
2 These are not mentioned in s 166 of the Constitution. They were created in terms of the 
Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944. 
3 Section 167(3)(a) of the Constitution, 1996. 
4 Section 167(3)(b) ibid. 
5 Section 168 ibid. 
6 Section 168(3)(b) ibid. 
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An attempt to determine where each of the above courts falls within 
the hierarchy of the South African judicial system is crucial when 
determining suitable measures for structuring the judicial independence of 
military courts because such measures should partially be informed by the 
status of a particular court.7 In the light of the conclusion reached in 
Chapter Three regarding the status of the CODH, the determination must be 
made with the understanding that there are three categories of military 
courts in the context of this study. These are the Court of Military Appeals 
(CMA); the Court of Senior Military Judge (CSMJ); and the Court of Military 
Judge (CMJ). The last two can be referred to as lower military courts. This 
means a court specific analysis is warranted.8 Comparing military courts 
with courts of similar status within the hierarchy of South African courts 
may help shed some light on the actual status of these courts. 
 
(a) Comparing lower military courts with magistrates’ courts 
 The role of lower military courts suggests that magistrates’ courts 
probably provide a suitable basis of comparison for purposes of determining 
the appropriate measures to ensure the independence of military courts. In 
this part the CMJ will be compared with district magistrates’ courts while 
the CSMJ will be compared with regional magistrates’ courts. However, the 
Constitution does not draw a distinction between magistrates and regional 
magistrates’ courts―that distinction is a creature of statute. As far as 
judicial independence is concerned, the distinction between the two courts 
only affects one element―financial security of the respective judicial officers. 
Regional magistrates naturally earn more than district magistrates.9 For 
purposes of this study the distinction may prove to be helpful in determining 
                                                 
7 This is in line with the approach of the Constitutional Court in Van Rooyen v The State 
(note 1 above). 
8 The Court of a Senior Military Judge is not necessarily a higher court because it has no 
appellate powers. 
9 See Proclamation 54 of 23 September 2011 made in terms of the Magistrates’ Act No. 90 of 
1993 for salaries of different grades of magistrates at the time of writing this thesis. 
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appropriate remuneration for both military judges and senior military 
judges.  
 
 The table below shows how the CMJ compare with district magistrates’ 
courts in terms of jurisdiction in respect of persons, offences and sentencing 
powers.  
 
 
Table C: Comparison between district magistrates’ courts and a court of 
military judge 
 
 DISTRICT 
MAGISTRATES’ 
COURTS 
COURT OF A MILITARY JUDGE 
Qualifications 
and experience 
required of 
presiding 
officer 
Be a fit and proper 
person; successful 
completion of an 
application course;  a 
pass in civil service lower 
law examination or 
equivalent10 
Degree in law, military law course, 
rank of major or equivalent, be a fit 
and proper person of sound 
character, three years’ of experience 
as a practising advocate or attorney 
or three years’ experience in the 
administration of criminal or military 
justice 
Jurisdiction in 
respect of 
persons 
(criminal 
jurisdiction 
only) 
All persons within the 
area of court’s 
jurisdiction in the 
Republic of South Africa 
Only persons subject to the military 
discipline code (but only up to the 
rank of major or equivalent) within 
or beyond South African borders 
Jurisdiction in 
respect of 
offences 
All offences11 except 
treason, murder, rape 
and compelled rape 
All offences (both military and 
civilian) except murder, treason, 
rape, culpable homicide, or any 
                                                 
10 These requirements are in terms of s 10 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 and 
General Regulations (GNR. 361 of 11 March 1994) enacted in terms of the Magistrates Act 
90 of 1993 (Regulation 3). 
11 Both civilian and military offences; but nothing much should be read into this because 
civilian courts can try military offences only on paper since they do not do so in practice. 
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offence under ss 4 and 5 of the 
MDC12 
Limits in 
respect of a 
sentence of 
imprisonment 
Imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding 
three years 
 
Maximum is two years 
 
 
 
 
Limits in 
respect of a 
fine 
Maximum of R60 000, 00 Maximum of R6000,00 
Extra-territorial 
jurisdiction 
and sittings 
No Yes 
 
 The first row shows that the expectations with regard to the 
qualifications of military judges are higher than those required in the case of 
district magistrates. The key requirement that separates the two is that 
military judges must be qualified military law officers. This entails 
successful completion of three military courses: basic military training, 
officers’ formative course, and advanced military law course. Taken together, 
these courses take almost a year to complete depending on the arm of 
service to which a particular military judge belongs. The second row of the 
above table shows that magistrates’ courts deal with more people than the 
CMJ. South Africa’s total population is estimated at 49, 32 million.13 This 
should be contrasted with the total size of the SANDF with a reported 
membership of 75 086 for the period 2007/08.14 The second row shows that 
magistrates’ courts try more offences than the CMJ. The offence that 
separates the two is culpable homicide. Magistrates’ courts can try this 
offence while the CMJ cannot. Similarly, the fourth row shows that 
magistrates’ courts have more sentencing powers in respect of imprisonment 
                                                 
12Offences endangering the safety of forces and offences in relation to conduct in action. 
These two offences carry sentences of 30 and ten years respectively. 
13 Statistics South Africa Mid-year population estimates July 2009 available at 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022009.pdf [accessed on 24 May 
2010]. 
14 Annual Report of the Department of Defence 2007/08, 17. 
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than those possessed by a CMJ. Finally, the fifth row suggests that 
magistrates’ courts can impose a far more severe fine than the CMJ.15  
 
 There is no doubt that magistrates possess more powers than the CMJ. 
However, the CMJ is unique in three senses. First, it tries both military and 
civilian offences as a matter of law and practice. Second, it has extra-
territorial jurisdiction. Third, it may at times be required to operate in a war 
or war like environment such as peace support operations. These aspects 
present a mixed picture as to how magistrates’ courts compare with the 
CMJ for purposes of determining the level of protection which should be 
afforded the CMJ to ensure its independence. Nonetheless, the CMJ 
compares very closely with magistrates’ courts.  
 
 Let us now consider the position of the CSMJ in relation to that of 
regional magistrates’ courts. The table below illustrates how the two 
compare. 
 
 
Table D: Comparison between the CSMJ and regional magistrates’ 
courts 
 
 REGIONAL 
MAGISTRATES’ 
COURTS 
COURT OF SENIOR MILITARY 
JUDGE 
Qualifications 
and 
experience 
LL.B or a pass in Public 
Service Senior Law 
Examination and 
Degree in law, military law course, 
rank of colonel or equivalent, be a fit 
and proper person of sound 
                                                 
15 However, this does not represent the total picture because the maximum fine of R6000, 
00 which may be imposed by the CMJ is subject to a maximum penalty imposed by law for 
a particular offence and its own penal jurisdiction. It means that there could be instances 
where the CMJ would be empowered to impose a fine over R6000, 00 provided the offence 
in question requires such and the maximum imprisonment for that offence do not exceed 
the penal jurisdiction of a CMJ. For example, if a particular offence provides for a period of 
imprisonment not exceeding three years with an alternative of imposing a fine not exceeding 
R7000, 00, the CMJ would not have jurisdiction to try the offence in question because the 
maximum period of imprisonment for that offence exceeds its penal jurisdiction. 
169 
 
 
 
required of 
presiding 
officer 
recommended as 
suitable for appointment 
by the Magistrates 
Commission 
character, five years’ of experience as 
a practising advocate or attorney or 
five years’ experience in the 
administration of criminal or military 
justice  
Jurisdiction in 
respect of 
persons 
(criminal 
jurisdiction 
only) 
All persons within the 
area of court’s 
jurisdiction in the 
Republic of South Africa 
Any person subject to the MDC 
Jurisdiction in 
respect of 
offences 
 
All offences except 
treason 
Any offence other than murder, 
treason, rape or compelled rape and 
culpable homicide committed within 
the Republic of South Africa 
Limits in 
respect of a 
sentence of 
imprisonment 
Period not exceeding 15 
years 
 
No limit 
Limits in 
respect of a 
fine 
Maximum of R300 000, 
00 
Maximum of R6000,00 but subject to 
the maximum fine provided by law for 
a particular offence 
Extra-
territorial 
jurisdiction 
and sittings 
No Yes 
 
 The first row shows that military legislation is much clearer in terms of 
the requirements for appointment of military judges. However, most of the 
requirements in the CSMJ column are considerations in the appointment of 
regional magistrates i.e experience in the administration of justice. That 
said, there are two unique requirements for appointment as a senior military 
judge. The one is that a candidate must be a qualified military officer which 
requires completion of certain military course as already explained in 
respect of ordinary military judges. The other is that one must be a qualified 
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military legal practitioner by virtue of having passed a departmental course 
in military law. This may suggest that a bit more is expected of senior 
military judges in terms of qualifications and this must be viewed in the 
context in which military judges function. 
 
 As was the case in Table C, the second row shows that regional 
magistrates’ courts in all likelihood try more people that the CSMJ because 
the civilian population  will almost always be far greater than persons 
subject to the MDC in any given area. The same logic obtains in respect of 
the third row―that regional magistrates’ courts try more serious offences 
than the CSMJ. The CSMJ only has a chance to try more offences when 
such offences have been committed beyond the borders of the Republic of 
South Africa. It is common cause that this rarely happens because it largely 
depends on the extent to which members of the defence force are deployed 
outside the borders of South Africa. 
 
 The fourth row shows that the CSMJ has more sentencing powers than 
regional magistrates’ courts with respect to imprisonment. However, this is 
slightly misleading because the extensive powers of the CSMJ with respect 
to imprisonment are rarely exercised. The reason for this is that the CSMJ 
does not have jurisdiction to try most serious offences16 (committed within 
the Republic of South Africa) which would attract a sentence of severe 
imprisonment. This means that despite the massive potential of the CSMJ to 
hand down severe sentences which may also include life imprisonment, 
regional magistrates’ courts still hand down more severe sentences of 
imprisonment than the CSMJ in practice. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
extensive sentencing powers of the CSMJ are infrequently exercised does not 
necessarily mean that such powers must be down played when considering 
the status which should be accorded to the CSMJ. The infrequency does not 
change the fact that the court possesses such powers.  
 
                                                 
16 These are murder, culpable homicide, rape and compelled rape. All these offences are 
generally common within the Republic of South Africa. 
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 On the whole, the comparison between regional magistrates’ courts and 
the CSMJ also presents a mixed picture. Regional magistrates’ courts are 
stronger in some aspects while the CSMJ is in other aspects. Ultimately, the 
two could be regarded on a par. 
 
In Canada, a special committee was appointed to consider the 
compensation of military judges.17 One of the crucial issues the Committee 
had to deal with was to determine ‘the appropriate level of Military Judges’ 
compensation taking into account the nature of their role and the tasks they 
undertake.’18  The Committee compared the role of military judges to that of 
other judicial officers in Canada and recommended that Provincial Court 
Judges across Canada provide an appropriate basis of comparison for 
purposes of determining the appropriate level of compensation.19 Provincial 
Court Judges are largely the equivalent of magistrates in South Africa. By 
way of analogy, the outcome of the Canadian study may serve to indicate 
that comparing military courts with magistrates’ courts is generally 
correct.20 Therefore, in this thesis, measures adopted to ensure the 
independence of magistrates in South Africa will, on occasion, be referred to 
where relevant and appropriate. 
 
(b)  The status of the Court of Military Appeals (CMA) 
 
As noted in Chapter Two the CMA is the highest military court. It 
exercises full appeal and review powers in respect of the proceedings of any 
                                                 
17 Department of National Defence Report on the Compensation of Military Judges (2004) 
www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/mjcc04/index_e.asp [accessed on 30 March 2006]. Canada 
stands out as a country that has probably done the most studies in the area of trying to 
understand the place of military courts within the hierarchy of a judicial system. 
18 Ibid. 
19 It is important to note that another member of the Committee, L’Heureux-Dube J, 
disagreed with the majority and took the view that military judges should be granted a 
status equivalent to that of Canadian Superior Court judges. 
20 For some related and fairly recent developments in Canada see Department of National 
Defence, ‘Report on the Compensation of Military Judges’ (2008) 
www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports-rapports/mjcc08/index-eng.asp  [accessed on 15 April 
2010]. This report builds on the studies carried out in the preceding years. It makes 
recommendations on the remuneration of military judges taking into account a number of 
new factors which have arisen since the previous studies. These will be dealt with later in 
this chapter further below. 
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case or hearing conducted before any military court.21 Its status was 
recently debated by the High Court in Mbambo v Minister of Defence22 and 
Borman v Minister of Defence respectively.23 These cases primarily dealt with 
the question whether soldiers had the right of appeal from military courts to 
the High Court.  Both courts held that the there was no right of appeal from 
the CMA to the High Court because an accused person’s right to approach 
the CMA constituted a right to the meaningful reconsideration of the 
conviction and sentence for purposes of s 35(3)(o) of the Constitution. That 
provision provides for an accused right ‘of appeal to, or review by, a higher 
court.’ Although the Court in Borman followed the approach in Mbambo, it 
also added that the High Court had inherent power to review proceedings of 
all military courts including the CMA for regularity because all military 
courts are inferior courts for purposes of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 
1959.24 Nevertheless, the Court declined to exercise this power because the 
seat of the CMA did not fall under its jurisdiction.25 
 
The conclusion reached by the High Court in the above cases means 
that the CMA is the final court with regard to appeals from military courts of 
first instance. This makes that Court very powerful and important in the 
hierarchy of military courts despite the fact that it is an inferior court for 
purposes of the Supreme Court Act.  
 
In the absence of the Supreme Court Act, the powers which the CMA 
exercises suggest that it is a court of a status similar to High Courts. The 
design of its independence must reflect that fact. It is not necessarily 
suggested that the CMA must enjoy the exact same level of independence 
enjoyed by the High Courts―its independence must simply capture the 
essence of it being a court of a status similar to High Courts, and it being a 
court of final instance in exercising appeals from lower military courts. 
                                                 
21 Section 8(1) of the Military Discipline Act. 
22 2005 (2) SA 226 (T). 
23 2007 (2) SA 388 (C). The seat of the CMA is in Pretoria. 
24 Ibid para 15. 
25 Ibid. 
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7.2.2 Approaches for improving the independence of military courts 
There are two possible approaches to resolving the problems identified 
in Chapter Six. The first of these is that the problems can easily be resolved 
by integrating military courts into the mainstream judiciary―especially the 
lower military courts. This can be referred to as an easy escape route. The 
approach may, for example, entail integrating the CMJ and the CSMJ into 
the magistracy but recognizing the unique role of these courts. They would 
be specialized magistrates courts which could for example be referred to as 
military magistrates’ courts. There is no doubt that this approach will 
resolve most of the problems identified. The situation in New Zealand is not 
entirely clear because it appears the Court Martial is now influenced greatly 
by civilians but the legislation regulating Courts Martial is administered by 
the New Zealand Defence Force. 
Following the ruling in Lane v Morrison,26 Australia appears to be 
heading in the direction described above, and breaking with a long standing 
tradition of separate existence of military courts. A Bill (Military Court of 
Australia Bill) introduced before the Parliament of that country in 2012 
creates the Military Court of Australia which would be integrated within the 
civilian court structure in every sense of the word, and it would be a 
superior court of record.27 The Court will have judges and magistrates 
serving in its two divisions respectively, and it would be administered by 
Chief Justice of the Military Court of Australia.28 These judicial officers will 
not be members of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) but would need to 
have understanding of service in the ADF by reason of experience or 
training.29 Judges and magistrates of the court would hold tenure until they 
retire at the age of 70 years, and their remuneration will be determined by 
                                                 
26 (2009) 239 CLR 230. I revert to this case further below. 
27 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/R
esult?bId=r4853 [accessed on 17 July 2012]. 
28 See ss 10 and 29 Military Court of Australia Bill 2012. 
29 Ibid s 11(3)(b). 
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the Remuneration Tribunal.30 While one acknowledges that the bill in 
question is yet to be passed, the proposal is one of the most radical steps in 
recent times in the reform of military courts aimed at addressing problems 
of institutional independence along the lines discussed in Chapter Six with 
reference to South African military courts. The approach probably 
represents the ultimate future direction of military court reform with respect 
to the independence of these courts. 
However, in the context of South Africa, the scenario described above 
should be approached with caution because there are factors which militate 
against it.  
The first is that s 200(1) of the Constitution requires military 
structures to stay within the military. That section provides that ‘[t]he 
defence force must be structured and managed as a disciplined military 
force.’ (emphasis added). Military courts are at the centre of discipline in the 
defence force. They are part of the defence force and must preferably be 
managed within it. 
The second factor which militates against incorporating military 
courts into the mainstream judiciary is their uniqueness as discussed in 
Chapter Two. The third factor is a pragmatic one―relating to the timing of 
such a radical step. It has been noted in Chapter Four that judicial 
independence is an evolving concept, and in this context, South Africa is 
probably not ready for such a radical transition. 
In Canada, the approach is to incorporate principles governing the 
independence of civilian courts into the military judiciary. In that country, 
there has been an attempt to achieve parity between civilian and military 
courts at the level of remuneration.31 Thus some countries have 
incorporated or are in the process of incorporating their military courts into 
                                                 
30 Ibid s 20. 
31 See Department of National Defence, ‘Report on the Compensation of Military Judges’ 
(2004) (note 17 above). 
175 
 
 
 
the mainstream judiciary while others have not.32 South Africa should take 
these developments into account as it seeks to improve the independence of 
military courts.  
In my view, the best way of improving the independence of South 
African military courts is to follow the second approach which entails 
incorporating principles governing the independence of the civilian courts 
into military courts but making the adjustments necessitated by the 
uniqueness of these courts. This approach is at the heart of this study, and 
in fact is what the Constitution requires as argued above. It does not 
necessarily mean limiting the application of judicial independence to 
military courts as judicial independence is not subject to limitation. The 
approach requires balancing different factors pointed out in the introductory 
chapter but ultimately ensuring that all military courts enjoy the basic 
requirements of judicial independence. 
An analysis of how the independence of military courts could be 
improved within the existing set up is set out below. 
 
7.3 Improving the judicial independence of military courts  
In this part, I analyse how various facets of independence of the military  
Judiciary could be dealt with. 
 
 
7.3.1 Institutionalising a military judicial office33 
The Constitution requires all judicial officers to be appointed to a 
judicial office.34 Section 174(1) provides that ‘[a]ny appropriately qualified 
woman or man who is a fit and proper person may be appointed as a judicial 
                                                 
32 Other examples of countries which do not regulate military courts as part of the 
mainstream judiciary are the United States and the United Kingdom although military 
judges in the latter country are civilians.  
33 What is meant by institutionalising a military judicial office is that military judges must 
be appointed to a judicial office instead of being assigned to serve as military judges. 
34 Section 174(1) and (7). 
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officer.’ (emphasis added). Both the UN and the African Union Principles 
speak of a term of office for judges. 35 It is proposed that ss 174 and 176 of 
the Constitution read with the above-mentioned principles envisage a 
judicial office to be institutionalised because they speak of appointment of 
judicial officers and judges holding office.   
Furthermore, certain provisions of the Magistrates’ Act echo these 
sentiments. For example, s 10 of this Act read with s 13 of the same Act 
suggests that a judicial office for magistrates is institutionalised. It (s 10) 
provides that ‘[t]he Minister shall, after consultation with the Commission, 
appoint magistrates in respect of lower courts…’ (emphasis added). Further, 
in s 13 of the same Act, reference is made to ‘vacation of office and discharge 
of magistrates’, and ‘[a] magistrate shall vacate his or her office on attaining 
the age of 65 years.’ (emphasis added) These, in my view, show that a 
judicial office is seen as an institution to which all judicial officers must be 
appointed.  
The recent establishment of the Office of the Chief Justice36 reinforces 
the view that a judicial office must be viewed as an institution in South 
Africa. Administratively, the office will be headed by ‘Secretary-General: 
Office of the Chief Justice’. It exists as an independent department alongside 
other national departments. 
In terms of s 174(7) of the Constitution, ‘[o]ther judicial officers must 
be appointed in terms of an Act of Parliament…’ (emphasis added).   There is 
no reason to believe that the judicial office referred to in s 174 does not 
apply to other judicial officers such as military judges. These judicial officers 
(military judges) must be appointed to a judicial office, and not assigned to 
serve as military judges. The full institutionalisation of a military judicial 
                                                 
35 UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, Principle 11 and African Union 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance 
(DOC/OS(XXX)241 Principle 4(l). These are obviously not binding but have a strong 
persuasive force and have been referred to with approval by the Constitutional Court in 
Justice Alliance of South Africa v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2011 
(5) SA 388 (CC). 
36 Established in terms of Proclamation No. 44, 2010 amending Schedule 1 of the Public 
Service Act. 
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office is an important step in improving the independence of the military 
judiciary. It will enhance people’s confidence in the military judiciary and 
the dignity of a military judicial office. The manner of appointment of 
military judges affects the extent to which they feel secure in their positions 
and how they are seen by those they serve. An analysis follows of the extent 
to which a military judicial office is institutionalised in five countries chosen 
for comparative study.37 
The United States still follows the system of military judicial 
assignments in a strict sense of the word; but the office of a military judge 
exists―having been created in 1969, 19 years after the enactment of the 
UCMJ in 1950.38 Before that, there were no military judges as known today. 
Trials were presided over by military law officers who had very limited 
powers and could even be overruled by lay members of courts-martial.39 In 
terms of the UCMJ military judges are assigned to each general or special 
court-martial on an ad-hoc basis.40 Their term expires when the trial comes 
to an end as they are not full-time. However, after Weiss v. United States, 
the Army and the Coast Guard created three year terms of office by 
regulation but other branches of the services did not follow suit.41 Strikingly, 
a military judge may be assigned non-judicial duties while serving as a 
judicial officer.42  The ad-hoc system might be good for those administering 
                                                 
37 The focus would just be on whether judges are appointed to a judicial office or are 
assigned to serve as judicial officers without looking at issues of tenure: those are dealt with 
elsewhere in the chapter. 
38 The United States military justice system was substantially reformed in 1950 because of 
the dissatisfaction with the then system during World War II (see Fredric I. Lederer & 
Barbara Hundley Zeliff ‘Needed: An Independent Military Judiciary. A Proposal to Amend 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice’ 25,  in Eugene R. Fidell & Dwight H. Sullivan (ed.) 
Evolving Military Justice (2002) ). 
39 For an incisive historical development of the United States military justice system see 
Fredric I. Lederer & Barbara Hundley Zeliff ibid. 
40 Section 826. Art 26(a).  
41 Weiss v United States 510 U.S 163 (1994) 
The disparity between the different arms of service was unsuccessfully challenged before 
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Oppermann v. United States 
2007 Civil Action No. 06-1824 (EGS). The Court relied on the following three reasons: that 
the due process clause does not require military judges to have fixed terms as held in Weiss 
v. United States; the principle that considerable deference is owed to the considered 
professional judgment of appropriate military officials; and that Congress has specifically 
sanctioned distinctions among the different arms of services in authorising each service 
Secretary to prescribe regulations for the manner in which military judges are organised. 
42 Ibid s 826. Art 26(c). 
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the military justice system in the sense that it allows them to chop and 
change military legal personnel as they see fit, a practice which some refer 
to as the flexibility element of the system. Indeed, flexibility is generally a 
good thing for the military justice system given that the system sometimes 
functions to satisfy operational needs of the military which may require 
rapid deployment of personnel on occasion. However, this should not be 
tantamount to undermining a military judicial office and the independence 
of military judges.43 Judicial independence must trump flexibility in this 
respect.  Flexibility is required only as far as it relates to the ability of 
military judges to deploy to any place the military may require, for purposes 
of exercising judicial functions. 
Until 2009, Australia had fully institutionalised a military judicial 
office in order to enhance the independence of military courts.44  The 
reforms made provision for full-time military judges appointed to the 
Australian Military Court created as a permanent court.45 However, in a 
dramatic turn of events, the High Court of Australia declared the provisions 
creating the Australian Military Court to be unconstitutional in Lane v 
Morrison46 for a number of reasons. Key among these are: (a) the Australian 
Military Court exercises the judicial power of the Commonwealth otherwise 
than in accordance with Ch III of the Australian Constitution and it cannot 
validly exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth of Australia;47 (b) 
the fact that the Australian Military Court makes binding and authoritative 
decisions of guilt or innocence independently from the chain of command of 
the defence forces. This case dealt with issues peculiar to the Australian 
Constitution which may be of limited relevance in the context of the South 
                                                 
43 As pointed out in Chapter Two, this system was nevertheless approved by the United 
States Supreme Court in Weiss v United States (note 41 above) where the Court relied 
unpersuasively on the long history of uniqueness of courts martial. 
44 This was done through the Defence Legislation Amendment Act 2006. 
45 For some discussion leading to the reform of the Australian military justice system see 
Department of Defence, Australian Government Response to the Senate Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade References Committee ‘Report on The Effectiveness of Australia’s 
Military Justice System’ (2005) 5, 
www.defence.gov.au/mjs/docs/MJ_GOVERNMENT_RESPONSE_4oct052.pdf [accessed on 
20 June 2006].  
46 Lane v Morrison (note 26 above). 
47 Ibid para 114. 
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African Constitution. While the case will clearly make people pause and 
think about the nature of military courts for a moment, it is unlikely that it 
(on its own merits) would have wider implications for military justice 
systems in other jurisdictions for the above stated reason―especially among 
those countries studied.48 
The Australian government moved in very quickly to address the 
vacuum left by Lane. It passed two pieces of legislation―the Military Justice 
(Interim Measures) Act (No.1) 2009 and the Military Justice (Interim 
Measures) Act (No. 2) 2009. According to the explanatory memoranda, the 
purpose of the two Acts is to return the service tribunal system that existed 
before the creation of the Australian Military Court.49 This is a temporary 
measure until the government can enact other legislation that would create 
a Chapter III court.50 
In the current system (at the time of writing), military judicial officers 
are appointed for each general court-martial or restricted court martial. In 
other words they are appointed on an ad hoc basis as and when a court- 
martial is convened by way of a convening order.51 The appointment 
terminates at the end of the trial. This means a military judicial office is 
currently not institutionalised in Australia. However, this system does not in 
any way represent how the Australian military justice system would look 
like in the near future given that the government looks determined to create 
a permanent military court of Australia with its judicial officers appointed 
on a full-time basis as already discussed above.52 The current system 
should therefore be viewed within the context in which it was enacted. It is a 
                                                 
48 However, the ruling was a major setback for the newly created Australian Military Court 
and has created some crisis in the Australian military justice system. For an incisive 
discussion of that case, and its aftermath see Kathryn Cochrane ‘Lane v Morrison’ (2009) 
61AIAL Forum 62. 
49 Military Justice (Interim Measures) Bill, (No. 1) 2009. 
50 There is some skepticism as to whether the government has the power to do this. See 
Cochrane (note 39) 73. 
51 See s 119(1) of the Military Justice (Interim Measures) Act (No 2) 2009. 
52 The government seems to have found a way out of Lane v Morrison. See recent comments 
of the Attorney-General and the Minister of Defence outlining the plan for the new 
Australian Military Court published on 24 May 2010 
www.australia.to/2010/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2938:military-
court-of-australia&catid=122:security&Itemid=169 [accessed on 07 June 2010]. 
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stop gap while the government is trying to address the flaws raised in Lane v 
Morrison in relation to the creation of the Military Court of Australia. 
The United Kingdom institutionalised military judicial office decades 
ago, but military judicial officers are still referred to as judge advocates 
although they are now civilians as noted already.53 These officers are 
appointed by the Lord Chancellor (a civilian), and hold a judicial office until 
they retire at the age of 70 years.54 A judge advocate is specified for each 
court proceeding by or on behalf of the Judge Advocate General.55  
In contrast, and in an unprecedented reform of its military justice 
system, New Zealand has recently done away with the concept of judge 
advocates and fully institutionalised a military judicial office.56 The system 
now boasts a Chief Judge, Deputy Chief Judges, and other judges who 
preside over the Court Martial all of whom are appointed to a judicial office 
by the Governor-General by warrant.57 
Canada led the way in the institutionalisation of a military judicial 
office as far back as 1998 following a successful challenge against the 
independence of its general court-martial in R v Généreux.58 In that country, 
military judges are appointed by the Governor in Council, and they hold a 
judicial office.59 
Of the five countries surveyed, only the United States assigns officers 
to serve as military judges instead of appointing them to a judicial office. 
The rest use the system of appointments and have fully institutionalised a 
military judicial office and appoint suitable personnel to a judicial office, 
although Australia is not yet fully there but strongly heading in that 
direction.  
                                                 
53 Section 155(1) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (c.52).  
54 Sections 29 and 30 of the Courts Martial (Appeals) Act 1951 (c.46). 
55 Section 155(5) of the Armed Forces Act 2006. 
56 See Chris Griggs ‘A New Military Justice System for New Zealand’ (2006) 6 New Zealand 
Armed Forces Law Review 62 for a full account of these reforms. 
57 Sections 12, 13 and 14 of the Court Martial Act No. 101 2007.  
58 (1992) 88 DLR (4th) 110. 
59 See Art 165.21 of the National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c N-5. 
181 
 
 
 
There is a clear emerging trend to fully institutionalize a military 
judicial office because this approach enhances the independence and status 
of military courts. With the establishment of permanent military courts and 
military judges in 1999, South Africa is moving towards full 
institutionalization of a military judicial office. What needs to be done now is 
to ensure that military judges are appointed to a military judicial office 
instead of being assigned to serve as such. This approach is more consistent 
with the Constitution, the relevant UN and African Union Principles 
mentioned above, and is in consonant with emerging foreign trends. 
Moreover, it does not require a major policy shift given that all members of 
the CMA are appointed, including the lay members. 
 
 
7.3.2 Determining the tenure of military judges 
 
In Chapter Four, we learnt that judicial officers need not necessarily 
be appointed for life but at the same time recognised the significance of 
fixing judicial appointments for a longer period of time. In Chapter Six, two 
concerns were noted regarding the tenure of military judges―the first being 
the lack of legislative clarity on the tenure required, and the second relating 
to the practice of fixing judicial assignments for a period of two years. 
 Comparatively, standards and practices vary across the various 
jurisdictions considered. In Australia, judge advocates and defence force 
magistrates have no tenure. They are appointed for each court-martial from 
a panel of judge advocates.60 Those on the panel remain on it for a 
maximum period of three years but are eligible for re-appointment.61 
However, with a new Military Court of Australia on the horizon, judges to be 
appointed to that court are set to get tenure similar to that on the federal 
bench.62 The problem of appointing judges on a case by case basis was dealt 
                                                 
60 Section 119 read with ss 117 and 127 of the Military Justice (Interim Measures) Act (No. 
1) 2009. 
61 Section 127(2) ibid. 
62 See s 11(6) of Military Court of Australia Bill (note 27above). 
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with by the Canadian Supreme Court in R. v. Généreux.63 In that case, the 
Court held that there was no objective guarantee that a career of a military 
judge would not be affected by decisions tending to favour an accused rather 
than the prosecution. The Court held, further, that, a reasonable person 
might well have entertained an apprehension that the person chosen as 
judge advocate had been selected because he had satisfied the interests of 
the executive, or at least not seriously disappointed executive expectations 
in previous proceedings. As noted in Chapter Six, South Africa correctly 
moved away from a system of appointing military judges on a case by case 
basis in 1999 following the Freedom of Expression case; there is therefore no 
need to discuss, further, the pros and cons of ad hoc appointments of 
military judges.64  
 
 Again with reference to Australia, the invalidated system had radically 
changed the situation when the Australian Military Court was created in 
2007. In terms of the relevant law at the time, military judges were 
appointed to hold office for ten years, and this was done in order to enhance 
the independence and impartiality of military courts.65 To further strengthen 
their independence from the chain of command, military judges would not 
be eligible for promotion during their tenure as judges.66 As already 
suggested, that is now history but worth noting. 
 
 The United States uses an approach very similar to that used in Australia 
at the time of writing―no fixed term of office or life tenure for military 
judges. They serve only as long as proceedings last, and at the pleasure of 
                                                 
63Note 58 above. 
64 For some analysis on the advantages and disadvantages of a fixed-term of office for 
military judges, see The Military Justice Act of 1983, Advisory Commission Report Vol I 
(USA) 8-9 http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/ACR-1983-I.pdf [accessed on 18 
April 2010]. 
65Sections 188AC(2) and 188(AP)(4) of the Defence Legislation Amendment Act 2006 
Schedule 1. See also Department of Defence, Australian Government Response to the 
Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee (note 45 above) for 
discussions leading to the adoption of the above Act.  
66 Ibid. For an analysis of those reforms, see Rachel Jones ‘Recent Reforms to the Australian 
Defence Force Discipline System’ New Zealand Armed Forces Law Review (2007) Vol. 7 77. 
183 
 
 
 
the Judge Advocate General.67 The idea of tenure for military judges was 
rejected in 1983 by an Advisory Commission mainly because it thought that 
‘[c]reating tenure for judges for the sake of appearance would misleadingly 
suggest that the system does not currently operate with an independent 
judiciary;’ and also that, in the view of the Commission, ‘the need to 
maintain assignment flexibility outweighs any possible benefit regarding 
appearance.’68  
 
 The lack of tenure for military judges reached the court of Military 
Appeals in United States v Graf where the Court held that fixed terms were 
not required for military judges.69 In Weiss v United States, the Supreme 
Court held that a fixed term of office ‘has never been part of the military 
justice system.’70 As pointed out in Chapter Two, the Weiss judgment is 
poorly reasoned because it relied too much on the historical make up of 
military courts without a substantive engagement with the issues that faced 
the Court in that case. Those two cases have made it easier for the 
Government to maintain the status quo regarding the independence of 
military judges. Notwithstanding the above authorities, fresh calls have been 
made to amend the UCMJ to establish an independent military judiciary 
including tenure for military judges.71 The thrust of the argument for this 
call is that military judges in the current set up do not present an 
appearance of independence mainly due to the fact that they lack any form 
of tenure.72 
 
                                                 
67 See s 826 Art26. of the UCMJ. 
68 The Military Justice Act of 1983, Advisory Commission Report (note 64 above) 9. 
However, three members of the Commission dissented against the majority opinion. 
69 35 M.J. 450 (1992). 
70 Note 43 above, 178. 
71 See Fredric I. Lederer & Barbara Hundley Zeliff (note 38) 54-55. Surprisingly, a recent 
Report of the Commission on Military Justice, October 2009, did not raise any issue 
concerning the independence of military judges despite the glaring problems on the 
independence of the system. The Commission was sponsored by the National Institute for 
Military Justice and the American Bar Association. 
72Fredric I. Lederer & Barbara Hundley Zeliff  ibid 28-30. This is with the exception of the 
Army and the Coast Guard which prescribe three year terms for military judges. 
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 In India, there is a new dawn in the history of the military justice system 
of that country.73 The Government recently established the Armed Forces 
Tribunal which consists of the chairperson (judge or retired judge of a high 
court) and such number of judicial and administrative members as the 
Central Government may deem fit.74 Members of this Tribunal hold office for 
a renewable term of four years.75 However, the Tribunal is not part of the 
mainstream court-martial system as it is largely an appellate forum. The 
regular military courts are governed in terms of the Army, Air Force, and 
Navy Acts discussed in Chapter Three.76 The system still resembles largely 
the old British courts-martial system where members serve on such 
tribunals on an ad hoc basis.77  
 
 In complete contrast, military judges of the United Kingdom (judge 
advocates and civilians), New Zealand (civilians), and Canada have tenure of 
office until they retire on attaining the age of 70 years78 and 60 years in the 
case of Canada.79 Prior to 2001, the age of retirement for judge advocates in 
the United Kingdom used to be 65 years. In New Zealand, judge advocates 
used to be appointed on an ad hoc basis as there was no permanent court-
martial before 2009, just like is currently the situation in the United States 
                                                 
73 See generally Umesh Jha (ed.) The Military Justice System in India: An Analysis (2009) 
257 commenting on the new era and providing some analysis of the Tribunal. For a general 
analysis of military law systems in the South Asia, see another book by the same author, 
U.C. Jha (ed.) The South Asian Military Law Systems (2010). 
74 The Armed Forces Tribunal Act 55 of 2007, s 5. 
75 Ibid s 8. 
76 Army Act 46 of 1950; Air Force Act 45 of 1950; and the Navy Act 62 of 1957. 
77 For a description and critical analysis of courts-martial in India see Jha (note 73 above) 
225-255.  
78 See s 32 of the Courts Martial (Appeals) Act 1951 (c.46) and s 19(1) of the Court Martial 
Act 2007 respectively. 
79 Section 165.21(3) of the National Defence Act, R.SC. 1985, c. N-5 http://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/N-5/page-57.html#h-104 [accessed 17 July 2012]. The new 
position in Canada follows a ruling by the Court Martial Appeal Court in R. v. Leblanc 2011 
CMAC 2 that five year renewable terms with a retirement age determined by regulation were 
unconstitutional on the basis that they did not provide judicial independence (security of 
tenure) required by s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See paras 44-
47 in particular. What weighed heavily with the Court was the increased role assigned to 
military judges in matters of criminal justice and military discipline and the fact that they 
essentially exercise the same functions and powers as superior and provincial courts of 
criminal jurisdiction. See paras 42 and 47 of the judgment in this regard. 
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and Australia.80 The key driver of reform of the New Zealand military justice 
system has been the  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, and to some 
extent the developments in Canada and the United Kingdom.81 
 
 Tenure of office until retirement is probably one of the most effective 
measures that can be taken to protect the independence of judicial officers. 
Its advantages are obvious, and need not be emphasised here. Full tenure 
has been proposed by Lederer and Zeliff for the United States military judges 
as a way of creating an independent military judiciary. In South Africa, the 
Constitution does not require life tenure for any judicial officer. Whether or 
not tenure until the age of retirement should be granted is therefore a 
matter of policy choice by the legislature―as long as the adopted scheme 
ensures that the courts are independent.  
 
 The issue of tenure has been debated by various people in many 
jurisdictions.82 Be that as it may, there are a number of pragmatic reasons 
which suggest that the idea of tenure until the age of retirement may not be 
suitable for the military judiciary or in general. The first among these is that 
in the context of the military, it may cut off military judges from other career 
opportunities within the military.83 While one acknowledges the fact that the 
purpose of judicial independence is not necessarily to appease judges, it is 
important to consider the context in which the concept is being applied. 
However, career ambitions (beyond military judiciary) of military judges are 
                                                 
80 For a brief description of the old court-martial system in New Zealand, see Chris Griggs 
(note 56 above) 80-82. 
81 See ibid 63-64. 
82 See for example the discussion in the context of the United States Supreme Court by 
Steven G. Calabresi and James Lindgren ‘Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure 
Reconsidered’ (2006) Vol. 29 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 770 in which the 
authors call for a constitutional amendment to address a number of problems associated 
with life tenure. Although that discussion takes place in an entirely different context, it 
serves to highlight potential problems of tenure until the age of retirement. 
83 This factor was positively considered by the Canadian Supreme Court in R. v. Généreux 
(note 58 above). The Court stated that ‘[i]t would not...be reasonable to require a system in 
which military judges are appointed until the age of retirement.’ However, the position 
taken in Généreux was challenged by the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada in R. V. 
Dunphy and R. V. Parsons [2007] CMAC 1, paras 19-20 where the Court held that the 
rationale behind Généreux has changed because military courts look different today. As 
noted above, this view has been confirmed in R. v. Leblanc by the same Court in 2011. 
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usually linked to higher financial incentives offered in other positions. Most 
of the positions military judges aspire to are management related. Generally, 
one of the objectives of the OSD MLP discussed in Chapter Six is to 
encourage military law officers to stay within the production line of their 
professional occupations by making it possible for such officers to reach 
higher salary grades without being in management positions.84 This means 
that adequate remuneration of military judges may partially address the 
above-mentioned concern. 
 
 Secondly, tenure until the age of retirement may make it difficult to 
manage appointees who turn out to be poor judges; especially if the 
appointment process is not rigorous or where the pool of quality candidates 
is very limited.  
 
 The third concern is that this may well be a move too radical for the 
military at this point in time considering the fact that a fixed-term 
assignment was traditionally not even part of the military justice system. It 
would not be farfetched to argue that the system has probably not yet 
evolved into a situation where tenure until the age of retirement may be 
implemented feasibly, at least for now. Indeed, we may well be on our way 
towards tenure until the age of retirement sometime in the future as judicial 
independence is an evolving concept. The final, and probably the most 
important point is that tenure until the age of retirement by its very nature 
unreasonably slows down the ascendance of fresh ideas in any 
judiciary―something which is useful from time to time. This brings me to 
some discussion of fixed-tenure, which Canada, until recently, offered to its 
military judges, which India offers to a section of its military judges as 
already discussed, and of course, South Africa, to some extent. 
 
 Military judges in Canada used to be appointed for a fixed-term of five 
years renewable for a further five-year term upon request and 
recommendation of an independent Renewal Committee. This situation 
                                                 
84 On file with the author. 
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prevailed until 2011. It was the practice and the policy of the Government of 
Canada to renew appointments.85 The strengthening of the independence of 
military judges in Canada was the consequence of R. v. Généreux.86 In that 
case, the Canadian Supreme Court held that military judges did not have 
sufficient security of tenure as they were appointed on a case by case basis. 
This is now all history as Canada has joined New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom in offering tenure until the age of retirement, albeit with a lower 
retirement age and also that military judges there are still uniformed. 
  
 In Chapters Four and Six it was observed that fixed judicial appointment 
is generally consistent with judicial independence. However, some 
authorities show that there are fundamental challenges associated with this 
mode of appointment. These challenges relate to the length of the term, and 
the renewability of the same. Lederer and Zeliff capture the limited effect of a 
fixed-term of office on the independence of military judges as follows: 
 
Unless a military judge is serving the last assignment of her or his career, fixed tenure 
is of little consequence. The independence problem stems from concern that a military 
judge’s decision will be influenced by his or her interest in future assignment and 
promotion. On conclusion of a fixed tenure, the judge is once again in competition with 
all other officers of similar grade for promotions and better assignments. The degree of 
protection afforded a judge by fixed tenure is thus de minimis.87 
 
Similar sentiments have been expressed by Stevenson J in R. v. Généreux 
that as the tenured term draws to a close, it may be in the interest of 
military judges wishing to secure re-appointment to please the executive.88 
These sentiments are persuasive. In my view, this means fixed tenure can 
only be more effective under the following conditions: when the incumbents 
would not be continuing the military upon completion of a term or when 
such terms are renewable through a truly independent process such as a 
properly staffed Committee or Commission, and when military judges are 
not eligible for promotion which is subject to the powers that be during their 
                                                 
85 Department of National Defence, ‘Report on the Compensation of Military Judges’ (2004) 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/mjcc04/index_e.asp [accessed on 30 March 2006]. 
86 Note 38 above. 
87 Note 38 above, 49. 
88 Note 58 above, 317. 
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tenure. Before the 2011 amendment, s 165.21(3) of the National Defence Act 
(Canada) made provision for a Renewal Committee which recommended 
renewals of term of office of military judges in that country.  
The above discussion shows that there are at least three models 
regarding tenure of military judges in the six countries considered. These 
can be described as follows: lack of fixed tenure (United States and Australia 
(only for now)); fixed tenure (India); and tenure until the age of retirement 
(United Kingdom; Canada; and New Zealand). The model prevailing in the 
United States and Australia does not support judicial independence despite 
its strange approval by the United States Supreme Court in Weiss. The 
choice therefore is between tenure until the age of retirement and tenure for 
a fixed period. Trends among the majority of the countries studied support 
both models; but there is a very strong movement towards granting tenure 
until retirement age. Finally, relevant international law and the South 
African Constitution support either of these models.  
 
Proposal for tenure of South African military judges 
It is proposed that South Africa should take the cue from the United 
Kingdom, New Zealand, and more recently Canada and grant tenure until 
the retirement age of 60 years.  I propose retirement at 60 years of age 
because military judges are sometimes deployed beyond the borders of the 
Republic, and as people get older, their ability to handle tough conditions 
such as war or war like environments deteriorate naturally. An outline of the 
proposal follows. 
 Tenure until retirement age is justified for military judges because they 
compare closely with magistrates, who hold tenure until the age of 
retirement, currently set at 65 years. However, I have, in the past argued for 
a fixed and renewable term of office of ten years for two reasons. The 
previously suggested period gives judges enough time to settle in their 
positions, and to develop their judicial skills without having to worry about 
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the next career move for a considerable period of time.89 Appointment for a 
fixed term also ensures acceptability of military judges within the wider 
scheme of things because most statutory appointments in the Defence Force 
are for a fixed period.90 While there is generally no problem with a fixed term 
of office, the recent ruling of the Constitutional Court in Justice Alliance of 
South Africa v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others91 suggests, 
however, that a renewable term of office is constitutionally questionable. In 
this connection, the Court stated the following: 
 
It is well established on both foreign and local authority that a non-renewable term of 
office is a prime feature of independence. Indeed, non-renewability is the bedrock of 
security of tenure and a dyke against judicial favour in passing judgment. Non-
renewability fosters public confidence in the institution of the judiciary as a whole, since 
its members function with neither threat that their terms will not be renewed nor any 
inducement to seek to secure renewal.92 (footnotes omitted) 
 
Although these remarks were made in the context of non-renewability of a 
term of office of a Constitutional Court judge, there is no reason to suggest 
that they have no general application to the judiciary as a whole. Moreover, 
in South Africa, no judicial officers hold office for a renewable term of office 
other than military judicial officers. It is either that they hold office until the 
age of retirement93 or for a fixed and non-renewable term.94  
                                                 
89 The range for a fixed tenure of military judges was previously between two, five and ten 
years. It is currently two years in South Africa (as a matter of general practice), was five 
years in Canada, and until recently ten years in Australia. 
90 Similarly, this factor played a role in fixing the tenure of Australian military judges at ten 
years. See Jones (note 66 above) 94-95 alluding to this. 
91 2011 (5) SA 388 CC. 
92 Ibid para 73. 
93 For example, s 13(1) of the Magistrates Act 90 of 1993 provides that ‘[a] magistrate shall 
vacate his or her office on attaining the age of 65 years...’. Furthermore, s 3(2)(a) of the 
Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act 47 of 2001 provides that ‘[a] 
judge who holds office in a permanent capacity- 
   (a)   shall, subject to the provisions of s 4 (4), be discharged from active service as a judge 
on the date on which he or she attains the age of 70 years...’ The Court Martial Appeal 
Court of Canada decision in R. v. Leblanc 2011 CMAC 2 provides very strong authority for 
this proposal. Delivering judgment in the context of Canadian military judges the 
Letourneau J.A. held that ‘[i]t seems inconceivable to me, and I say this with all due respect 
for the contrary view, that military judges, who exercise the same functions and have 
essentially the same powers as superior and provincial courts of criminal jurisdiction, 
should be subject to the whims, the unknowns, the uncertainty and anxiety of having their 
positions come up for renewal every five years. In fact, they are the only judges with such 
jurisdiction to be subject to short, renewable terms of employment.’ As shown above, the 
same comments could be made about military judges in South Africa and there is no longer 
justification for offering them lesser measures of judicial independence. 
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 The appointment of military judges should be carried out by a truly 
independent structure95 that could be styled as the Military Judicial 
Commission (Commission), for example. The Ministerial Task Team correctly 
suggests that such a structure should follow a transparent and accountable 
process.96 The Commission must be diverse and balanced in its 
composition. It should be representative of various interests including the 
military judiciary; the military command; the Parliament; the Ministry of 
Defence and possibly scholars in the field of military law or judicial 
independence. Most importantly, it should not be dominated by any specific 
interest group so that it would not be biased in its approach, particularly to 
the executive or the military command.97 
 The appointment could be subject to a probationary period98 of three 
years because tenure until retirement is a major step and unprecedented for 
military judges in South Africa.99 As there is no guarantee of the quality and 
suitability of appointees in any environment, the probationary period could 
serve as a screening mechanism if taken seriously. The appointment and 
confirmation of candidates must be done by the independent Commission 
proposed above and an objective criterion for confirmation will need to be 
                                                                                                                                                        
94 For example, s 176(1) provides that ‘[a] Constitutional Court judge holds office for a non-
renewable term of 12 years, or until he or she attains the age of 70, whichever occurs 
first...’. 
95 Ministerial Task Team Report (2004) 35. 
96 Ibid. 
97 The South African Judicial Service Commission is widely perceived by some as biased 
because it is a body whose membership is dominated by politicians or political appointees. 
See s 178 of the Constitution. For some critical and interesting reflection on aspects of the 
JSC see Hugh Corder ‘Appointment, Discipline and Removal of Judges in South Africa’ in 
H.P. Lee (ed.) Judiciaries in Comparative Perspective (2011). For a discussion of the 
performance of the JSC during the early stages of its existence see Kate Malleson ‘Assessing 
the performance of the Judicial Service Commission’ (1999) Vol. 116(1) South African Law 
Journal 36. Furthermore, Kate Malleson ‘Assessing the strengths and weaknesses of a 
Judicial Appointment Commission’ May (1998) Amicus Curiae 16 , commenting on the 
possibility of establishing a judicial appointment commission for the United Kingdom more 
than a decade ago, cautioned that ‘[t]he use of a commission is not a panacea…’. However, 
Malleson generally concludes in favour of establishing such commissions. More can be said 
on this topic but for pragmatic reasons, this study will not go into great detail on this. 
98 This concept has been proposed by Lederer and Zeliff (note 38 above) 56, for the United 
States military judges to ensure that tenure is only offered to candidates of highest quality. 
However, they recommend fixed tenure of 30 years which effectively would be tenure until 
the age of retirement because most military judges would usually be over the age of 30 
years upon appointment to a military bench. 
99This is the period recommended by Lederer and Zeliff regarding United States military 
judges being offered fixed-term tenure of 30 years. 
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set. However, some may argue that probation is subject to same problems as 
fixed term, but in this case, potential problems could be alleviated by 
ensuring that confirmation is done by a truly independent structure 
suggested above. That said, the real danger with appointments subject to 
probation lies in the fact that it might discourage some candidates from 
availing themselves to become military judicial officers for fear that the 
appointment may not be confirmed. This means that making judicial 
appointments subject to probation must be viewed with great caution as it 
may produce unintended consequences. Others may argue (perhaps rightly) 
that the best option is to have a rigorous selection and appointment process 
to ensure that the best possible candidates are appointed and that newly 
appointed judges should be given high quality judicial training prior to 
occupying their seats on the military bench and thereby dispensing with the 
need for probation. 
 Finally, military judges should not be subject to any non-judicial transfer 
during their tenure of office in order to ensure non-interference by the 
executive or the military command. They should also not be eligible for 
promotion as this can be a negative source of influence on their 
independence. Instead, military judges who aspire for senior positions 
within the judiciary should compete for available vacancies as is generally 
the case in the civilian judiciary. Judges at the CMJ level would compete for 
posts at CSMJ and those at CSMJ for posts at the CMA. Due to their 
ineligibility for promotion, members of the CMJ could be appointed at the 
level of Lieutenant-Colonel as opposed to Major or Lieutenant-Commander 
(in the case of the Navy) and members of the CSMJ could be left at Colonel’s 
level. The suggested military ranks are relatively senior among officers’ 
ranks. This, together with adequate remuneration, would make a career 
within the military judiciary attractive. 
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7.3.3 How to address the financial security of military judges? 
 
 
 As discussed in Chapter Four, basic financial security entails (a) 
adequate remuneration;100 (b) safeguards to avoid arbitrary reduction of 
salaries of judicial officers;101 and (c) an assurance that judicial officers 
should not be put in a position to engage in negotiations with the executive 
over their salaries because they are not employees, and cannot resort to 
industrial action to advance their interests in their conditions of service.102 
Chapter Six demonstrates that the current scheme of remuneration, as a 
matter of principle and practice, meets none of those requirements. A 
discussion on how the concerns identified in that chapter could be fixed 
follows below. 
 
 
(a) Who should determine the remuneration of military judges?  
 As discussed already, the compensation of magistrates and civilian 
judges is maintained by an independent structure―the Independent 
Commission for the Remuneration of Public Office Bearers103 established in 
terms of s 219 of the Constitution and the Independent Commission for the 
Remuneration of Public Office-bearers Act.104 Although s 219 does not 
mention magistrates as public office bearers, s 1 of the legislation 
establishing the Commission includes magistrates in the definition of public 
office bearers.105 Let us look at how the five comparative countries have 
dealt with the question of remuneration of their military judges.106 
 
                                                 
100  Van Rooyen v The State and Others (note 1 above) para 138. 
101 Ibid para 149. 
102 Ibid para 139.  
103 The Commission consists of seven members appointed by the President in terms of s 3 of 
the Act. At the time of writing, the Chairperson of the Commission was Judge Willie Seriti. 
104 No. 92 of 1997. 
105 The original version of the Act did not include magistrates as public office bearers but 
was later amended to include them. 
106 The United States will not be considered here because it does not have full-time military 
judges. 
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  In Australia, the remuneration of military judges used to be set by the 
Commonwealth Remuneration Tribunal when the new system was still up 
and running.107 In the proposed system, the position has not changed.108 
That move amounted to integration of military judges into the mainstream 
on the question of remuneration. Salaries and allowances of judge advocates 
in the United Kingdom are determined by the Lord Chancellor109 with the 
approval of the Treasury.110 In Canada, the remuneration of military judges 
is regularly reviewed by a Compensation Committee.111 More recently, New 
Zealand has passed legislation which requires the salaries of military judges 
to be paid out of public money at a rate determined by the Remuneration 
Authority.112 The same institution determines salaries of other judges in 
New Zealand. This, too, is an integration of military judges into the 
mainstream regarding their remuneration. On the issue of reduction of 
salaries, of the six countries examined, New Zealand and India are the only 
countries with legislative provisions which specifically bar the reduction of 
salaries of military judges.113  
 
 The above survey shows an emerging trend to establish special measures 
to deal with financial security of military judges. Military judges are 
increasingly receiving special attention.  I would argue that this is both 
appropriate and necessary for all the reasons outlined above. Most countries 
seem to favour integrating military judges into existing mainstream 
structures with respect to the determination of their salaries. Canada is the 
only country with a structure created specifically to look into the 
compensation of military judges. 
 
 
                                                 
107 That is the same structure which determines remuneration for justices in Chapter III 
courts in that country. 
108 See s 20 of the Military Court of Australia Bill. 
109 The Lord Chancellor is a senior functionary in Great Britain responsible for the efficient 
functioning and independence of the courts. 
110 Section 33 of Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act 1951. 
111 Section 165.22(2) of the National Defence Act 1985. 
112 Established in terms of the Remuneration Authority Act 1977. 
113 See s 20(3) of the Court Martial Act 2007 and s 10 of The Armed Forces Tribunal Act 
2007 respectively. 
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(b) Options on who should determine salaries of military judges in 
South Africa 
 It was argued in Chapters Four and Six that the law envisages special 
measures regarding the remuneration of all judicial officers. In my view, 
there are three possible options that could be followed on who should 
determine the remuneration of military judges. 
 
 The first option could be to integrate military judges into mainstream 
civilian structures on the issue of remuneration. They could be included in 
the work of the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of Public 
Office Bearers. This would obviously require amending the definition of a 
public office bearer in s 3 of the Independent Commission for the 
Remuneration of Public Office-bearers Act to include military judges as was 
done in the case of magistrates. Military judges are judicial officers, there 
should not be any legal difficulty in accepting them as public office bearers. 
Integrating military judges into mainstream civilian structures is supported 
by foreign trends in the area of compensation of military judges as seen in 
Australia and New Zealand. The Commission on the Remuneration of Public 
Office Bearers has over the years developed expertise in determining salaries 
of judicial officers. This move might help in lifting the status of military 
judges and the strengthening of their financial security. However, a possible 
difficulty with this option is that military judges and their work are hardly 
known in civilian settings due to the historical separate existence of the 
military justice system. The Commission will need to study the role of 
military judges and their unique situation in order to come up with 
appropriate recommendations with respect to their compensation. This is 
not an impossible task although it may initially require a considerable effort. 
It is hoped that the work done in this thesis could assist in that process. 
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 The second option could be the newly established Defence Force Service 
Commission.114 The Commission’s role would be annually to make 
recommendations to the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans 
concerning the salaries, service benefits and other conditions of service of 
members of the Defence Force. It would also be empowered to conduct 
research on the conditions of service and consider any representations made 
to it.  
 
 Ordinarily, the Commission would also be looking into the salaries of 
military law officers, and by extension military judges; but it would be 
unlikely to address the concerns raised in Chapter Six if it looks at military 
judges as mere military law officers instead of viewing them as judicial 
officers. Nevertheless, there are two concerns which suggest that the 
envisaged Commission may not be a suitable vehicle to deal with the 
financial security of military judges. The first is that the Commission would, 
in all likelihood, be overwhelmed in its work given the size of the Defence 
Force and the diverse interests of its members. It could be expected that the 
financial security of military judges would be over-shadowed by many other 
competing interests. The second concern is its independence and the force 
of its recommendations. The Commission consists of no fewer than eight 
members all of whom are appointed by the Minister of Defence. Its 
recommendations would have to be approved by the Minister of Defence 
acting in consultation with the Minister of Finance, and agreed upon in the 
Military Bargaining Council (MBC).115 If no agreement can be reached in the 
MBC, the Minister ‘may, after consideration of any advisory report by the 
Military Arbitration Board and with the approval of the Minister of Finance, 
determine the pay, salaries and entitlements...’ of members of the Defence 
Force.116 The inappropriateness of the MBC as a vehicle to determine 
salaries of military judges was discussed in Chapter Six, and will not be 
repeated here. Furthermore, it is clear that the force of the 
                                                 
114 Established through the Defence Amendment Act 22 of 2010, amending s 55 of the 
Defence Act 2002. 
115 Section 5(1) of the Defence Amendment Act 2010. 
116 Section 55(3) of the Defence Act. 
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recommendations of the envisaged Commission would be weak as this 
would entirely depend on the take of the Minister of Defence in the first 
place, and the Minister of Finance in the second place. 
 
 The third and probably the most viable option to determine the 
remuneration of military judges could be the Military Judicial Commission 
already proposed and discussed in this chapter. That option is also 
supported by foreign precedent as shown in the context of Canada above. 
The Commission could be modelled on the South African Magistrates 
Commission.117 It would be more useful if it is also empowered, by law, to 
conduct research on the working conditions of military judges and make 
policy recommendations. Most importantly, the annual recommendations of 
the commission concerning the remuneration of military judges should be 
submitted to Parliament for approval, not to the Minister of Defence as this 
may mean that military judges would be at the mercy of the executive 
regarding their remuneration. The implication is that military judges would 
have to be paid from monies appropriated by Parliament instead of the 
coffers of the Department of Defence.118 The Military Judicial Commission 
could serve as a filter between the military judiciary and the SANDF or the 
Parliament with regard to remuneration of military judges and that would 
enhance the independence and dignity of military courts.119 It is possible to 
                                                 
117 In this connection, the Magistrates Act, 90 of 1993 s 12(1)(a) allows the Minister of 
Justice to determine salaries in consultation with the Commission. The relationship 
between this and recommendations made by the Commission for Public Office Bearers is 
not entirely clear. 
118 Similarly, the recommendations of the Independent Commission on the Remuneration of 
Public Office Bearers must be submitted to Parliament before their publication in the 
Government Gazette (see s 8(5) of the relevant Act). This is in line with the UN Principles 
which require that the law should secure adequate remuneration of judicial officers. This 
presupposes the involvement of the legislature in setting the salaries of judicial officers. 
119 By way of emphasis, in Reference re: Public Sector Pay Reduction Act (PEI), Attorney 
General of    Canada et al, Interveners; Reference re: Independence of Judges of Provincial 
Court, Prince Edward Island, Provincial Court Act and Public Sector Pay Reduction Act; 
Attorney General of Canada et al, Interveners (1997) 150 DLR (4th) 577 the Canadian 
Supreme Court held that ‘independent commissions were required to improve the process 
designed to ensure judicial independence but that the commissions’ recommendations need 
not be binding. These commissions were intended to remove the amount of judges’ 
remuneration from the political sphere and to avoid confrontation between governments 
and the judiciary...’  
However, it must be noted that in In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC), paras 59 and 124, it was held that there is no obligation 
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structure such a body in such a way that it would not cost much to the 
State. After all, judicial independence does not come for free. It requires 
political will and a fair level of commitment of resources.  
 
 Finally, encouragement to carry out the above suggestions should be 
drawn from the fact that military judges are judicial officers and therefore 
public office bearers. Their uniqueness should not overshadow their actual 
status. 
 
 
(c) What factors should guide the remuneration of military judges? 
Section 165 of the Constitution does not explain how to determine 
appropriate levels of remuneration of judicial officers. It has already been 
noted in Chapter Four that the Constitutional Court has acknowledged this 
to be a difficult area for which there are no easy answers.120 What is known 
is that the remuneration must be adequate, and the UN Principles require 
that the law should secure adequate remuneration of judicial officers. It is 
also known that, currently, there is no military judicial salary―in other 
words military judges are not recognised as judicial officers for purposes of 
remuneration. 
 
The Independent Commission for the Remuneration of Public Office 
Bearers is required to take the following factors into account when 
determining appropriate salary levels for different office bearers including 
judicial officers:  
 
When making recommendations referred to in subsection (4) the Commission must 
take the following factors into account:  
    (i)     The role, status, duties, functions and responsibilities of the office-bearers 
concerned;  
    (ii)     the affordability of different levels of remuneration of public office bearers;  
                                                                                                                                                        
to establish independent structures to serve as a filter between the judiciary and the 
executive; and that this is a matter of political choice, not mandatory for securing judicial 
independence. On the other hand, the Constitutional Court recognises that such structures 
play a crucial role in the determination of salaries and conditions of service for judicial 
officers: Van Rooyen v The State (note 1 above) paras 145-148. 
120 Van Rooyen v The State ibid para 138. 
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    (iii)   current principles and levels of remuneration, particularly in respect of 
organs of state, and in society generally;  
    (iv)    inflationary increases;  
    (v)     the available resources of the state; and  
    (vi)    any other factor which, in the opinion of the said Commission, is relevant.121  
 
The above factors are quite interesting because they are comprehensive, 
capable of flexible application to various office bearers, and would in all 
likelihood ensure that salaries of judicial officers are adequate if applied 
reasonably. Factor (i) is the crucial missing link with regard to the 
remuneration of military judges as their role, status, duties, functions and 
responsibilities as judicial officers are currently not taken into account. 
Factors (ii) – (v) are generic and usually considered in the ordinary course of 
events. 
 
Switching to comparative analysis on the issue, Canada has evolved to 
become a model in structuring the remuneration of military judges. As 
already pointed out, it has established a special and independent Committee 
whose purpose is to enquire into the adequacy of the remuneration of 
military judges.122 The Committee has conducted studies and compiled 
reports on the issue. In its enquiries, that Committee must be guided by the 
following factors: 
 
(a) the prevailing economic conditions in Canada, including the cost of living and the 
overall economic and current financial position of the federal government; 
(b) the role of financial security of military judges in ensuring judicial independence 
(c) the need to attract outstanding officers as military judges, and 
(d) any other objective criteria that the Commission considers relevant.123 
 
Each of these factors is discussed by the Committee in its 2008 Report. 
Countries which are keen to improve and understand the financial security 
of military judges could find the work being carried out in Canada to be 
instructive. Factor (b) is very important because it goes to the heart of the 
                                                 
121 Section 8(6) of the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of Public Office-
bearers Act 92 of 1997. 
122 The Military Judges Compensation Committee. 
123 See Report of the Military Judges Compensation Committee September 2008 (note 20 
above) 1. 
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issue. The Committee’s role is to determine an appropriate level of 
remuneration of military judges based on the above factors.124 Its aim is 
neither to determine the minimum remuneration nor to achieve maximal 
conditions.125 Having assessed the factors provided for in the Remuneration 
of Public Office-bearers Act and the Canadian approach on the matter, it is 
proposed that the appropriate remuneration of South African military judges 
should be guided by the following six factors: 
 
 the role, status, duties, functions and responsibilities of military 
judges including their unique circumstances;126 
 the status of military courts within the South African judicial system; 
 the role of financial security of military judges in ensuring judicial 
independence; 
 the available resources of the state taking into account the prevailing 
economic conditions; 
 inflation, and 
 the need to attract outstanding officers as military judges. 
 
These factors could go a long way in determining an appropriate level of 
remuneration of military judges. 
 
 
(d) What is the appropriate level of remuneration of military 
judges? A tentative proposal 
It is probably ambitious to attempt to answer this question within the 
scope of this study but it is necessary to do so because a decent level of 
remuneration is an important element of judicial independence. Bearing 
that difficulty in mind, what follows is an attempt to answer the question in 
a principled and tentative way, without necessarily considering all the 
                                                 
124 See ibid 6-7. For the workings of the Committee see art. 204.23 to 204.27 of the Queens 
Regulations and Orders. 
125 See ibid. 
126 The assessment of this factor should also include the fact that military judges are 
required to travel extensively, sometimes even beyond the borders of the Republic of South 
Africa. 
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pragmatic aspects of the question but primarily guided by the factors 
proposed above. 
 
 The role, status, duties, functions and responsibilities of military judges 
are well known. Their primary role is to preside over military courts. The 
jurisdiction of those courts was explained in Chapter Two and also in this 
Chapter. Similarly, the status of military courts is also illustrated in this 
Chapter. Table A in particular, and to some extent parts of Chapter Two 
show the place of military courts within the South African judicial system. 
In general, they can be regarded as courts of status similar to that of 
magistrates’ courts as provided for in s 166(e) of the Constitution (except the 
CMA).  The role of financial security of military judges in ensuring judicial 
independence was explained in Chapters Four and Six, that it safeguards 
the individual judge’s freedom from outside influence. Taking into account 
all these factors and the fact that magistrates’ courts provide an appropriate 
comparator group for military judges as shown in Tables C and D, it is 
suggested that the salaries of military judges should mirror those of 
magistrates. This means that, in line with the analysis of Tables C and D, 
salaries of military judges (CMJ) would reflect those of magistrates presiding 
over district magistrates’ courts, while those of senior military judges would 
mirror those of regional magistrates’ courts. By way of emphasis, as at 
September 2011, a magistrate’s remuneration was set at R671,219 
compared to the range of  R188, 736127 and R309, 216 per annum for 
military judges depending on the exact years of service and experience, 
qualifications, and performance.   On the other hand, it has already been 
noted that the total remuneration package for senior magistrates is R738, 
262, compared to an all inclusive package of between R434,451 and 
R527,232 for a senior military judge with legal experience of between 11 and 
                                                 
127 For comparison purposes, it is an equivalent of about $23.592 per annum. At this level, 
the package is not all inclusive—meaning that it excludes benefits such as medical aid and 
housing allowance. These are difficult to quantify, suffice to say that the military offers the 
most generous medical benefits than any State department. The current (2012-2014) 
housing allowance for most state departments is R900 per month. As already pointed out, 
the accuracy of the figures presented here may be disputed given the varied nature of the 
application of the OSD MLP in relation to specific individuals. However, the range is 
generally accurate in terms of the OSD MLP on file with the author. 
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13 years. The disparity between military judges and magistrates is huge, at 
least according to these figures. It is unlikely that the military would be able 
to attract outstanding judges with the current salary package. The 
suggested level of remuneration would undoubtedly ensure that military 
judges are financially secure, and that outstanding officers are attracted to 
the military bench.  
 
Affordability is unlikely to be a big issue given that the size of the 
military judiciary is very small. As at 31 March 2004, there were only 19 
full-time military judges, four of whom were senior military judges.128 Even if 
that number may have doubled since 2004, it would still be relatively small. 
Moreover, the cost of salaries of military judges is negligible when compared 
with the number of magistrates in South Africa. As at mid - 2008, there 
were 1 830 magistrates in South Africa.129 Certainly, South Africa cannot 
fail to provide financial security to its military judges even if the matter is 
viewed from an unfavourable economic conditions perspective. 
 
7.3.4 The appropriate procedure for the removal of military judges 
 Two areas of concern relating to the removal of military judges were 
established in Chapter Six. The first relates to the lack of appropriate 
procedure for their removal as required in terms of s 174(7) of the 
Constitution and the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary which require that the judicial officer must have the right to a fair 
hearing. The second relates to the principle established by the 
Constitutional Court in Van Rooyen―that a finding as to whether or not a 
judicial officer is guilty of misconduct should be made by a judicial officer.130 
The current mechanism for the removal of military judges as provided for in 
the Military Discipline Act meets none of those conditions. As noted in 
Chapter Six, military judges may be removed by the Minister of Defence on 
                                                 
128 Presentation of the Military Legal Services Division 
www.pmg.org.za/docs/2004/appendices/040907services.ppt [accessed on 06 June 2010]. 
129 www.info.gov.za/aboutgovt/justice/courts.htm [accessed on 06 June 2010]. 
130 Van Rooyen v The State (note 1 above) para 195. 
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the recommendation of the AG. No procedure is spelt out as to the process 
that should be followed, which, undesirably, leaves the matter open ended. 
 
 South African Magistrates have elaborate removal procedures which 
involve the Magistrates’ Commission, the Minister of Justice, and the 
Parliament. The key elements of that procedure as provided for in the 
Magistrates Act131 are as follows: investigation of complaints before any 
action is taken,132 fair hearing,133 independence of the process, removal or 
suspension of a judicial officer by the Minister of Justice upon 
recommendation by the Commission, and parliamentary involvement.134 
 
 As can been seen from the above, the procedure concerning the removal 
or suspension of magistrates involves several parties and various processes 
when contrasted with that of military judges which involves only two parties, 
none of whom are judicial officers. The relevant legislation does not even 
enjoin both the Minister and the AG to follow a specific procedure. 
Nevertheless, the removal of military judges is subject to constitutional 
control, which would entail affording the relevant military judge a fair 
hearing before any action is taken.135 That said, spelling out the procedure 
in the relevant legislation is fundamental in order to avoid any confusion. 
This is particularly important in the case of military judges because most 
things in the military are hardly transparent, and rarely the subject of 
public scrutiny.   
 
 Procedures similar to those of the removal of magistrates could be 
adopted for military judges, and perhaps procedures in other comparable 
                                                 
131 Act 90 of 1993. 
132 Ibid section 13(3)(a)(ii). 
133 Ibid section 13(3)(a)(i). 
134 Ibid section 13. The provisions of that section require the Minister to table a report 
before Parliament on the suspension or removal of a magistrate after which the parliament 
must pass a resolution on whether or not the suspension or the removal of a magistrate is 
confirmed. 
135 That assertion is supported by s 174(7) of the Constitution which provides that ‘…an Act 
of Parliament…must ensure that the…the dismissal of, or disciplinary steps against, these 
judicial officers take place without favour or prejudice.’ Removing or disciplining military 
judges without affording them a fair hearing will prejudice them. 
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jurisdictions could be considered as well. The proposed Military Judicial 
Commission could play the role which is played by the Magistrates 
Commission in relation to magistrates. The involvement of Parliament is also 
desirable. The relevant parliamentary structure would be the Portfolio 
Committee on Defence or the Joint Standing Committee on Defence. All in 
all the process will include the following parties: the Military Judicial 
Commission, the Minister of Defence, and Parliament’s Portfolio Committee 
on Defence. 
 
 In this part of the thesis comparative analysis was not offered because 
the law is fairly clear on the subject, and most importantly, South Africa 
offers sufficient examples of procedures for removal of judicial officers in the 
civilian set up which could be adapted to the military context. 
 
 This concludes the discussion of conditions of judicial independence 
which protect judicial officers as individuals. It has been noted already that 
those conditions alone have been held not to guarantee judicial 
independence if the courts themselves are not independent of the other 
branches of government.136 The discussion which follows will focus on how 
to remedy the concerns identified regarding the institutional independence 
and impartiality of military courts. 
 
 
7.3.5 The appropriate design for institutional independence and 
impartiality of military courts137 
 In this part of the chapter, challenges of institutional independence of 
military courts are addressed. 
 
 
                                                 
136 R v Valente (1985) 24 DLR (4th) 161 (SCC) para 20. 
137 Independence and impartiality are jointly discussed here because the two are closely 
linked and often referred to together in many legal instruments (including the South African 
Constitution) and precedents – as observed in chapters four and six. 
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(a) Administrative independence of military courts in comparative 
military justice 
 I begin by restating the institutional independence problems of military 
courts for ease of reference. The AG sits at the apex of the military justice 
system and is responsible for the overall management of the system. His or 
her local representative plans and schedules the availability of military 
judges and military assessors in consultation with the Director: Military 
Judges. Furthermore, the AG or his or her local representative is involved in 
the rating and promotion of military judges. Most importantly, he or she is 
responsible for most command and control aspects relating to military 
courts, military judges and all staff associated with the running of the 
courts. 
 
  Adjutants General/Judge Advocates General in the majority of the 
countries studied play a role similar to that of the AG in South Africa. For 
example, in Canada, the Judge Advocate General has the superintendence 
of the administration of military justice in the Canadian Forces.138 Similarly, 
the Judge Advocate General or his senior officers in the United States are 
required to ‘make frequent inspections in the field in supervision of the 
administration of military justice.’139 He acts as a principal adviser to the 
armed force,140 assigns military judges for duty, and judges generally fall 
under his command and control.141 In addition, all other judge advocates 
including prosecutors fall under him as well. Some, correctly, see the roles 
of the Judge Advocate General to be potentially conflicting and contradictory 
for obvious reasons; that he advises the command on military criminal law 
matters, controls all judge advocates including prosecutors, and that 
                                                 
138 Section 9.2(1) of the National Defence Act. As is the case in the United States, the Judge 
Advocate General also acts as legal adviser to the Governor-General, the Minister of 
Defence, the Department of Defence, and the Canadian Forces in matters relating to 
military law (see s 9.1 of the National Defence Act 1985). 
139 See s 806. Art 6(a) of the UCMJ. 
140 In South Africa, the AG used to be the chief legal adviser to the SANDF. However, the 
Military Legal Services Division was recently restructured and the AG no longer plays that 
role―now only confined to the military justice system. The legal advice section of the SANDF 
has been transferred to the defence secretariat – the civilian component of the SANDF. 
141 See Lederer and Zeliff (note 38 above) 39-42 describing and discussing the role of the 
Judge Advocate General in the United States. 
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military judges fall under his control.142 However the United States Supreme 
Court stated the following on the role of the Judge Advocate General: 
 
[b]y placing judges under the control of Judge Advocate General, who have no 
interest in the outcome of a particular court-martial, we believe Congress has 
achieved an acceptable balance between independence and accountability.143 
 
 As already stated, the decision in Weiss v. United States is poorly 
reasoned because it relies too much on the historical outlook of military 
courts despite that the fact that those courts have evolved and now look 
different. The United Kingdom is interesting because the Judge Advocate 
General is more or less Chief Military Judge, and does not get involved with 
prosecution services.144 In New Zealand, what used to be the Judge 
Advocate General is now called the Chief Judge of Court-Martial following 
reforms in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom.145 There is now a 
clear separation between the military judiciary and military prosecutorial 
services. 
 
  However, it is important to point out that, despite the concerns 
highlighted the South African model still looks acceptable because it has a 
Chief Military Judge or Director: Military Judges whose presence enhances 
the structural independence of military courts. Canada, the United Kingdom 
and New Zealand are similar to South Africa in the sense that the notion of 
a Chief Military Judge exists in all three except that the Chief Military Judge 
is a civilian in the case of the United Kingdom and also that he or she is 
called Judge Advocate General.146 In fact both New Zealand and South 
Africa appeared to have been influenced by Canada in this respect, that 
country having introduced the notion in 1998, South Africa in 1999, and 
New Zealand in 2007.  
 
                                                 
142 See ibid 40. 
143 Weiss v. United States (note 41 above). 
144 Section 364 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 makes provision for Director of Service 
Prosecutions. 
145 Griggs (note 56 above) 81. See also s 12 of Court Martial Act 2007. 
146 Although the United States is more of a mixed bag, each arm of service has a Chief Trial 
Judge by way of regulation. 
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  Nonetheless, there is one important distinction between South Africa, 
and Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand with respect to 
institutional administrative independence of military courts. The AG in 
South Africa is primarily responsible for all matters relating to the 
administration of military courts. In the above-mentioned countries, the 
administration of the courts is the statutory responsibility of the registrar or 
court administration officer who functions under the authority of the chief 
military judge.147 In New Zealand, the registrar is appointed by the Chief 
Military Judge.148   
 
 In Australia, the Chief Justice of the Military Court of Australia will solely 
be responsible for the management of the court assisted by the registrar 
who will function under the direction of the chief justice.149 In fact all the 
administrative staff attached to the court will function under the Chief 
Justice, including ADF members.150 This is an interesting model and 
probably the strongest outlined thus far. However, the model must be 
viewed in the context within which the Military Court of Australia was 
created as per Lane v Morrison discussed already. 
 
  What can be learnt from the above arrangements is that there is a 
move to strengthen the institutional administrative independence of military 
courts through court registrars who function under chief military judges. In 
other words, the administrative powers of military judges are increasing. 
These developments augur well for the judicial independence of military 
courts. If these signs are anything to go by, we are possibly heading to an 
era where Adjutants General would become redundant within military 
justice systems. 
 
 
                                                 
147 Canada: see s 165.18 of the National Defence Act 1985 (but the post was only created in 
1998), United Kingdom: see s 362 of the Armed Forces Act 2006, New Zealand: see s 79 of 
the Court Martial Act 2007. 
148 Section 79(1) of the Court Martial Act 2007. 
149 Section 29 of the Military Court of Australia Bill. 
150 Ibid s 32. 
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(b) Proposals for enhancing administrative institutional independence 
of military courts 
 Firstly, the AG should be stripped of his powers relating to the 
administration of military courts. The powers that should not be exercised 
by the AG are as follows: planning and scheduling the availability of military 
judges and military assessors, allocation of court rooms, and the direction of 
administrative staff engaged in carrying those functions. Those should be 
exercised by the Chief Military Judge151 or any senior judge nominated by 
the Chief Military Judge assisted by a military court registrar who should 
preferably be appointed by the Chief Military Judge. This means that each 
legal satellite office would have a judge nominated by the Chief Military 
Judge to perform the said functions. It may very well mean that the 
administrative functions of military judges would increase, but this is an 
important step if military courts are to have institutional administrative 
independence. Moreover, those functions are directly related to judicial 
functions of judges. 
 
  Secondly, military judges should fall under the Chief Military Judge 
for command and control purposes to avoid the perception that they are 
part of the general chain of ‘military’ command. In practice, this would mean 
that aspects such as approval for leave of absence of military judges would 
be done by the Chief Military Judge or his or her nominee. The office of the 
chief military judge would run as a unit of the SANDF as is currently the 
case in Canada, and of which the Chief Military Judge is the commander.152  
 
  The separation of powers does not necessarily mean that cooperation 
between the office of the chief military judge and the AG is not required. 
There would still be a fair amount of co-operation required between the two 
offices as long as the two respect each other’s functions and powers. The 
detail of the modalities of co-operation is a matter which should be left for 
                                                 
151 Except the assignment of military assessors, it is suggested that that should be the 
function of the registrar under the general guidance of the Chief Military Judge. This is 
generally the case in New Zealand (see s 21(4) of the Court-Martial Act 2007). 
152 Report on the Military Judges Compensation Committee (note 20 above) 5. 
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legislative drafting, and lessons can be drawn from the model proposed in 
Australia with respect to the envisaged cooperation between the Chief 
Justice of Military Court of Australia and the ADF.153  
 
 Finally, it is worth pointing out that the policy direction of the South 
African civilian court context supports the idea that judges should have full 
administrative control over courts. Recently, the Office of the Chief Justice 
(OCJ) was established as an independent national department falling under 
the Chief Justice in order to strengthen administrative institutional 
independence of the judiciary.154 With the establishment of the OCJ, it can 
be expected that the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, 
as an arm of the executive, will lose most of its administrative powers over 
courts in South Africa. This will enhance the institutional independence of 
the judiciary. 
 
 
(c) Addressing perceived partiality of military courts 
 The extent to which military judges can be perceived to be impartial was 
discussed in Chapter Six, mainly relating to their attachment to the SANDF 
and service in uniform. Different approaches could be followed to address 
the concerns. The Ministerial Task Team grappled with the issue, and 
recommended that the Court of Military Judge and the Court of Senior 
Military Judge should be chaired by a civilian magistrate or retired civilian 
magistrate who will bring with them the experience of institutional 
independence from civilian courts. Of the six countries studied, only the 
United Kingdom155 and New Zealand provide precedent for the suggestion of 
the Ministerial Task Team.156 Similarly, Australia would most likely be part 
of that group soon due to its peculiar circumstances arising from Lane v 
                                                 
153 See in particular s 32 of the Military Court of Australia Bill. 
154 Proclamation No. 44 of 2010. For a passing reference to the establishment of the office 
see Justice Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa (note 91 above) para 9. 
155 For an incisive discussion on civilianisation of military law in the UK in a general sense 
see G.R. Rubin ‘United Kingdom Military Law: Autonomy, Civilianisation, Juridification’ 
2002 62 Modern Law Review 36. 
156 India does not feature in this group because its Armed Forces Tribunal is primarily an 
appellate forum. 
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Morrison. As already noted, in the United Kingdom, the Court-Martial 
consists of a civilian judge advocate and at least three but not more than 
five lay military members.157 Similarly, New Zealand’s Court-Martial consists 
of one civilian judge and either five military members if the proceedings 
relate to a serious offence; or three military members in any other case.158 In 
both countries, military members are triers of fact while judges take 
responsibility for all the legal issues including the admissibility of evidence.  
  
 In Cooper v The United Kingdom, the Court observed that the presence of 
civilians in a court-martial constitutes a significant guarantee of the 
independence of the court-martial proceedings.159 In general, there is, 
therefore, some scope for debate about the possibility of partial 
civilianisation of military courts but this must not be done to the detriment 
of military effectiveness.160 
 
 However, civilianisation (partial or full) of military courts is not the best 
solution for addressing the concerns of perceived partiality and institutional 
independence of South African military courts. What is needed is 
‘civilisation’161 of military courts instead of their civilianisation. This means 
ensuring that the design of military courts is in line with principles of 
judicial independence along the lines suggested in this chapter. There are a 
                                                 
157 Section 155(1) of the Armed Forces Act 2006. 
158 Section 21(1) of the Court Martial Act 2007. 
159 Cooper v The United Kingdom (2003) ECHR 686, para 117. 
160 See generally Rubin (note 155 above). However, it is important to point out that term 
‘civilianisation’ is used here in the context of the Ministerial Task Team suggestion that 
military courts should be chaired by civilians. The term is not necessarily used in the sense 
discussed by Rubin (note 155 above) and Matthew Groves ‘The Civilianisation of Australian 
Military Law’ (2005) 28(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 364. Groves generally 
refers to ‘civilianisation’ as ‘the incorporation of civilian values into military life.’ Rubin (note 
155 above) 47 refers to civilianisation as ‘a social and legal process of convergence between 
military and civilian law where no detriment to military effectiveness can be perceived...’ 
That said, as will appear further below, the model of judicial independence proposed for 
South African military courts is in line with ‘civilianisation’ as defined by Rubin because it 
emphasises incorporation of civilian notions of judicial independence into military 
structures with no detriment to military effectiveness. The Ministerial Task Team suggested 
the incorporation of civilian values by means of replacing soldiers with civilians as a 
possible option for improving the independence of military courts. 
161 See Draft Principles Governing the Administration of Justice through Military Tribunals 
para 11 E/CN.4/2006/56 published on 13 January 2006 discussed in some detail in 
Chapter Six. 
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number of factors which militate against civilianisation of military courts 
most of which have already been canvassed elsewhere in this chapter but 
will be repeated by way of emphasis. 
 
 First and foremost, as acknowledged in Potsane, soldiers live and work in 
a subculture of their own.162  This is accepted by acknowledging the 
constitutional validity of a separate military justice system.163 It takes a 
soldier to understand properly the subculture of soldiers. Soldiers 
understand the pains, pressures and pleasures of military life. A civilian 
may fail to appreciate the dynamics of such life. He or she may end up being 
too strict or too lenient in some cases. The following observation by Lord 
Rodger of the UK’s House of Lords is instructive in illuminating the value of 
military personnel as members of military courts:164 
 
The members of a court-martial perform a role in deciding sentence which is no part of 
a jury's function in the United Kingdom. I accept that, in determining sentence, the 
members will indeed have regard to such issues as the impact of the offence on Service 
morale and discipline. They will, inevitably, be more aware of these effects than a civil 
judge would be. Therefore, while the safeguards of the independence and impartiality of 
the members should mean that they approach their verdict in much the same way as 
jurors in a civil trial, it cannot be assumed that, when passing sentence, the court-
martial will necessarily give exactly the same weight to these Service factors as would a 
Crown Court judge. The sentences which a court-martial passes may therefore not 
coincide exactly with the sentences which a civil judge would pass on the same facts.  
 
One may add that offending soldiers are mostly likely to be more responsive 
when it is their fellow soldier adjudicating their fate than when it is a civilian 
doing so. This is because of the shared military understanding that exists 
among military comrades, something which only soldiers can accurately 
understand. Although the court in the above-mentioned case was not 
necessarily referring to military judges but lay members of a military court, 
its observations are relevant in a jurisdiction such as South Africa where 
military judges are uniformed and there is no compulsory system of military 
jury as tries of fact. This means that military judges have a crucial role to 
                                                 
162 2002 (1) SA 1 (CC), para 31. 
163 Ibid. 
164 R. v Boyd (2002) UKHL 31, para 86. 
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play in bringing the necessary service knowledge to bear in the 
proceedings.165 
 
 Secondly, s 200(1) of the Constitution requires the defence force to be 
structured and managed as a disciplined ‘military’ force. The section 
requires the creation of ‘military’ disciplinary structures. Civilianised 
disciplinary structures will fall foul of this constitutional requirement. 
Furthermore, s 11 of the Defence Act 2002 provides that the SANDF 
consists of the regular force and the reserve force. Civilian military judges 
cannot feasibly be classified as either members of the regular or reserve 
force in the South African context. It must also be emphasised that the 
military justice system is part of military capacity. It provides the military 
with the capacity to discipline its members. Civilianisation of military 
judicial services may present practical difficulties in relation to the capacity 
of the military to comply with its constitutional and international defence 
obligations.166 The practical difficulty relates to the deployability of civilians 
in war situations. Civilians’ health status, fitness and non-exposure to 
military life may make it difficult for them to participate in full-scale military 
deployments. In Australia, one of the requirements for appointment as a 
full-time Chief Military Judge or a military judge in the invalidated system 
was that the person must meet individual service deployment 
requirements.167 It may well be possible to address concerns about 
deployability of civilians in some ways but it must be recognised that this 
may present some difficulty as argued above. 
 
                                                 
165 However, see, Grieves v The United Kingdom (2004) 39 EHRR) 2 para 88 where the 
European Court was not persuaded that ‘a civilian Judge Advocate would have more 
difficulty in following naval language or customs than a trial judge would have with a 
complex expert evidence in a civilian case.’ 
166 See generally s 200(1) of the Constitution. 
167 See Defence Legislation Amendment Act 2006 (repealed) ss 188(AD)(d) and 188(AR)(d). 
By way of emphasis, it may be worth noting that judges of the anticipated civilianised 
military court would have to have some military background or familiarity with the military. 
See recent comments of the Attorney-General and the Minister of Defence outlining the plan 
for the new Australian military court published on 24 May 2010 
www.australia.to/2010/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2938:military-
court-of-australia&catid=122:security&Itemid=169 [accessed on 07 June 2010] and the 
Military Court of Australia Bill respectively. 
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 Thirdly, a look at the international law of armed conflict suggests a 
preference for military personnel to be tried in military courts.168 This 
preference is probably informed by a particular understanding of the nature 
of military courts and the possible practical benefits of trial of soldiers by 
such courts. Furthermore, in situations of war, civilian judicial officers may 
sometimes run into difficulties when it comes to the process of being 
recognised as prisoners of war in terms of the Geneva Convention on 
Prisoners of War.169 
 
 In Canada, as the leading country in the reform of military justice 
systems, there is disapproval of the civilianisation of military courts. The 
2004 Report on the Compensation of Military Judges observes that military 
judges ‘must be thoroughly versed in the military life.’170 The Report added 
that ‘[m]ilitary Judges must have military training and be aware of the 
importance of military discipline to the functioning of all military units.’171 
Currently, military judges are military officers in that country.172 
 
 It is possible to address institutional and impartiality concerns 
without civilianising the military judicial system. The solution to 
institutional and impartiality concerns regarding the military judiciary lies 
in Findlay v The United Kingdom. In this case, the Court held that a court-
martial must be impartial from an objective point of view in that it must 
                                                 
168 Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for 
signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135, Art 84 (entered into force 21 October 1950). 
169 For categories of prisoners of war, see Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War, ibid Art 4. That article does not rule out the possibility of civilians being 
recognised as prisoners of war. It is not suggested that civilian military judges would not 
qualify as prisoners of war with respect to those categories listed in Art 4 of the relevant 
Geneva Convention. However, the stipulations and the open ended nature of that article 
may lead to complexities and delays in determining the status of civilians accompanying 
members of the regular armed forces. See also Peter Rowe (ed.) The Impact of Human Rights 
Law on Armed Forces (2006) 67 expressing the view that ‘...the civilian who takes an active 
part in hostilities, will not be entitled to prisoner of war status if captured.’ However, it is 
not clear whether, in his view, this will include civilians who are part of the armed forces 
given the complexities referred to above in relation to the Geneva Convention (III). 
170 Note 17 above.  
171 Ibid. 
172 See s 165.21(1) of Canada’s National Defence Act which provides that ‘[t]he Governor in 
Council may appoint officers who are barristers or advocates of at least ten years standing 
at the bar of a province to be military judges.’ (emphasis added). 
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offer sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt of impartiality.173 
Fairness and independence may still be achieved by keeping the military 
character of military courts provided there are strong guarantees to exclude 
any legitimate doubt of impartiality and independence. There are clearly 
different models for achieving an acceptable degree of impartiality and 
independence of military courts. Each model has its own advantages and 
disadvantages. The focus should be on improving the conditions of military 
judges and the institutional structure of military courts along the lines 
suggested in this chapter rather than changing the inherent character of 
military courts.174  
 
 
7.4 Military judicial reviews: continuing a good thing without 
compromising the dignity of military courts 
 
 The problems with the current set up of military judicial reviews were 
discussed in Chapter Six. In the main, they relate to the dignity of military 
courts, which is connected to judicial independence.  
 
 The emerging trend in modern military justice appears to be in favour of 
the discontinuation of automatic reviews of courts-martial decisions by 
reviewing authorities, and entrusting review powers to appeal courts. For 
example, New Zealand has abolished the Board of Review. Consequently, the 
Court Martial Appeal Court has been granted greater powers.175 This, 
                                                 
173 Findlay v The United Kingdom (1997) ECHR 8, para 77. 
174 I should point out, however, that M Carnelley ‘The South African Military Court System – 
Independent, Impartial and Constitutional?’ (2005) 33(2) Scietia Militaria: South African 
Journal of Military Studies 55 71 argues that problems relating to impartiality of military 
judges are adequately catered for in the military legislation. She relies on Rule 35 of the 
Military Discipline Act Rules of Procedure which makes provision for the recusal of a 
military judge in certain instances. However, this provision addresses concerns related to a 
specific judge sitting on a specific case. For example, if the judge is related to the 
complainant by affinity or consanguinity in the first or second degree. Rule 35 o the Military 
Discipline Act Rules of Procedure does not deal with impartiality or institutional 
independence concerns related to judges serving on the system in general. In her analysis, 
Carnelley fails to draw a distinction between specific concerns of impartiality which should 
be assessed on particular facts and general concerns of impartiality which should be 
assessed by looking at the entire system. 
175 See the Court Martial Appeals Amendment Act 2007. 
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combined with an expanded power to make special references to that Court 
through the Judge Advocate General in some way replaces the role of the 
Board of Review.176  
 
 Furthermore, the recent reforms in Australia excluded the system of 
automatic review of proceedings by non-judicial authorities.  
  
 The automatic review of cases should be retained but carried out through 
a suitable judicial body. The Ministerial Task Team recommends that the 
military judicial review authority should be divested of powers to change 
decisions of military courts, and should only be empowered to make 
recommendations to the CMA. This suggestion could possibly work if the 
CMA sits on a full-time basis with the necessary capacity to consider all the 
recommendations that may come from the review authority.177 The most 
viable option could be to create a standing court of military judicial reviews 
which focuses squarely on the reviews or to mandate the CMA with the task 
of reviews in addition to appeal powers. If the option of creating a new court 
is preferred, the conditions of service of the judges of the court could be 
along the lines already suggested with respect to the CMJ and the CSMJ. 
This will strengthen the dignity and credibility of military courts, and will 
also achieve the sought objective in respect of military judicial reviews. 
 
 
7.5 Strengthening the Court of Military Appeals (CMA) 
 The main problems of the CMA as discussed are that the Act does not 
make provision for the appointment of its judges to be fixed when serving on 
the Court; and its military members are not secured. An additional problem 
is the existing practice of appointing members of the CSMJ to sit as military 
                                                 
176 Section 24(1) of the Court Martial Appeals Amendment Act 2007 provides that ‘[t]he 
Judge Advocate General may refer to the Court a finding made, a conviction entered, or a 
sentence passed in any proceedings in the Court Martial if the Judge Advocate General 
thinks that it is in the interests of justice or discipline to do so.’ 
177 The Court of Military Appeals usually sits for two sessions in a given year. 
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judicial members of the CMA.178 It is anomalous for judges to act as both 
members of lower and higher courts. A stronger CMA with sufficient 
guarantees of independence is required in order for it to be a credible court 
to remedy the flaws in the lower levels. This is particularly important in the 
light of the recent ruling by the High Courts that there is no appeal from the 
CMA to the High Court.179  
 
 The problems of the CMA stem from the fact that that its actual status is 
unclear, and that it is not a full-time court. This is despite the fact that it 
handles a large number of cases. The Court finalised 154 cases for the 
period 01 April 2003 to 31 March 2004.180 However, of the countries 
studied, only the United States has a full-time appellate military court with 
dedicated judges. The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
is composed of five civilian judges appointed to serve for a 15 year non-
renewable term. In fact, in most of the countries studied, judges of courts of 
military appeals serve for a fixed term, and are civilians. As for status, in 
Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the 
Court Martial-Appeal Court is a superior court of record.181 
 
 In South Africa, a full-time CMA is certainly justified; it must be a 
superior court of record, and must be accorded a status similar to that of 
the High Court.  It could be modelled on that of the United States given that 
the equivalent court in that country is full-time, and also handles a sizable 
number of cases.182 Having a full-time court may also improve its 
jurisprudence.  
                                                 
178 See Information Bulletin, Defence Legal Services Division Vol. 4 Issue 6 (2008), 1 for 
names of some of the members of the CSMJ serving on the Court 
http://www.dlsdiv.mil.za/infobulletins/Info%20Bulletin%20November%202008.pdf  
[accessed on 13 July 2012]. 
179 Mbambo v Minister of Defence (note 22) and Borman v Minister of Defence (note 23 above). 
180 Presentation of the Military Legal Services Division 
www.pmg.org.za/docs/2004/appendices/040907services.ppt [accessed on 06 June 2010]. 
The author has not been able to secure the latest statistics for the CMA. 
181 Similarly, the Court-Martial Appeal Court of the neighbouring Zimbabwe is a superior 
court of record. See s 79(3) of the Defence Act of Zimbabwe which makes reference to the 
Court Martial Appeal Court as ‘a superior court of record.’  
182 In 2009, the Court handled 213 petitions and other categories of cases. See Annual 
Report of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
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 However, South Africa should keep the mixed composition of the court – 
civilian and military−to ensure that the balance of perspective brought by 
this arrangement is kept. It is suggested that the composition should be 
three civilian judges, two of whom must have served as high court judges for 
purposes of experience on the court and one military judge to bring military 
law experience but this member must not be a member of any of the lower 
military courts for obvious reasons. Last but not least, a lay member with 
operational or command experience should be appointed for a five year non-
renewable term, and this could be a retired person. The civilian judges and 
the military judge should be appointed for a fixed non-renewable term of 15 
years. The members should be appointed by the Minister of Defence on the 
recommendation of the Military Judicial Commission proposed and 
discussed in this chapter. These proposals would ensure that the Court is 
balanced, experienced, diverse, and most importantly, independent.183 
 
7.6 Concluding remarks 
 
 It is hoped that the model of judicial independence suggested in this 
chapter will go a long way in addressing problems of judicial independence 
of military courts identified in this thesis.  
 
 The next chapter summarises the findings and recommendations of the 
thesis in its entirety.  
                                                                                                                                                        
www.armfor.uscourts.gov/annual/FY09AnnualReport.pdf  for full statistical data of the 
Court [accessed on 06 June 2010]. 
183 See Rowe (note 168 above) 87, commenting generally on the composition of military 
appeal courts and alluding to various models. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study has examined the judicial independence of South African 
military courts. It has centred around two major and related questions. The 
first was whether South African military courts are independent, and the 
second was ways in which their independence could be improved. Its aim 
was to demonstrate that South African military courts do not meet the basic 
requirements of judicial independence, and more important, to suggest 
feasible ways of fixing the problems identified. 
 Before answering the two major questions, the study looked at certain 
aspects which needed to be understood before reaching the main issues. It 
started off by describing the military court system from an historical 
perspective up to the current system, analysing the status of military courts 
and assessing their uniqueness. An attempt was also made to locate the 
status of the CODH within the military court system. It then provided an 
analysis of the relevant theoretical framework, its application to military 
courts and an assessment of the judicial independence of South African 
military courts. Finally, it suggested ways of improving their judicial 
independence.  
In line with the major questions investigated, two arguments permeate 
the thesis: that military courts do not meet the basic requirements of 
judicial independence; and that the new model of judicial independence for 
South African military courts must take into account the following factors: 
relevant principles of constitutional and international law relating to judicial 
independence and the right to a fair trial; emerging foreign trends and most 
importantly, military needs or operational effectiveness. It is hoped that the 
value and the need of these factors were demonstrated in the thesis. 
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The main findings and recommendations of the study as set out in 
various chapters are as follows. These include findings on the preliminary 
questions and main questions of the study. 
 
8.1 Main findings and recommendations 
The findings that follow include findings on the preliminary questions and 
main questions of the study. 
 
8.1.1 Findings on the preliminary questions of the thesis 
The findings on the preliminary questions of the study are as follows. 
 
(a) Military courts are part of the South African judicial system 
The place of military courts within the South African judicial system 
has always been unclear. This study looked at that question by analysing 
several provisions of the Constitution and the relevant legislation. It found 
that military courts are actually part of the South African judicial system 
despite their separate existence. That means two things: that the principles 
of judicial independence apply to those courts; and it also means that the 
separate existence of military courts has no bearing on whether standards of 
judicial independence apply to those courts. The question therefore is rather 
how those standards could be applied to military courts given their 
uniqueness 
 
(b) The uniqueness of military courts is changing 
Military courts are still unique in many senses despite the radical 
changes they have gone through since the dawn of democracy in South 
Africa. For example, they are still unique in their purpose, their jurisdiction 
219 
 
in respect to the offences they deal with, their uniformed personnel, and 
their extra-territorial jurisdiction. However, this study established that their 
uniqueness is not static―it can rather be described as changing given the 
events in the last decade or so, both in South Africa and in countries 
considered in this thesis. There was a time when these courts were 
completely subsumed within the military command. That was seen as part 
of their uniqueness; but that thinking has lost ground due to a number of 
factors. In South Africa, the main driving force for the changes has been the 
new Constitution. Today, these courts are more or less akin to civilian 
courts in many respects. Although the structure of their judicial 
independence is still unique and unusual, more changes to that aspect can 
be expected in the near future as it has been happening in other parts of the 
world. 
 
(c) The Commanding Officer’s Disciplinary Hearing is not a court 
of    law 
The Military Discipline Act classifies the CODH as a military court. 
Identifying the actual status of the CODH is not without difficulty. This study 
has established that although the CODH is more like a court of law, it is not a 
court of law because it does not have some of the key attributes of what 
constitutes a court. Its character and stature are in line with similar forums 
in selected open and democratic societies, some of which have recently 
reformed their military justice systems. At best it could be identified as a 
unique disciplinary tribunal. The conclusion reached means that the CODH 
cannot be expected to comply with the requirements of judicial 
independence as provided for in s 165 of the Constitution since those only 
apply to courts of law or tribunals envisaged in s 34 of the Constitution. 
Although there is room for improvement, it has also been established that 
the CODH is generally constitutionally defensible. 
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(d) Judicial independence does not bear a different meaning for 
military courts 
This study assessed some key authorities on the meaning of judicial 
independence. It found no evidence suggesting that judicial independence 
bears a different meaning for military courts or that the concept is subject to 
limitation. Most importantly, the Constitutional Court of South Africa has 
stated that judicial independence is not subject to limitation. This means 
the fact that military courts are unique would not necessarily result in a 
limited application of principles of judicial independence to those courts. It 
only means that applying principles of judicial independence to military 
courts would, in some cases, be challenging, and that, in certain areas, 
unique measures may need to be adopted to satisfy the requirements of 
judicial independence. Most precedents which shield military courts from 
full application of judicial independence unpersuasively rely on the 
historical uniqueness of military courts, and in some cases on ambiguous 
instruments or constitutional provisions relating to the application of 
principles of judicial independence to military courts. None of those 
authorities suggest a different or parallel meaning of judicial independence 
for military courts. 
 
(e) The interpretive problems of international instruments 
regarding the application of standards of judicial independence 
and fair trial do not affect South African military courts 
The limited regulation of military courts in universal human rights 
instruments has over the years made it possible for those courts to operate 
in ignorance of principles of judicial independence and some fair trial 
standards. It is on that basis that there are moves at the UN to ensure 
specific and universal regulation of military courts.  
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 Nonetheless, this study has found that the interpretative problems in 
universal human rights instruments do not affect South African military 
courts because they are empowered to try both military and criminal 
offences. The interpretative problems referred to above only affect military 
courts with no jurisdiction to try criminal offences over and above military 
offences. The study has also observed that those interpretative problems 
have lost prominence because the relevant treaty and judicial bodies have 
found ways of filling the gaps. Moreover, the Geneva Convention (III) Relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War expects military courts to be 
independent. More importantly, the African Charter is the best authority for 
showing that military courts are subject to principles of judicial 
independence due to its unequivocal language that the States parties ‘[s]hall 
have the duty guarantee the independence of the Courts.’ That language has 
been boosted by the interpretation of the African Commission that 
‘…military courts are required to respect fair trial standards’1 which 
includes the right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal. 
 
8.1.2 Main findings on the primary questions of the study 
Having disposed of the preliminary questions of the study, the main findings 
of the thesis are as follows. 
 
(a) A military judicial office is not institutionalised 
This study has established that a military judicial office is not 
institutionalised because military judges in lower courts are not appointed 
to a judicial office as required. They are rather assigned to act or serve as 
judicial officers. This means that a military judicial office is not guaranteed 
because a judicial function is seen as more of an assignment than an office 
                                                          
1 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Dakar Declaration and 
Recommendations Twenty-sixth Session (1999), para 3 in Christof Heyns (ed.) Human 
Rights in Africa: Vol. 1 586. 
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which is held by the relevant officers. It was noted that this raises questions 
about the status of military judges as judicial officers. 
There is a need to fully institutionalise a military judicial office. This 
must be done by ensuring that military judges are appointed to a military 
judicial office instead of being assigned to act or serve as such. It would help 
enhance the status and independence of military courts because military 
judges would be guaranteed a judicial office. It has been established that a 
majority of the countries surveyed in this study have fully institutionalised a 
military judicial office. 
 
(b) Military courts fail to meet most requirements of judicial 
independence―from the top to the bottom 
Building on the previous research of the author, this study found that 
military courts do not meet most aspects of judicial independence. That 
conclusion applies to all military courts right from the CMA to the CMJ.  
The thesis established that although military judges enjoy some 
degree of security of tenure, the lack of legislative clarity on the renewal of 
military judicial assignments does not help their independence. Assignment 
of judges to serve a two year term may frequently make military judges to be 
too concerned about the renewal of their assignments in the process of 
adjudicating cases. Moreover, a recent case of the Constitutional Court in 
Justice Alliance v The President of the Republic of South Africa suggests that 
renewable terms of appointment are constitutionally questionable. 
While the grounds for removal of judges comply with the requirements 
of judicial independence, the lack of procedure for their removal and the 
involvement of only the AG and the Minister of Defence in removing military 
judges are inconsistent with the requirements of judicial independence. 
Furthermore, the study found that the current system of remuneration of 
military law officers is not suitable for military judges. The financial security 
of these judges is inadequate. Another area of concern is that military courts 
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do not enjoy institutional independence on important administrative aspects 
such as assignment of judges and control over administrative staff assisting 
in the running of the courts.  
What is even more concerning is that the independence of the Court 
(CMA) that is supposed to remedy the flaws from lower military courts is 
questionable because the law does not guarantee the tenure of its members 
and is has also been established that its composition is questionable. Based 
on all those flaws, it has been concluded that a reasonable and informed 
person would not perceive military courts to be independent and impartial. 
Finally, the study has also concluded that the current system of automatic 
military judicial reviews by officers who are not part of the military judiciary 
compromises the dignity and credibility of military courts. 
 
(c) Military courts are almost on a par with magistrates’ courts 
The study compared the CMJ with ordinary magistrates’ courts and the 
CSMJ with regional magistrates’ courts. These courts were compared with 
regard to their jurisdiction and sentencing powers. The result of the 
comparison is that the CMJ compares very closely with ordinary 
magistrates’ courts, and that the CSMJ is almost on a par with regional 
magistrates’ courts. The overall picture presented was that military courts 
compare very closely with magistrates’ courts. The study also found that the 
CMA can be regarded as a court with status similar to that of the High 
Court given its appellate powers within the military court system as recently 
interpreted by the High Court. It has been suggested that these findings 
should be taken into account in structuring the judicial independence of 
future military courts. 
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(d) The independence of military courts should be improved by 
integrating principles of judicial independence into the existing 
military set up 
This study found that there are basically two approaches that could 
be followed in improving the independence of military courts. The first of 
these is that military courts could be integrated into civilian courts thereby 
benefiting from strong measures of judicial independence found in civilian 
courts. The second entails integrating principles of judicial independence 
into the existing set up of military courts – this means keeping military 
courts within the military establishment. After analysing both approaches, 
the latter was recommended as the suitable approach to addressing existing 
challenges of judicial independence of military courts in South Africa. 
 
(e) There is strong movement towards strengthening the judicial 
independence of military courts in the majority of countries studied 
In this study, developments in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and India were considered. Although 
Uganda was referred to in setting the tone for the thesis, it was not 
considered for comparative study for reasons set out in Chapter One. The 
survey conducted shows that in all countries but the United States, strong 
measures have been taken to guarantee the judicial independence of 
military courts. Even though there have not recently been reforms of 
independence of military courts in the United States, several calls have been 
made for such. The movement described above is boosted by efforts at the 
level of the UN to regulate universally military courts. 
Countries which have reformed their military courts have been 
influenced by different factors at different times. In Canada and the United 
Kingdom, the reforms have largely been forced upon the military due to 
successful court challenges on the independence of respective military court 
systems. On the other hand, the reforms in Australia and New Zealand have 
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to large degree been voluntary since there have not been direct judicial 
challenges to reform the independence of military courts, with the exception 
to the challenge in Lane v Morrison with reference to Australia. Having said 
that, it is important to note that, developments in Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and to some extent South Africa, have influenced the need for 
reforms in New Zealand and Australia. At the center of all the reforms is the 
need ensure that military personnel receive a fair trial and to also boost the 
credibility of military justice systems. 
 
8.1.3 Summary of key proposals for the improvement of judicial 
independence of South African military courts 
In Chapter Seven, the study made the following key proposals for the 
improvement of judicial independence of South Africa military courts. 
 
(a) A structure to deal with the military judiciary 
This study has observed that appointment and renewal processes, 
removal processes, determination of salaries and conditions of military 
judges have an impact on the independence of judicial officers. It has 
established that the current processes in relation to South African military 
judges on those aspects do not enhance judicial independence. It therefore 
recommends the establishment of an Independent Military Judicial 
Commission or a similar body that would oversee the appointment and 
renewal processes of military judges, removal processes, and determination 
of their salaries and conditions of service. The details on the structuring and 
composition of such a proposed body have been discussed in Chapter Seven. 
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(b) Tenure of South African military judges should be fixed until the 
age of retirement 
We have noted in Chapter Six that military judicial assignments are 
usually fixed for two years as matter of practice rather than law. Having 
studied the pros and cons of various options on the tenure of military judges 
existing in the countries studied, this study recommends fixing the 
appointment of military judges until the age of retirement which could be set 
at 60 years for reasons set out in Chapter Six. This proposal is in line with 
an emerging trend among some of the progressive countries in this field. The 
appointment should be subject to a probationary period of three years. To 
help reduce the potential of judges wanting to please the command or the 
executive for purposes of securing promotion, military judges should not be 
entitled to promotion or subject to any non-judicial transfer. However, it 
important to re-iterate that there is a policy choice to be made in this area. 
Short to medium term fixed appointments are constitutionally acceptable 
provided that they are not renewable; but there is a clear trend in favour of 
granting tenure until the age of retirement. 
 
(c) Remuneration of military judges should be guided by factors 
which would ensure their financial security 
This study has proposed that the remuneration of military judges 
should be guided by the following factors: the role, status, duties, functions 
and responsibilities of military judges including their unique circumstances; 
the status of military courts within the South African judicial system; the 
role of financial security of military judges in ensuring judicial 
independence; the available resources of the state taking into account the 
prevailing economic conditions; inflation, and the need to attract 
outstanding officers as military judges. 
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(d) Salaries of military judges should be structured along the lines 
of those of magistrates 
Because this study finds that military courts compare very closely 
with magistrates’ courts, it recommends that the salaries of military judges 
be drawn very closely to those of magistrates. It has been suggested that the 
cost for the proposed change would be negligible given the relatively small 
size of the military judiciary as discussed in Chapter Seven. 
 
(e) The procedure for removal of military judges should be spelled 
out in the relevant legislation 
It has been established that the current framework for the removal of 
military judges is sketchy and inadequate. Given that security of tenure is 
the heart of judicial independence, it is imperative that the procedure for 
removal of military judges be reasonably spelled out in the relevant 
legislation. That procedure must involve appropriate functionaries as set out 
in Chapter Six. 
 
(f) The powers of the Adjutant General concerning the 
administration of military courts should be reduced 
In Chapter Six, it was noted that the sweeping powers of the AG on 
the administration of military courts negatively affect their institutional 
independence. That problem can be fixed by scaling down the powers of the 
Adjutant General on the administration of military courts, particularly in 
relation to the assignment of judges, the direction of administrative staff 
concerning military courts and the overall command and control role of the 
AG. Those powers should primarily rest with the Chief Military Judge. The 
study has established that there is a strong trend among countries studied 
in support of the proposed arrangement. Moreover, it has also been 
demonstrated that the general South African court context supports the 
proposed arrangement as a matter of principle. 
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(g) The military character of military courts should be retained 
We have noted that there is an emerging trend among some countries 
to civilianise military courts with the view of addressing challenges of 
institutional independence and impartiality of military judges. In this study, 
that approach has not been supported because military courts are part of 
military capacity in South Africa. Furthermore, there are other challenges 
associated with the civilianisation of military courts discussed in Chapter 
Six. It is therefore recommended that the military character of military 
courts be kept but making significant reforms to the existing framework in 
order to guarantee their judicial independence. At the same time, it is 
acknowledged that there is scope for further debate about partial 
civilianisation of the military court system to the extent that this is not to 
the detriment of the effectiveness of the system.  
 
(h) A standing court of military judicial reviews should be created 
The study has argued that the current system of military judicial 
reviews compromises the dignity and credibility of military courts because it 
involves changing decisions of military courts by a non-court entity. The 
system of reviews should continue but must be conducted by an appropriate 
body. In that connection, it is recommended that a court of military judicial 
reviews must be established to take over the responsibility of the existing 
military judicial review authority. 
 
(i) The Court of Military Appeals should be restructured 
It has been noted have that the CMA sits at the apex of the military 
court system. Furthermore, it has also been established that although that 
Court is more independent than lower military courts, it is not free from 
concerns relating to judicial independence. Its members have no security of 
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tenure, and its status is unclear. This study recommends making that Court 
full-time, and its judges should be appointed for a fixed non-renewable term 
of at least 15 years. The court could generally be modeled on the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Its composition must be 
diverse; and it must be a superior court of record. 
 
8.2 Final remarks about the thesis 
The measures suggested in this study would ensure that South 
African military courts have an acceptable degree of judicial independence. 
Some of the measures suggested are mandatory while others can best be 
described as merely desirable. The suggestions made would not necessarily 
make military courts absolutely independent from the chain of command 
and the executive since that can hardly be achieved in the context of 
military courts. Similarly, absolute independence cannot be achieved in the 
context of civilian courts given the elusive nature of separation of powers 
and judicial independence. The goal therefore should always be one of 
achieving an acceptable degree of independence of military courts by 
ensuring that these courts meet the basic requirements of judicial 
independence.  
The South African military should be pro-active in improving the 
independence of military courts. Failure to do so may lead to changes being 
forced upon the military following litigation or political pressure. The 
changes adopted in 1999 were forced upon the military as a result of 
successful litigation in the Freedom of Expression case. Recently, there has 
been a great deal of political pressure on the military to improve the judicial 
independence of military courts. A pro-active approach would be in the 
interest of the military and everyone involved. In the process of reforming 
the system, it is important to realize that the ‘right’ of the military to be 
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different has been eroded significantly in the past two decades; we have now 
entered the era of the need to be different.2 
 
8.3 Areas for future research 
Although this study was comprehensive in looking at the judicial 
independence of military courts, there are two aspects which must be 
investigated separately. The first is the link between a fair and independent 
military court system and high levels of military discipline. This study has 
made a positive assumption about this question but there is scope for 
research. 
Lastly, more work could be done on the implications of civilianisation 
of the military court system in the modern age, and perhaps attention to the 
prosecutorial and defence roles in military courts. Rowe is on point when he 
observes that the presence of independently-minded and impartial lawyers 
as actors in the process of military courts is an important ingredient to a fair 
trial.3 This means that securing the independence of military judges 
constitutes only one piece of the puzzle. 
 
                                                          
2 See generally Gerry R. Rubin ‘United Kingdom Military Law: Autonomy, Civilianisation, 
Juridification’ 2002 62, 39 Modern Law Review 36 on the two concepts. 
3 Peter Rowe (ed.) The Impact of Human Rights Law on the Armed Forces (2006) 85. 
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